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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,
Supreme Court Case No. 43125
Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,
Respondent.

• I

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the J?istrict Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER

JOSEPH D. McCOLLUM, JR.

JEAN URANGA

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

Date: 6/11/2015

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 10:57 AM

ROA Report
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User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CV-OC-2014-04321 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder
Robert Michael Mena MD vs. Idaho State Board Of Medicine

Robert Michael Mena MD vs. Idaho State Board Of Medicine
Date

Code

User

Judge

3/4/2014

NGOC

CCSWEECE

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Michael McLaughlin

PETN

CCSWEECE

Petition for Judicial Review

Michael McLaughlin

3/18/2014

STMT ·

CCSCOTDL

Statement of Issues for Judical Review

Michael McLaughlin

3/19/2014

ORDR

TCEDWAAM

Order Governing Judicial Review

Michael McLaughlin

HRSC

TCEDWAAM

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
08/14/2014 02:00 PM)

Michael McLaughlin

4/14/2014

NOTC

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Lodging

Michael McLaughlin

4/28/2014

NOTC ,·

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Filing Record On Appeal

Michael McLaughlin

MISC

TCLAFFSD

Certification

Michael McLaughlin

5/19/2014

BREF

TCLAFFSD

Petitioner's Opening Brief On Judicial Review

Michael McLaughlin

6/24/2014

NOTR

CCNELSRF

Notice Of Reassignment

Gerald Schroeder

6/25/2014

CONT

CCNELSRF

Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal
08/14/2014 03:00 PM)

Gerald Schroeder

CCNELSRF

Amended Notice of Hearing 08/14/14@ 3 pm

Gerald Schroeder

6/30/2014

BREF

CCRADTER

Respondent's Brief

Gerald Schroeder

7/17/2014

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Order for Rebriefing

Gerald Schroeder

7/21/2014

HRVC

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 08/14/2014 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated ·

Gerald Schroeder

7/25/2014

BREF.

CCMCLAPM

Petitioners Amended OPening Brief on Judicial
Review

Gerald Schroeder

7/31/2014

MOTN

CCMARTJD

Motion For Extension Of Time

Gerald Schroeder

AFFD.

CCMARTJD

Affidavit Of Jean R. Uranga In Support Of Motion Gerald Schroeder
For Extension Of Time

MOTN·

CCMCLAPM

Motion for Extention of Time

Gerald Schroeder

AFSM

CCMCLAPM

Affidavit of Jean R Uranga In Support Of Motion
for Extention of Time

Gerald Schroeder

8/4/2014

ORDG

CCNELSRF

Order Granting Extension of Time (8/22/14)

Gerald Schroeder

8/20/2014

BREF:

CCMCLAPM

Respondents Amended Brief

Gerald Schroeder

9/11/2014

RPLY

CCHEATJL

Petitioner's Reply Brief On Judicial Review

Gerald Schroeder

10/9/2014

HRSC.

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
11/06/2014 01 :30 PM)

Gerald Schroeder

CCNELSRF

Notice of Hearing

Gerald Schroeder

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 11/06/2014 01 :30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: t. fisher
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 5000
Opinion on Appeal

Gerald Schroeder

8/1/2014

11/6/2014

DCHH'

CCNELSRF

2/12/2015

DEOP.

DCABBOSM

.

Gerald Schroeder
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Robert Michael Mena MD vs. Idaho State Board Of Medicine
Judge

Date

Code

User

2/12/2015

CDIS

CCNELSRF

Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho State Board Of Gerald Schroeder
Medicine,, Defendant; Mena, Robert Michael MD,
Plaintiff. Filing date: 2/12/2015

STAT

CCNELSRF

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Gerald Schroeder

NOTA.

CCJOHNLE

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Gerald Schroeder

APSC

CCJOHNLE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

MOTN

CCJOHNLE

Motion to Stay Pen~ing Appeal

Gerald Schroeder

MEMO

CCJOHNLE

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay
Pending Appeal

Gerald Schroeder

4/3/2015

BREF

CCHOLDKJ

Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Motion to
Stay Pending Appeal

Gerald Schroeder

6/11/2015

NOTc·

TCWEGEKE

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Gerald Schroeder
43125

3/25/2015

- Gerald Schroeder
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MARO~ 201~
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
ByCHAfSTINE BWEl!T

Joseph D. McCollum, Jr., ISB No. 1299
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5235
MlCkAEI.. Mct~UGHUN
Email: jmccollum@hawleytroxell.com

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,

)
)

Petitioner,

CV OC 1 4 0 4 3 21 '

)
)

vs.

Case No.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

)
)

IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,

Filing Fee: $96.00

)
)

Respondent.

)
)

--------------TO:

THE IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE AND ITS ATTORNEYS, AND THE
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Professional licensee, Robert Michael Mena, M.D ..

("Petitioner"), petitions the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho for judicial
review of the "Final Order" ("Order") entered by the Idaho State Board of Medicine ("IBOM"),

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1

000004
45966.0001.6441208.1

in Case No. 2007-BOM-5888. The IBOM's Order from which this Petition for Review is taken
was served by facsimile February 5, 2014.
2.

Petitioner represents that this IBOM action was brought in completing a statutory

process identified and well known as the Disabled Physician Act (DPA), I.C. 54-1831 through
1839, Idaho Code. Petitioner had been requested by the IBOM, through its counsel, to undergo
an examination by an Examining Committee of Idaho licensed physicians. J.C. 54-1833. He
complied with the Committee's requests and the Examining Committee issued its report to the
IBOM. I.C. 54-1834 and 1836. Following its receipt of the Examining Committee's report, the
IBOM purportedly initiated this proceeding under I.C. 54-1836 (c) and J.C. 54-1837.
3.

Petitioner has a right to seek relief from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial

District of Idaho, and the Order described in paragraph 1 above is a reviewable Order ripe for
review under and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84.
4.

This appeal is taken upon matters of law and fact.

5.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5249, the IBOM should have the following records

in its Case No. 207-BOM-5888:
(a)

all notices of proceedings, pleadings, motions, briefs, petitions, and
intermediate rulings;

(b)

evidence received, excluded or considered;

(c)

a statement of matters officially noticed;

(d)

offers of proof and objections and rulings thereon;

(e)

the record prepared by the presiding officer under the provisions of
Section 67-5242, Idaho Code, together with any transcript of that record;

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2
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(f)

staff memoranda or data submitted to the presiding officer or the agency
head in connection with the consideration of the proceeding; and

(g)

any recommended order, preliminary order, final order, and order on
reconsideration.

6.

A hearing was held in August 2013 before a hearing officer designated by the

IBOM. That hearing was reported by a court reporter. Insofar as Petitioner knows, the transcript
of the hearing and the full case record in its Case No. 2007-BOM-5888 is in the possession thte

IBOM.

7.

Statement of the issues on Judicial Review: Judicial Review is requested pursuant

to I.C. 67-5279, and particularly subsections (2) (a) through (d), inclusive, and (3) (a) through
(e), inclusive. Petitioner also specifically represents that the IBOM's action herein substantially
prejudice his substantial rights, thereby complying with the statutory requirements of I.C. 675279 (4).
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(d)(5), Petitioner advises the Court that he
will file separately the required list of issues for judicial review.
8.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Request for Judicial Review is being served on the
reporter who transcribed the hearing.

(b)

That the clerk of the administrative agency has been requested to provide a
fee estimate for the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's
transcript pursuant to Rule 84(n).

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3
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(c)

That the estimated fee, if any, for preparation of the agency's record will
be paid upon receipt of the agency's notifications of the estimated amount.

(d)

That the District Court's filing fee applicable to petitions for review of
final decision from administrative agencies has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 84(e).

9.

Additionally, by way of notice, Petitioner tentatively asserts that he is considering

requesting the Court's permission for leave to present additional evidence pursuant to I.C. 675276 (1). Preceding any such request to the Court, Petitioner currently expects to communicate
with the agency, the IBOM in this case, concerning actions permitted under I.C. 67-5276 (2), and
would foresee doing so prior to the time the agency would be required to prepare and submit the
agency record pursuant to I.C. 67-5275.

DATED THIS~ day of March, 2014.

No. 1299

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4
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•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .1!:Fday of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
Jean Uranga
URANGA & URANGA
714 North 5th Street
P.O. Box 1678
Boise, ID 83701-1678

rnlu.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-mail
D Telecopy

Nancy Kerr, Executive Director
Idaho State Board of Medicine
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0058

@'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-mail
u2f Telecopy

Cathleen M. Morgan
Idaho State Board of Medicine
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0058

[y'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-mail
u}Telecopy
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MAR 1 8 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

Joseph D. McCollum, Jr., ISB No. 1299
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5235
Email: jmccollum@hawleytroxell .com
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,
Petitioner,
vs.
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 1404321
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Robert M. Mena, M.D ., referred to herein as "Petitioner", through his counsel of record,
and pursuant to Rule 84(d)(5), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby states the issues he now
anticipants raising on Judicial Review:
A.

The Idaho Board of Medicine ("IBOM") has violated substantial rights of

Petitioner to his legal detriment and prejudice.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1
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e
B.

The IBOM has violated Section 67-5279(2)(a)- (d), Idaho Code, inclusive, and,

in particular:
1.

This case was initiated by the IBOM by filing a Notice of Hearing

pursuant to the Disabled Physician Act ("DPA") and, specifically, Sections 54-1836(c) and 541837, Idaho Code. Prior to seeking a hearing, the IBOM in communications with Respondent
asserted that Respondent "may have psychiatric issues which impact his ability to practice with
reasonable skill and safety"; the IBOM sought an Examining Committee evaluation with which
Respondent cooperated and in which he participated; after seeking a hearing, the IBOM filed the
Examining Committee Report, which stated, among other supportive provisions that: (a) "We do
not find that requiring a formal Psychiatric evaluation at this time would be helpful", and (b)
"The Examination committee concluded that Dr. Robert Mena can continue his present practice
of medicine with reasonable skill and safety" with continuing medical management
recommendations, with all of which Respondent agreed. Did the IBOM exceed its statutory
authority in utilizing the DPA for the purpose of addressing and considering sanctions and/or
license limitations outside the DPA or not limited to its referral under DPA auspices.
2.

Given its Examining Committee's findings, did the IBOM err in:
a.

Going outside the parameters of the DPA to impose disciplinary

licensure restrictions, denominated as permanent in duration;
b.

Going outside the parameters of the DPA and prior Stipulations

between Respondent and the Board to increase the duration of license restrictions previously
entered into from voluntarily between the parties to permanent restrictions neither agreed to

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2
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previously, litigated in a disciplinary proceeding nor addressed within the noticed scope for this
DPA-based examination, report and purported enforcement action;
c.

Not only finding licensing restrictions based on Medical Practice

Act ("MPA") statutes not found within the DPA, but reporting those restrictions as new
restrictions imposed in this DPA action to the National Practitioners Data Bank ("NPDB"), a
mandatory national registry for disciplinary actions taken by state licensing boards; and reporting
them to the Idaho Board of Pharmacy ("IBOP") which automatically restricted Respondent's
controlled substance registration prescription rights (see, I.C. 37-2718(g)(l) and (2); and
reporting them indirectly to the American Board of Family Medicine ("ABFM"), the specialty
board by which Respondent was previously licensed but from which recertification was being
precluded, Respondent had been informed, by the IBOM's actions; and by transmitting its
decision to all other states in which Respondent was concurrently licensed.
d.

Even seeking a hearing against Respondent under LC. Section 54-

1837(a) in the absence of an Examining Committee "diagnosis" addressing or otherwise
supporting other or further practice restrictions associated with the statutory bases for invoking

DPA jurisdiction;
e.

Ordering permanent license restrictions in the face of the

Examining Committee's recommendations by asserting, without disclosed investigation or
notice, that Respondent has "some level of impairment", adopting language from an attorney
hearing officer, not apparently related to the Examining Committee's Report and only apparently
consistent with the exercise of IBOM discretion extending beyond the parameters of the DPA
under which the case was brought against Respondent;

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3
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e
f.

Referring Respondent to its designated Examining Committee

under the DPA, invoking jurisdictional grounds limited to those found in I.C. Section 541852(a) - (c), while imposing permanent license restrictions on other, including disciplinary
and/or other unrelated grounds.
C.

The IBOM has violated Section 67-5279(3)(a)- (e), Idaho Code, inclusive, and,

in particular:
1.

If this court should find that the IBOM was required to issue an order

under the DPA, or the MPA, by reason of its referral of Respondent to its statutorily authorized
Examining Committee, then Respondent reincorporates the issues, general and specific, raised
under Section B.1. of this Statement.
2.

Given its Examining Committee's findings, did the IBOM err in:
a.

Taking those actions, making those decisions and addressing those

issues, general and specific, raised above under Section B.2. of this Statement.
D.

In conducting its prosecution of this claim pursuant to the DPA, the IBOM,

through its hearing officer, inappropriately precluded Respondent from introducing testimonial
and documentary evidence addressing his ability to practice with skill and safety, by upholding
the IBOM's assertion of an independent right as a licensing agency to rely on Idaho's Peer
Review statute to preclude such documents and proffered testimony to be considered in
Respondent's case; moreover, in the IBOM's rebuttal case, the hearing officer allowed
evaluation and monitoring documents arising out of the continuation of that same prior hospitalbased review and evaluation process to be admitted in evidence against Respondent. The
differentiation, it seems, is that the documents the IBOM was allowed introduce, in rebuttal,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4
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were those submitted to the IBOM by Respondent before this DPA case was initiated and in
response to the IBOM's specific request to him, as his governmental licensor, and in its
regulatory capacity, to address the events behind a particular patient's care. Respondent
respectfully suggests that the IBOM, through its appointed hearing officer erred in his
pervasively exclusionary interpretation of Idaho's Peer Review statutes toward Respondent's
proffered evidence and differentiating interpretation of those statutory guidelines in admitting the
IBOM' s submissions in rebuttal. The Board affirmed its hearing officer's evidentiary rulings.
E.

The IBOM has treated this case since the hearing as a MPA disciplinary case

rather than or in addition to a DPA disability evaluation case, as further evidenced by the
IBOM's "Final Order" enumerated provisions, including sub-parts 5, 7, 8 and 12, particularly the
latter in which the IBOM designated its "Final Order" to be a "public record". This treatment of
issues, under these circumstances, Respondent cites as error constituting an abuse of discretion.
F.

Irrespective of the status of the IBOM' s Orders under Sections B and C above,

did the IBOM exceed its statutory authority under the DPA statutory provisions and described
process by expanding and imposing a license restriction earlier addressed by the parties in an
MPA case. In the prior instance, the parties had negotiated a stipulation several years before,
and later partially rescinded it at Respondent's request, only to have the IBOM re-imposed the
practice restriction in this DPA case by order and make it a permanent Idaho medical license
restriction on Respondent's license albeit arising out of the narrow purview of a DPA action, as
if a disciplinary case, and as to which no notice was provided Respondent of the Board's
regulatory direction. Respondent respectfully suggests that the IBOM erred in its handling of

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 5
45996.0001.6471052.1
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this DPA filing and prosecution under the standards of sub-sections (a) - (e), inclusive, of
Section 67-5279(3), and as referred to in Section C. above.

CONCLUSION
In setting out his issues for anticipated judicial review, Respondent is stating them above
in the context of the scope of review in such matters pursuant to the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act. For his requested relief, Respondent suggests that the Findings and Final Order
of the IBOM be reversed and the disciplinary provisions of the Board's order, particularly subparagraphs 5 and 12, substantively, be deleted as inappropriately ordered in a DPA statutory
proceeding, that the IBOM be instructed to issue a new order without such sub-parts, and that
Respondent not be required to comply with sub-part 8 of its order in view of the IBOM' s
improvident imposition of restrictions and penalties as if the case below were a disciplinary case
under the broader MPA and not a more narrowly designated and limited DPA statutory action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

1'1

J.I ~ay of March, 2014.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

0.

1299
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J.tU:y of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Jean Uranga
URANGA & URANGA
714 North 5th Street
P.O. Box 1678
Boise, ID 83701-1678

0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-mail
0 Telecopy

Nancy Kerr, Executive Director
Idaho State Board of Medicine
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0058

0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-mail
0 Telecopy

Cathleen M. Morgan
Idaho State Board of Medicine
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0058

0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-mail
0 Telecopy
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Jean R. Uranga
URANGA & URANGA
714 North 5th Street
P.O. Box 1678
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (2 08) 342 -8 931
Facsimile: (208) 384-5686
Idaho State Bar No. 1763

APR 2 B2014
CHRISTOPHER O. AICH, Clerk
By STACEY LAFFERTY
oePVTY

Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,

)
)

Petitioner,

)

-vs-

Case No. CV OC 2014 04321

)
)

NOTICE OF FILING RECORD
ON APPEAL

)

IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,)
)

Respondent.

)

________________ )

Pursuant to Idaho Code §67-5275,

the

Idaho State Board of

Medicine, by and through its attorney of record,

Jean R. Uranga,

hereby certifies that a certified copy of the agency record in the
above-entitled action has been transmitted to the Court on April
28, 2014.
1.

The record includes:
Volume I of the transcripts of the administrative hearing

conducted August 12, 2013;
2.

All

pleadings

set

forth

in

the

Docket

of

Pleadings

attached hereto as Exhibit A; and

NOTICE OF FILING RECORD ON APPEAL - 1

000016

3.

All

exhibits

set

forth

in the Exhibit

List

attached

hereto as Exhibit B.
DATED This~

day of April, 2014.
URANGA

&

URANGA

~d~~~

JEAN R. URANGA, OftheFir
Attorneys for the Board

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ;;;;/~ day of April, 2014, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING
RECORD ON APPEAL by depositing a copy thereof in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed to:
Joseph D. Mccollum, Jr.
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
Attorneys at Law
877 W. Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701

NOTICE OF FILING RECORD ON APPEAL - 2
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Jean R. Uranga
URANGA & URANGA
714 North 5th Street
P.O. Box 1678
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-8931
Facsimile: (208) 384-5686
Idaho State Bar No. 1763
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,

)
)

Petitioner,

)

-vs-

Case No. CV

oc

2014-04321

)
DOCKET OF PLEADINGS

)
)

IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,)
)

Respondent.

)

_______________ )
DATE

PLEADING

July 23, 2009

Stipulation and Order

July 27, 2009

Certificate of Service

September 26, 2011

Order Terminating Stipulation and Order

September 27, 2011

Certificate of Service

May 15, 2012

Order Appointing Examining Committee

May 15, 2012

Order for Examination

May 15, 2012

Certificate of Service

July 3, 2012

Certificate of Service

May 21, 2013

Notice of Filing Examining Committee Report

May 21, 2013

Order Appointing Hearing Officer

EXHIBIT
DOCKET OF PLEADINGS - 1
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May 21, 2013

Notice of Hearing.

May 21, 2013

Certificate of Service

June 7, 2013

Notice of Representation

July 9, 2013

Notice of Hearing

July 9, 2013

Certificate of Service

August 6, 2013

Board's Disclosure of Witnesses and
Exhibits

August 19, 2013

Scheduling Order

August 2 6, 2013

Motion Predicated on Review of Idaho's Peer
Review Statute to: (1) Reconsider and
Reverse Admission of Certain Board Exhibits
(#8, #11, #12, and #13), Particularly if
Hearing Officer Continues to Deny Admission
of Respondent's Exhibit #108; (2)
Reconsider and Reverse the Exclusion of
Certain of Respondent's Exhibits (#101,
#102 and #103) and Admit Those Exhibits as
Not Falling Within the Classification of
Peer Review Records; (3) Allow Richard
Lally, M.D. to be Recalled to Testify Concerning Documents not Presented as a Part
of the Hospital Peer Review in Which he
Participated in October, 2007; to Address
Respondent's Exhibits #101-103, Inclusive,
Previously Excluded; and to Discuss, if
Permitted, the Failure of the Hospital's
Peer Review Process to Comply with Bylaw
Standards

August 26, 2013

Memorandum Review of Idaho's Peer Review
Statute and Privilege, and Supporting: (1)
Respondent's Objection to Admissibility of
Board Exhibits 11, 12 & 13; (2) Respondent's
Motion and Request for Reconsideration of
Admission/Rejection Rulings on Exhibits Based
on Hearing Officer's Broad Application of the
Exclusionary Breadth of the Privilege; (3)
Respondent's Motion to
Reconsider the
Proffered Testimony of Dr. Richard Lally,
Excluded Under Peer Review Objections or, if
Denied, an Offer of Proof of Dr. Lally' s
Excluded Testimony; and (4) Respondent's
Motion to Recall Dr.
Mena to Testify
Concerning the Scope of the Board's Exhibit
4, and as to his Personal Conditions and/or
Professional Practices and Decisions not
Excluded From Testimony by a Narrower Application of the Privilege

DOCKET OF PLEADINGS - 2
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August 2 9 t

2013

Board's Reply Brief

September 11, 2013

Order Denying Evidentiary Motions of
Respondent

September 16, 2013

Board's Closing Argument and Brief

October 17, 2013

Respondent's Closing Argument and Brief and
Request to Recommend Dismissal of Proceeding Under I.C. Section 54-4837(3)

October 21, 2013

Board's Reply to Respondent's Closing Brief

November 18, 2013

Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)

Case No. CV OC 1404321
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON
JUDICIAL REVIEW

)

IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,

)
)

Respondent.

)
)

I.
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
This case arises under the "Disabled Physician Act" (hereafter sometimes "DPA"), a
1976 addition to the Idaho Code, S.L. 1976, Ch. 290, codified as Sections 54-1831 to 54-1838
and Section 54-1840. The codification remains little changed in almost 38 years and less
discussed in reported decisions. Through these nine sections, the Idaho Board of Medicine
(hereafter sometimes "IBOM" or "Board") is empowered to assess a physician licensee's
"(a) mental illness," "(b) physical illness" and/or "(c) excessive use or abuse of drugs, including
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alcohol". I.C. Section 54-1832. If the Board, has "reasonable cause to believe" that a licensed
physician is "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients because of a
condition described in section 54-1832," it "shall" cause a committee to examine the physician.
I.C. Section 54-1833. Thereafter, in the usual case, the Board will receive the Examining
Committee's "report and diagnosis," make a "determination of the merits," and assess one of
three specified orders to address the physician's "impairment". I.C. Section 54-1837(c).
In concept, therefore, the DPA sets out a process by which the Board may evaluate a
physician licensee's "inability" caused by the cited illnesses, mental or physical, or addictive
processes. Put differently, the Board is charged with an examination obligation to ascertain
physician disability (a state of being "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and
safety to patients") when that condition is found to be caused by any one or more of the three
cited conditions.
In this case the Board referred Petitioner for examination under the "mental illness"
prong, I.C. Section 54-1832(a), and two of three appointed examiners were psychiatrists. That
occurred mid-June, 2012 and the committee issued its report dated June 29, 2012 (Board's
Hearing Exhibit 8), as required by I.C. Section 54-1836, which the Board could accept or reject
and, in this case, accepted. (Tr. p.4, L. 15-20).
The Examining Committee articulated its statutory charge (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) to
determine Petitioner's "fitness to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients"
and concluded that he met that statutory test. In reaching their unanimous conclusion, the
members also observed that a "formal psychiatric evaluation", which the statute allow them to
request, was then not needed and would not be helpful. The parties essentially agree that the
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DPA provisions through the Examining Committee process and its report to the Board
appropriately and sequentially proceeded as statutorily outlined.
II.

ESSENCE OF PARTIES' SUBSTANTIVE DISPUTE:
The parties are in disagreement not with respect to the preliminary DPA process, but with
the Board's unrestrained interpretation of its statutory powers once it received, as illustrated in
this case, the report of its selected Examining Committee. The Board's compliance monitor
testified, for example, that the Board "accepted" the Examining Committee's recommendations
at its September 2012 board meeting, but it didn't then tell Petitioner. (Tr. p. 36, LL. 15 - 25).
Instead, the Board had its counsel prepare another stipulation and encouraged the physician
licensee to sign it; and if he would not, the process was that "we had to proceed with this
hearing." (Tr. p. 37, LL. 1 - 15, 21 - 23).
On Judicial Review, we are favored with no exhibits proffered by the Board of
documents it drafted as proposed stipulations it pushed on Petitioner and that Petitioner declined
to sign after September 2011, but its staff monitor apparently accepted as routine, and heard
"often", that physicians who had a license "restriction" or "who are being monitored," her staff
role, "were unable to become board certified." (Tr. p. 38, LL. 5-10). What is disturbing, in this
context, is that neither the Board nor its staff appear to differentiate between disciplinary cases
sometimes resulting in licensing restrictions as sanctions and DPA cases in which restrictions, if
any, must be related to a licensee's inability/disability from specific disease/impairment causes
that impede/obstruct/prevent the physician licensee from practicing with "reasonable skill and
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safety to patients by reason of' the three specific categories of disease or aging processes. LC.
Section 54-1832. It's all "discipline" in the Board's mind's eye, and through its staff.
The Board seems to believe that once a physician comes to their attention, irrespective of
the statutory process, he's fair game for imposed "sanctions." That, in essence, is Petitioner's
concern and was his fate in this case. That which was administratively opened as a DPA case,
and went through the Examining Committee process, became on referral back to the Board with
recommendations of fitness to practice no more than another disciplinary opportunity against
someone who would not sign that which the Board told him to sign. From a legal perspective,
the obvious illustration of this Board's pervasive concept that everything is discipline, and all
deserved, is found in the Board's Final Order that does not once refer to the DPA, speaks in
terms of imposing "sanctions" as "necessary upon Respondent's (Dr. Mena's) license to fulfil its
statutory duty" and cites the "purposes" clause of the MPA as the authority for its actions in this,
a clear DPA case.

A.

The Board's Filing of Administrative Proceedings under the DPA and Petitioner's
Principled Objections to the Board's Post-Examining Committee Report Process:
This DPA case was commenced by the Board on or about May 21, 2012, almost 11

months after the appointed Examining Committee issued its report to the Board. At that time
Respondent filed and served a Notice of Hearing, attached a copy of the Examining Committee's
report and cited I.C. Subsection 54-1837(a). For substantive support, the Board cited LC.
Subsection 54-1836(c) and LC. Section 54-1837, both DPA statutory provisions. Petitioner
believes the Board, in acting to notice this matter for hearing, in then prosecuting its DPA case
against Petitioner, and in formulating the restrictive sanctions set forth in its final order exceeded
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its statutory authority under the DPA as outlined by Petitioner in his Statement of Issues on
Judicial Review and in the following sections of his Opening Brief.
In overview, this case on Judicial Review raises fundamental issues of the relationship
and interaction between the structure and functioning of the DPA and its co-interaction, if at all,
with the "Medical Practice Act" (sometimes hereafter referred to the "MPA"). Both these
statutory schemes are administered by and enforced, when needed, through the IBOM, an agency
of the State of Idaho from whose decision Judicial Review is applicable. In its handling of the
matter, Petitioner suggests to this judicial reviewer, the Board violated his substantial rights to
his legal detriment and prejudice in ignoring or deviating from statutory guidelines in
prosecuting the claim below against him and, in particular, imposing "sanctions" against him
inconsistent with the DPA's statutory scheme and outlined process.

III.
FACTS UNDERLYING THE BOARD'S ORDERING A DPA COMMITTEE
EXAMINATION AND EVALUATION:
Historically, the DPA statute has provided a process by which a physician's "inability"
by reason of disability under defined circumstances is assessed for the purposes of protecting
patients. The factual circumstances are unusual in this case, but nonetheless clear in their
presentation to the Board. In early October 2011, the Board received a letter report on hospital
stationery addressed to the Board stating that over five months before Petitioner's hospital
clinical privileges "had been forfeited by him" because he had not completed "required medical
training." (Hearing Ex. 1). Treating this letter as an "adverse clinical action" report, mandating
investigation, the Board asked Petitioner by letter dated October 11 for a "written personal
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response," a "copy of pertinent records" and copies of continuing education credits. (Board's
Ex. 2). Petitioner was given a response deadline of November 8, 2011.
Nearing the response deadline, in part for reasons described below, Petitioner was
scrambling to pull together his written response to the Board's request for data concerning the
alleged "adverse clinical privilege action for not completing required educational training," as
the Board's staff characterized the report it had received. Several unexplained factual gaps
impede cogent analysis of these events preceding the Board's appointment of and referral of
Petitioner to an examining committee authorized by the DPA:

1.

No evidence was presented that the Board had received anything other than the

single page letter, either contemporaneously with it or later, concerning the Jerome hospital's
taking the reported adverse action in April 2011, over 5 months before the IBOM was notified;
nothing besides the single letter was forwarded to Petitioner by the board staff in requesting his
written response and supporting documentation (Tr. p. 109, LL. 14-20; p.22, LC. 10-22).
2.

At the time Petitioner received a copy of the hospital letter report in October

2011, he had not known of the reported adverse action taken the preceding April; moreover, he
did not believe that he even had hospital privileges at that time against which the reported action
against him could have been taken (Tr. p. 109, LL. 20-22) since he had resigned hospital
employment in 2008 (Tr. p. 122, LL. 1-6), had last had a "Courtesy Staff' appointment in
September 2009 on provisional status covering adult admissions (Hearing Ex. 110), and
subsequently, on the expiration of his national board certification in family medicine in late
2009, he lost his eligibility for staff privileges as he was formally notified in January 2010
(Hearing Ex. 111), 21 months before he received the Board's inquiry letter.
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3.

No independent investigative or testimonial evidence was proffered by the Board,

or public record presented by it, that the Jerome hospital had actually taken an adverse clinical
action against Petitioner in 2011, as reporting of that action would have been required, under
federal law, to the National Practitioners Data Bank ("NPDB") within a few weeks of becoming
final. The only testimonial evidence addressing this point was that of Dr. Jonathan Housley,
formerly a resident Jerome physician staff member and, during the time in question, was first a
CPEP "mentor" of Petitioner, then a member on the Jerome hospital's Medical Executive
Committee (MEC) and later an advocate for Petitioner in seeking an unrestricted license. Dr.
Housley also testified both that hospitals are required to report adverse actions to the NPDB and
that he was not aware of any such action or report against Petitioner for the noncompletion of
CPEP educational monitoring, the program specifically mentioned in Ex. 111, concerning which
he had previously been a Petitioner's voluntary mentor.
4.

No evidence was presented that Petitioner had prior knowledge of the reported

adverse clinical action report in April 2011 or between then and October. Nor would it have
made much sense for Petitioner to ask the Board to lift the 2009 two year stipulation in
September 2011 if he knew an adverse action report had been taken against him and would be
submitted to the IBOM in October; more significantly, the Board either found nothing to
substantiate the Jerome letter report, or made no attempt to do as it had no record that it even
contacted the letter's author or the hospital that was reported to have taken the adverse clinical
action (TR. p. 21, LL. 1-13) many months before for which there was also no NPDB
documentation to which the Board as the state licensing agency has preferential access and
through upon NPDB reports are transmitted.
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5.

Thus, by October 2011, some 21 months after his eligibility for staff privileges

had terminated by reason of the expiration of his board certification, Petitioner was being asked
by the Board's staff to access and produce for Board review a confidential patient chart and/or
related historical records pertaining to the reported clinical course and physician action toward a
patient whose care appeared to be of interest to the Board. Almost five years had elapsed from
the December 2006 delivery that gave rise, eventually, to educational recommendations, the
asserted non-completion of one of which was cited as triggering the letter interpreted by the
Board's staff as an adverse action report requiring of Petitioner a written response he was
obviously struggling to create. His wife testified concerning significant family medical issues
with which they were then dealing (Tr. p. 72 - 73) while Petitioner was "trying to meet a
deadline" to submit his written response to the Board; she thought a draft product was
"inadvertently" delivered to the Board. (Tr. p. 73. L. 23 - p. 24, L. 25). The delivered form
reflected assistance from her sister who helped Petitioner pull his notes from her computer as the
deadline approached and he appeared to be under pressure.
Petitioner's delivered response to the Board was typed and contained attachments, but
only the response itself, and a supplemental conclusion, the Board elected to include as proffered
exhibits at hearing. (Hearing Ex. 4, 5). No Board members were called to testify about their
reaction to Petitioner's required response to his licensing agency, but its counsel's representation
at hearing suggested that the letter's form and/or organization "generated a great deal of
concern ... about his mental capacity" and "generated the creation of the examining committee ... "
(Tr., p.6, LL. 4-7;). The board staff investigator (and only witness called to testify by the Board
at hearings) also agreed with the Board's counsel in characterizing the Board as having
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significant concerns at its December 2011 meeting about what Petitioner's written response
"might reflect about his mental health." (Tr. p. 16, LL. 9-11).
However, no testimony was presented by the Board or its staff that the substance of the
requested written response pertaining to clinical events almost five years earlier in Petitioner's
practice involving a particular patient about which the Board had inquired had anything to do
with its subsequent examining committee referral under the DPA. In other words, the Board's
reported reaction to the form of Petitioner's submission was the clear focus, while their
substantive comments about patient care issues, if any at all, were never related by witnesses.
Indeed, when the Board later appointed its DPA Examining Committee, as explained by the staff
compliance employee, "we decided to go with the two psychiatrists because this was
predominately a mental health issue and not a standard of care issue ... " (Tr. p. 32, LL. 22-24).
Nor was there any other evidence suggesting that the Board's referral to an Examining
Committee was made under any statutory basis except the "mental illness" jurisdictional prong
of the DPA, J.C. Section 54-1832 (c).
The single staff witness and the Board's counsel in her opening remarks at hearing
addressed the form, organization and presentation of Petitions better response to the exclusion of
any clinical observations about the 2006 clinical events or 2007 post-event hospital-based
activities associated with educational suggestions/recommendations for Petitioner about which
the Board requested Petitioner to respond in writing. Indeed, as addressed below, The Board,
through counsel not only objected on relevancy grounds to almost every attempt by Petitioner to
bring in background data and clinical history the Board has asked him to respond to in writing,
but also went further in asserting a broad statutory peer review privilege to preclude Petitioner
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and his witnesses from discussing hospital-related educational programs and monitoring arising
out of the 2006 clinical history that precipitated an event chain leading to Petitioner's submission
of his November 2011 written response to the Jerome hospital's letter report.
IV.
EXAMINING COMMITTEE ACTIVITY AND REPORT:

The written response by Petitioner to his licensing board, including all attachments, was
submitted to the Board's selected Examining Committee comprised of one family practice
physician and two psychiatrists. In its report, that Committee identified it as Petitioner's
"Undated response to the Board with attachments," one of eleven documents presented to the
Examining Committee (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) and a part of the information reviewed by the
Committee. Only one of the reviewed documents, the June 14, 2012, letter of Scott Albright,
M.D., Petitioner's treating physician, was submitted at the request of Petitioner.

Although identified as prospective Board witnesses, none of the three Examining
Committee members appointed under DPA auspices and scope testified at Hearing. Nor did
neuropsychologist Craig Beaver whose examination of Petitioner, ordered by or on behalf of the
Examining Committee, testify at Hearing. Thus, the record of the process is supplied by the
Examining Committee's report, dated June 29, 2012 (Hearing Ex. 8). Dr. Albright, was called to
testify by Petitioner. All five of the individuals just mentioned, four of whom were mental health
specialists, found Petitioner to be "fit" for practice from a mental health/illness perspective after
reviewing and focusing on Petitioner's written response to the Board, the triggering DPA referral
factor, interviewing him about it and examining him. All five were unanimous in finding him fit
for the practice he had been performing, and none voiced concerns for patient safety. The panel
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also noted the absence of a pattern of patient complaints. (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 2). Petitioner
acknowledged good patient relations and related his 20 year career history of having no
malpractice claims filed against him.
What, then, did the Examining Committee do in discharging its duties? Clearly, it found
Petitioner "fit" to practice. Secondly, it reviewed and discussed with him his medical history,
considered that history in light of the "mental illness" referral for committee review and found
no reason to express any patient safety concerns associated with Petitioner's practice.
Additionally, it reviewed his treatment and medications for pre-existing conditions not the focus
of the Board's referral. More specifically, it found his use of one prescriptive anxiety
medication, Lexapro, and a sleep aid, CPAP therapy for use during sleep, both appropriate and
well managed by Dr. Albright, Petitioner's treating psychiatrist of several years; significantly, it
drew no causal relationship between the management of these routine medical management
issues and any mental health concerns under the DPA. Committee members and Petitioner
agreed that the medical management of the anxiety and sleep apnea symptoms should continue
and Petitioner represented that he intended to do so, and had done so for several years to his
betterment. Finally, it told the Board that it did not have recommendations concerning
Petitioner's OB care, and did not mention caring for chronic pain management patients, topics of
review not assigned, directly or implicitly, to the Committee by the Board. There has never been
a dispute about the Examining Committee doing its duty and filing its report.
We know from the Board's one witness, confirmed by the Board's attorney, that it
accepted the recommendations of its appointed Examining Committee. In view of that
administrative fact, and the fact the Board in its Final Order "acted to adopt the Recommended
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Findings in toto" (Final Order, p. 1), reviewing some of the hearing officer's findings is both
illustrative and telling concerning the Board's view of its statutory role.
The hearing officer below misperceived Petitioner's argument. Petitioner is not
suggesting that the Examining Committee was required to find a "newly diagnosed
issue ... before the Board can take action." (Recommended Findings, p. 9). Rather, concerning
those pre-existing conditions for which Petitioner was then, and before and after, being treated,
there was nothing giving rise to a fitness impairment caused by mental health issues on which the
Examining Committee was tasked to focus. Or, in the language of the statute, the Examining
Committee could not say it was "because of a condition", addressing Petitioner's pre-existing
medical conditions, that he was "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to
patients." (LC. Section 54-1833). Only if it had fist found that Petitioner were "unfit", would it
have been required to more narrowly bring its findings within DPA statutory parameters by next
tying that finding of unfitness to be "because of', in this case, "mental illness" (LC. Section 541832). There was no need to reach that step.
The hearing officer also perceived Petitioner to be arguing that the Examining Committee
findings "preclude a hearing,"; he found to the contrary, asserting the appropriateness of Board
action prior to the DPA referral. Again, the hearing officer does not display an appreciation of
the statutory niche filled by the DPA; nor, we submit, does the Board itself as illustrated in its
approach to every case as if each is a matter of discipline even if by fact and process the case is a
matter of disability.
Under the DPA, the Examining Committee plays a significant role, and mandatory one at
that, in the evaluation process. This is particularly true, Petitioner respectfully submits, in
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addressing Board referrals involving mental health/illness issues which usually require special
expertise to appropriately evaluate. The Board initially recognized that in placing two
psychiatrists on its three physician Examining Committee to address its mental health concerns
triggered by its members visceral reaction to the form and organization of Petitioner's November
2011 written response to the Board's request for clinical information and documentation. Upon
later receiving its Examining Committee's advisory report, the Board had the right to "accept or
reject the recommendation" of it, Examining Committee "to permit a physician to continue to
practice with or without any restriction on his license to practice medicine." (I.C. Section 541836(b)). Here the Board accepted the report, or so we're told.
Yet the Committee recommended no "restriction" on Petitioner's license as it confirmed
his fitness to practice. Had it found a causal fitness issue, particularly if tied to a factor falling
within its mental health expertise, it was authorized to recommend a license restriction, if not
suspension during the period of impairment, or even license revocation. The Examining
Committee did not find a "fitness to practice" issue of import and recommended none of the
available license-restricting actions suggesting a need to protect patients from a risk associated
with Petitioner's mental fitness to practice. Rather, the Examining Committee reviewed the
panoply of data available to it, felt comfortable with the prior diagnoses and ongoing treatment
Petitioner was undertaking and recommended that his current care continue, adding only a
reevaluation in two years.
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v.
EVALUATION OF THE BOARD'S ADJUDICATIVE ROLE IN THIS DPA CASE:
It would appear the Board Improperly used the report and failed to continue the DPA

process. Its single live witness suggested that it did not share the report with Petitioner. Rather,
it put together a proposed stipulation to monitor his conduct which he preferred not signing.
When he declined to sign it, they invited him to appear before the Board to tell it why he
wouldn't sign the Board's stipulation. He did so. The Board sent him yet another stipulation
which he declined to sign. So, as the witness explained, the Board brought this case as a
compliance matter. And, in its Final Order after a hearing, the Board "deemed sanctions were
necessary upon Respondent's License to fulfill its statutory duties." (Final Order, p. 3). One of
those "sanctions" then imposed was a standard of practice restriction: "5. Respondent shall
permanently cease from practicing obstetrics and chronic pain management." (Final Order, p. 3).
The Board cited the MPA's enforcement powers to "protect Idaho's public health, safety and
welfare" through licensing, regulation and enforcement of standards of physicians. In short, the
Board put on its disciplinary hat and imposed its disciplinary will, sanctioning Petitioner, it
would appear, for not accepting whatever the board had wanted to impose, of whatever duration,
and for whatever unstated reason outside DPA parameters.
Focusing back on the DPA's provisions, and its 38 year history, it seems reasonable to
assume that there has been little controversy raised by referring a physician with "inability ... to
practice medicine" (I.C. Section 54-1832) due to illness, mental or physical, or deterioration by
aging or drug/alcohol use and impairment In such instances the Board must only have a
"reasonable cause to believe" that an Idaho licensed physician is "unable" to practice for these
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reasons to warrant the mandatory examination. (LC. Section 54-1833. And in the usual case, a
physician, in facing such a referral, may "request a restriction of his license to practice medicine
(I.C. Section 54-1835) to avoid the hearing while still qualifying for the reinstatement process
"under this act," referring to the DPA. (I.C. Section 54-1838).
But this is not the usual case. Petitioner was referred to the Examining Panel not because
his medical history or a clinical report but because of something he wrote, purportedly in draft
form, but then submitted to the Board in response to meeting his licensing agency's imposed
submission deadline. And, probably unlike most of the obvious cases, the Examining Committee
found no reason for disqualification by reason of "fitness" to practice. After all, Petitioner
essentially agreed with the Committee that he was "fit" to practice as he had been doing, and
agreed with the continuing care he had been obtaining from his attending psychiatrist. What it
appears the Board did for several months after its Committee's report was delivered was to
attempt to persuade or coerce Petitioner to voluntarily accept a license restriction as part of a
monitoring/disciplinary process. Unfortunately, we don't know what it was thinking or what
proposed stipulations it presented to Petitioner because it neither tendered any into evidence nor
offered any transparency by producing Board witnesses or executive staff to explain its interval
actions.
What we do know is that the Board's counsel asserted, its only witness supported, the
· hearing officer bought and the Board then affirmed by Final Order a process whereby the Board,
in a pure DPA case, may "accept" but still ignore its Examining Committee's recommendations;
and, in switching to its disciplinary role, the Board approved its right to demand Petitioner's
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compliance, or else, as if the case were a disciplinary matter from the inception, and as to which
it asserted entitlement to apply disciplinary sanctions.
And so it did. The DPA is integrated as a distinct act for considering and resolving
situations arising from the "disability" rather than the "disciplinary" side of the Board's
regulatory responsibilities. Petitioner is not suggesting that the Board was bound to what its
Examining Committee recommended; rather the Board may not ignore the constraints of the
DPA and transmute a case following Examining Committee review to a purely disciplinary one.
In particular, the Examining Committee is charged with reporting the physician's fitness

"by reason of' the Section 54-1832 factors. As to any related impairment, the Examining
Committee "shall report" to the Board "as to the fitness of the physician to engage in the practice
of medicine ... , either on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management the committee
may recommend." (I.C. Section 54-1836(a). The Board's statutory role is somewhat different.
In addition to addressing a "restriction" or not under the statutory parameters, the Board may
also impose the more severe sanctions of suspension or revocation, but not as a disciplinary
sanction. With respect to its authority to "suspend" or "restrict" a license under the DPA, the
Board may only do so "for the duration of his impairment" (LC. Section 54-1837(c)(2) within
the statutory parameters of the DPA.
There is nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to impose "sanctions" for disability
or impairment. There is nothing in the DPA that empowers the Board to impose restrictions that
last "permanently," or for life or for any extended duration beyond a licensee's "duration of
impairment". As pointed out above, there is also nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to
impose restrictions for conditions not causally related to those categories specified in the DPA.
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Moreover, there is nothing in either the language, the history, the concept or the spirit of the
DPA that the Board has the authority in a DPA case to impose restrictions for typical standard of
care violations, practice deviations or disciplinary transgressions. Finally, there is no authority
granted or implied in the DPA for the imposition of permanent restrictions on practice, of "OB
and chronic pain management" which were not referred to the Examining Committee under the
DPA referral standards, were not addressed by the Examining Committee as relevant to their
review. Nor could such a restriction have been easily addressed by the Board under DPA criteria
and on which the Board did not submit evidence at hearing while precluding Petitioner from
doing so.
VI.
THE BOARD'S RULING HAS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
The Board's sole witness testified that a license "restriction" imposition by the Board
would prevent a licensee to qualify for specialty board certification (Tr. p. LL. 4 - 12).
Petitioner first took and passed his specialty board in 1996 in family practice medicine. The
certificate was issued by the American Board of Family Medicine (ABFM), certifying his having
achieved a standard of knowledge and experience of professional and personal importance. He
also recertified on his first examination. (Tr. p. 95). He moved to Idaho and received his Idaho
medical license in 2002 (tr. p. 94- 95). As mentioned previously, the Jerome hospital bylaws
required physician staff members to be board certified to retain staff privileges. Although not
directly at issue in this DPA case, hanging over Petitioner is the shadowy prospect of reclaiming
eligibility for specialty board diplomat status. An abbreviated summary is found in an exchange
of emails between Petitioner and the ABFM representative (Hearing Ex. 119, p. 1). By a two
year monitoring stipulation he signed in early 2009, his license was restricted, and, as a result,
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Petitioner was unable to sit again for recertification in late 2009, leading to his exclusion from
the Jerome hospital medical staff in January 2010 (Hearing Ex. 111).
In seeking to regain his eligibility to recertify in his practice specialty, Petitioner, when
the two year 2009 stipulation had reached its stated duration, he asked the Board that it be
administratively terminated, and the Board did so, replacing it with another that, in the language
of the ABFM credential coordinator, "it appeared that you were released from any and all terms
of that prior agreement, thus reinstating your medical license to a full and unrestricted status".
He was delighted and, indeed, applied to sit for the examination, paid his fees, and took the
examine in the spring of 2012. However, the ABFM, in reviewing his status found that the Idaho
Board's replacement stipulation referred to one paragraph of the prior agreement between the
Board and its licensee that had not been terminated; therefore, the ABFM concluded that his
state-imposed "restriction" remained, avoiding his efforts, but leaving him still board eligible.
As the ABFM representative summarized, choosing to not perform OB, or not treat pain patients
was not disqualifying, but having those restrictions/conditions placed on a medical license, his in
this case, made him ineligible to sit for a recertification examination. The IBOM uses the
leverage of "restriction" with its monitoring (Hearing Ex. 3), even if practicing clinicians most
familiar with the licensee may think a license restriction may not be clinically warranted
(Hearing Ex. 122, 123). As Dr. Lorraine Tangen testified, she, too, has quit doing obstetrics, she
was aware of Petitioner's several educational courses, believes him to be a much better
physician, improving his fitness to practice since completing them, once treated him for CPAP,
treated his family and, significantly, opined in November 2011 that Petitioner ought not have an
imposed license restriction (Tr. pp. 100 - 104).
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What is somewhat mysterious is that from the Board's staff monitor, testimony was
elicited that at its September 2012 board meeting, not only did the Board "accept" the Examining
Committee's recommendations, but also offered Petitioner a "voluntary stipulation to
incorporate" the recommendations of the Examining Committee (Tr. p. 19, LL. 11-14, 15 - 20).
Then, in asking Respondent to appear before the Board, the witness was asked and agreed that
the Board did "still vote to ask him to voluntarily restrict his practice" which he refused (Tr. p.

20, LL. 4 - 9). If, indeed, the Board was giving Petitioner the right to free himself from the 2009
restriction by agreeing to a no strings attached recommendation consistent with the Examining
Committee's recommendation, why didn't the Board offer into evidence those proposals made to
Petitioner while he was not represented by counsel? And how does that contrast to the Board's
objecting and successfully keeping out Petitioner's offer of its marked hearing exhibit 117
conveying a to his former counsel a very restrictive stipulation proposal? And why would
counsel press, unsuccessfully, in November 2012 an unrepresented Petitioner to sign an early
Board stipulation (Hearing Ex. 118, letter only) when Petitioner had been looking for the
opportunity to voluntarily withdraw from certain aspects of his earlier practice for personal
reasons unrestrained by state-based but ABFM accepted non-eligibility restrictions?
While there may be circumstances when, for disciplinary reason, a physician should be
precluded from attaining additional educational experiences or specialty certifications, even
though I personally, and Petitioner, may find that hard to understand. In even fewer cases, it
would seem, a license restriction should be imposed in a disability case unless the reason for the
disability raises safety and/or fitness issues. No such restrictions were recommended by the
Examining Committee. The Board, for reasons unexplained but perhaps based on an unknown
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history with Petitioner's serial requests for its lifting an earlier restriction, the Board has now
specifically and purposefully imposed "permanent" practice restrictions as "sanctions", cited a
statute not a part of the DPA as authority and ensured that this physician would have a license
restriction of record purportedly arising out of a disability act application.
Additionally, there is one matter not covered by the record of this case below but
followed shortly thereafter and prejudices Petitioner. This court is referred to the Idaho Uniform
Controlled Substances Act, Section 37-2718(g) which allows the Idaho Board of Pharmacy to
issue without a hearing a restriction upon a physician registrant's controlled substance
registration consistent with that of a state licensing board for that registrant. Petitioner represents
that his controlled substance registration was restricted to not allow him to prescribe to OB
patients or chronic pain patients. Thus, if covering in a rural hospital ER or an urgent care clinic
situation, a patient should present who happens to be injured, but is also pregnant and/or has
chronic pain issues, Petitioner may be constrained in appropriately treating that patient on an
emergent basis by reason of the IBOM's permanently imposed restriction and that Final Order's
impact on Petitioner's controlled substance license. And, for reasons unknown, the IBOM
waited until 2014 to notify the IBOP under a 1971 law of his now imposed "permanent" license
restrictions as "sanctions" automatically carrying over to his controlled substance registration.

VII.
THE HEARING BELOW WAS CLOUDED BY THE BOARD'S PERVASIVE
ASSERTION OF IDAHO'S PEER REVIEW STATUTE
As related above in more detail, in response to a purported "adverse clinical action" taken
by the Jerome hospital in April 2011, but not received by the Board until October, the Board
asked Petitioner for clinical records and his written explanation of what occurred. At hearing,
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Petitioner was prepared to produce documents and call witnesses to address the events about
which he was asked. In summary, much of his proposed testimony through Drs. Lally, Tangen,
Housley and himself was prepared to describe the underlying clinical events of December 2006,
an early 2007 hospital Fair Review Panel hearing, and later educational/training courses and
related activities. A substantial component of this planned and/or proffered evidence was
excluded by the hearing officer in upholding the Board's comprehensive assertion of Idaho's
Peer Review privilege. Petitioner was narrowly permitted to show that after the obstetrical event
in question, his hospital privileges were suspended for 60 days on 2/22/2007 (Hearing Ex. 104)
but reinstated less than a month later on 3/20/2007 (Hearing Ex. 105). He was also allowed to
submit a neuropsychological report by Dr. Beaver to the hospital that Petitioner underwent on
8/8/2007 as the hospital's request (Hearing Ex. 107) which provided a nice baseline for the
Beaver evaluation five years later and available to the Board's Examining Committee (Hearing
Ex. 9).
We will not here repeat the extensive briefing previously filed with the hearing officer.
In essence, after a substantial portion of Petitioner's potential documentary case and much of his
prospective witnesses testimony was excluded, the Board, on rebuttal, moved for admission of
three stacks of documents as "rebuttal" records, several of which appeared to be some of those
which Petitioner had attached to his written response, denuded of which had been previously
admitted (Hearing Ex. 4). What was sauce for the goose (in keeping out Petitioner's records on
peer review grounds) apparently wasn't good enough for the gander (in admitting similar timelined documents by the Board as rebuttal). The difference, that Petitioner gave most of them to
the Board and were thus fair game, sounded hollow in view of the compulsion and deadline the
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Board had imposed on him to get to it "pertinent records" of the clinical events of almost five
years before, and those of subsequent in-hospital educational monitoring and related
developments. Recognizing the breadth of Idaho's peer view statute, the concept of some equalhandedness in its application seemed reasonable in a case in which the Board did absolutely
nothing to obtain hospital records and/or otherwise learn the facts about the circumstances under
which, in the end, it saw fit to impose permanent restrictions on Petitioner's license as an
disciplinary sanction arising out of events it in large part refused to consider or allow the hearing
officer to review.
For purposes of making a record, Petitioner hereby incorporates his arguments filed in a
Memorandum dated August 22, 2013, particularly pages 8-16, concerning the request of
Petitioner to have his submissions and those of the Boards be judged by similarly fair standards
in applying Idaho's complex, and broad, statutory peer review concepts. In that context,
Petitioner asserts that the hearing officer, and the confirming Board, erred in sustaining the
Board's peer review privilege claims against Petitioner's proffered exhibits and testimony and in
admitting the Board's rebuttal exhibits. In retrospect, however, the narrowed review serves to
emphasize that this case was a DPA matter, not a disciplinary review of a reported "adverse
clinical action" either in 2011 or in 2006. And the focus of this case, in view of the subsequent
Final Order, is on the Board's exercise and abuse of the DPA in its imposition of permanent
"sanctions" against Petitioner to his significant professional detriment.

PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON JUDICIAL REVIEW - 22

000048 l
45996.0001.6639077.

•

•
VIII.
CONCLUSION:

For the reasons discussed above, and consistent with the statutory guidelines governing
Judicial Review, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's imposition of
sanctions against Petitioner under the Disabled Physician Act, and particularly the sanction of
license restriction, item 5 in its enumerated Final Order. Moreover, the Board should be
instructed to dismiss the DPA proceedings per the last cited alternative stated in I.C. 54-1837(b)
due to grounds for the other alternative findings not found to exist.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ~ a y of May, 2014.
EY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This case is an appeal of a Final Order issued by the Idaho State Board of Medicine
placing restrictions on Dr. Mena's license and awarding costs and attorney's fees.
Course of the Proceedings

By Order dated May 14, 2012, the Idaho State Board of Medicine instituted proceedings
involving Dr. Mena under the Disabled Physician Act. The Examining Committee met with Dr.
Mena on June 13, 2012. The Examining Committee issued a report June 29, 2012, which was
accepted by the Board at their December, 2012 Board meeting. Since Dr. Mena was unwilling to
stipulate to voluntary restrictions, he was invited to personally appear at the March 1, 2013,
Board meeting, which Dr. Mena personally attended with his attorney. The Board again voted to
accept the Examining Committee report. Dr. Mena was still unwilling to voluntarily agree to
follow the recommendations and a hearing was scheduled for July 10, 2013. Following the
hearing, the Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
November 14, 2013. The Board issued its Final Order January 7, 2014.
Statement of Facts

Dr. Mena is a family practice physician who was first licensed by the Idaho State Board
of Medicine on September 13, 2003. He practices in Jerome, Idaho.

- 1-

000056

In 2007 and 2008, Dr. Mena went through various evaluations due to problems which
arose at St. Benedict's Hospital in Jerome, Idaho and which were also reviewed by the Board of
Medicine.
Dr. Mena was evaluated at the Betty Ford Center from February 28, 2007 to March 1,
2007. The Betty Ford records are included in Exhibit 11, pp. 12-106. Concerns regarding Dr.
Mena related to slurred speech, tired or depressed affect, inattentiveness and complaints about
inadequate record keeping, late dictations and possible inadequate medical care. (Exhibit 11, p.
12.)

During the Betty Ford evaluation, Dr. Mena conceded that he had "difficulties with

authorities" which had precipitated moves from prior positions in Provo, Utah; Washington
State; and Vermont. (Exhibit 11, p. 28.) During the Betty Ford evaluation, they did a complete
evaluation of Dr. Mena' s cognitive capabilities through use of a MicroCog Assessment. The
entire results of that assessment are found at Exhibit 11, pp. 58-106.

The psychologist

administering the MicroCog Assessment of Cognitive Functioning noted that Dr. Mena took an
unusually long period of time to complete the tests and many of his scores fell in the low range.
The evaluator stated: "Using norms for licensed professionals with this instrument, Dr. Mena's
scores show significantly compromised cognitive functioning and further testing is indicated".
(Exhibit 11, p. 42.) Another evaluator noted:
Using norms established for licensed professionals, Dr.
Mena's scores indicate that he is currently functioning
significantly below professional standards and further
neuropsychological testing is recommended. (Exhibit 11, p.
50.)
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In the final Integrated Clinical Summary, while Betty Ford found no substance abuse
problems, they did diagnose Dr. Mena with obsessive compulsive disorder, a nonspecific
personality disorder with negativistic, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic traits. (Exhibit 11,
p. 56.) At the time of the Betty Ford evaluation, Dr. Mena had no ongoing psychotherapy or
psychiatric care. The Betty Ford Center expressed the following opinion:
In the opinion of the CDE Team, Robert M. Mena, M.D., is
not currently fit to practice medicine. His suitability for
returning to work should not be reassessed until after he has,
(1) completed residential treatment as outlined above, (2)
been discharged with staff approval, (3) is currently
functioning cognitively within professional standards, (4)
enrolled in therapeutic monitoring programs directed by the
Idaho Medical Board Physician Recovery Network. (Exhibit
11, p. 57.)
On August 1, 2007, the Colorado Physician Health Program referred Dr. Mena to Dr.
Craig Beaver in Boise for neuropsychological testing. The case summary from CPHP is found in
Exhibit 11, pp. 3-11.

The CPHP evaluation notes the concerns raised by the MicroCog

Assessment of Cognitive Functioning. (Exhibit 11, p. 4.) That same page notes that Dr. Mena
had a history of depressive disorder and he had recently begun treatment for anxiety disorder as
well as sleep disorder.

It was noted Dr. Mena did meet diagnostic criteria for depressive

disorder. (Exhibit 11, p. 5.) The report supported Dr. Mena's return to work in a clinic-based
setting with a caveat that his work be supervised in some way and with a recommendation that
Dr. Mena refrain from hospital work. (Exhibit 11, p. 6.)
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In order to evaluate clinical skills, Dr. Mena submitted to a Physician Assessment and
Clinical Education Program (PACE), with those evaluations occurring December 20-21, 2007
and February 4-8, 2008. The PACE evaluation results are included as Exhibit 12. On Page 3 of
Exhibit 12, PACE again noted Dr. Mena' s below average performance on processing speed,
general cognitive proficiency, reasoning/calculation, memory, spatial processing and general
cognitive functioning.

PACE reported that they did not observe any behaviors indicating

cognitive impairment. The evaluation noted relative weakness on the use of opioids. (Exhibit
12, p. 4.) The oral obstetrics examination found numerous deficiencies in Dr. Mena's knowledge
base and approach to treatment. (Exhibit 12, p. 7.) The conclusion found adequate performance
in family practice, but stated:
The oral exam administered by Dr. Gin revealed significant
deficiencies in Dr. Mena's approach to obstetrics. Due to the
deficiencies, Dr. Mena should either discontinue his
involvement in obstetrics or pursue an intensive hands-on
training course or a fellowship program as a means to update
his knowledge base. (Exhibit 12, p. 8.)
Dr. Mena apparently attempted to question the recommendations of the PACE Program and sent
a series of emails to the PACE Program. In a letter dated October 3, 2008, the PACE Program
notified Dr. Mena that they would not accept any more emails, faxes, letters or phone calls from
him and that his file would be closed. (Exhibit 12, pp. 9-10.)
Finally, Dr. Mena completed a Center for Personalized Education for Physician
Evaluation at CPEP in Denver, Colorado. (Exhibit 13.) The Assessment was done November
10-11, 2008. (Exhibit 13, p. 5.) The CPEP Assessment Summary begins in Exhibit 13 at Page

-4-

000059

32.

With respect to medical knowledge, the report found Dr. Mena demonstrated medical

knowledge that varied from adequate to poor and his knowledge of obstetrical topics lacked
adequate depth overall. (Exhibit 13, p. 33.) The CPEP evaluation found his knowledge was
adequate in family medicine, but in obstetrics, his clinical judgment and reasoning overall was
varied and concerning. (Exhibit 13, p. 36.) CPEP recommended:
Should Dr. Mena return to obstetrical care, he should
participate in a clinical experience to provide the necessary
supervision required as he addresses the areas of
demonstrated need for obstetrical care. Dr. Mena should
initially have 100% direct supervision in the inpatient
obstetrical care setting as well as retrospective chart review
in the last trimester to determine relevant issues related to
delivery. (Exhibit 13, p. 38.)
On June 23, 2009, Dr. Mena signed a Stipulation and Order with the Board of Medicine
related to Dr. Mena' s training and ability to perform certain medical procedures, including
obstetrics and treat chronic pain. (Paragraph II.) In Paragraphs VI(b) and VII of the Stipulation
and Order, Dr. Mena stipulated to a permanent restriction on performing obstetrics and treating
chronic pain patients. He also agreed to limit his work hours and continue in treatment with a
Board approved counselor and psychiatrist and agreed to follow their recommendations.
On September 26, 2011, an Order Terminating Stipulation and Order was signed by the
Board chair. That Order was mailed to Dr. Mena on September 27, 2011. On October 13, 2011,
a letter was sent to Dr. Mena reminding him of the permanent restriction on obstetrics. (Exhibit
3.) The letter did not refer to the permanent restriction on chronic pain treatment but that is
included in Dr. Mena's Stipulation and agreement with the Board.
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Within a few days of termination of the Stipulation and Order, on October 3, 2011, the
Board received a notice from St. Benedicts Family Medical Center that they had taken an adverse
clinical privilege action involving Dr. Mena. Pursuant to Idaho Code §39-1393, hospitals are
required to report adverse actions to the Board of Medicine. That letter was admitted as Exhibit
1 and notes that Dr. Mena had agreed to obtain additional training before he exercised any
privileges and he failed to receive the training so his medical staff membership was forfeited.
There is no explanation for why the hospital delayed reporting the adverse action which was
taken April 15, 2011.
Upon receipt of that letter from the hospital, the Board staff initiated an investigation and
wrote to Dr. Mena for an explanation. (Exhibit 2.) The letter noted that the adverse clinical
privilege action indicated he had not completed required educational training.
The Board staff received an undated written response from Dr. Mena which was admitted
as Exhibit 4. A review of that letter indicates that it is disjointed, tangential and irrational.
During the hearing, Dr. Mena admitted that the letter was concerning and tried to explain that it
should have never been sent. (Tr., p. 137, ls. 2-18 and p. 138, ls. 14-25.) He acknowledged
staying up all night to polish the drafts. (Tr., p. 138, ls. 19-20.)
However, in an email sent later on November 15, 2011, Dr. Mena provided the Board
investigator with a one page Conclusion to be annexed to his prior response. (Exhibit 5.) That
Conclusion is still as disjointed, tangential and irrational as Exhibit 4.
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The Board reviewed Dr. Mena's responses at the December, 2011 Board meeting. Given
Dr. Mena' s psychiatric history and cognitive difficulties as noted in the prior evaluations, the
Board was particularly disturbed by and concerned about Dr. Mena' s responses. The Board
instructed the staff to institute Disabled Physician Act proceedings to review Dr. Mena's ability
to practice with reasonable skill and safety.
In an email dated December 29, 2011, Dr. Mena advised the Board attorney that he would
never be allowed to be Board certified in family practice because of the fact that he agreed to
permanently restrict obstetrics in 2009. (Exhibit 6.) At the hearing, Dr. Mena testified that the
American Board of Family Practice mistakenly allowed him to take the Board certification exam
in April, 2013 and he failed that exam by a very large margin. (Tr., p. 150, ls. 10-19; p. 65, ls.
21-25; and p. 96, ls. 5-22.)
In Orders dated May 14, 2012, the Board created an Examining Committee pursuant to
the Disabled Physician Act and ordered Dr. Mena to appear for an examination.

That

Examination Committee consisted of Dr. Jeffrey Berlant, a psychiatrist; Dr. Martin Gabica, a
family practice physician; and Dr. Ronald Larsen, a psychiatrist. The Examining Committee
met with Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012.
They issued their report June 29, 2012 which was admitted as Exhibit 8. That report lists
the records that the Examining Committee reviewed, including Exhibits 11, 12 and 13. The
report indicates that the Examining Committee met with Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012 for 90
minutes. The report states:
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Dr. Mena provided a verbal summary of the events that led to
Board's involvement. He revealed that he has benefitted
from treatment for Depression and Anxiety. He stated that
he is under Psychiatric care and plans to continue with that
care. Treatment for Sleep Apnea has also addressed past
concerns about "slurred speech" and "tiredness".
A review of prior examinations revealed that Robert has been
found to have Obsessive - Compulsive and Narcissistic
personality traits. There is also evidence for deficits in
Cognitive processing
speed
demonstrated on
Neuropsychological testing. The PACE evaluation revealed
deficits in Obstetrics knowledge. These findings, as well as
past concerns about chart completion, were discussed with
Dr. Mena. He admitted that he signed and submitted a
version of the "Undated response to the Board" without
reading its contents.
Based upon their review of the reports and their meeting with Dr. Mena, the Examining
Committee issued the following recommendation:
The Examination committee concluded that Dr. Robert Mena
can continue his present practice of medicine with reasonable
skill and safety, with required management including:
Repeat Neuropsychological testing by Dr. Craig Beaver
Continued outpatient Psychiatric care
Reevaluation in two years, with continuing Board
oversight
Consistent with the recommendation of the Examining Committee, on September 10,
2012, Dr. Mena completed a neuropsychological examination by Dr. Craig Beaver. A detailed
report prepared by Dr. Beaver was admitted as Exhibit 9. Dr. Beaver conducted a variety of
psychological tests. His report reviewed the prior Betty Ford evaluation, PACE evaluation and
CPEP evaluation.

Dr. Beaver reported that Dr. Mena was currently on Lexapro and was
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continuing in counseling. (Exhibit 9, p. 5.) On Page 7 of his report, Dr. Beaver noted that Dr.
Mena's memory functioning had significantly dropped from Dr. Beaver's prior testing. (Exhibit
9, pp. 7 and 8.)

Dr. Beaver confirmed the obsessive compulsive disorder and continuing

narcissistic personality traits together with sleep apnea. Dr. Beaver made the following
recommendations:
2.

In considering further care and treatment, I would recommend the
following:
a.

Dr. Mena continues to need to follow medical
recommendations with regard to his sleep apnea. For
example, continued use of the CPAP machine if
indicated.

b.

Dr. Mena is currently on a low dose of Lexapro
which his psychotherapist and he have noted to be
beneficial. I would defer to Dr. Albright as to his
continuing need for medication.

c.

Dr. Mena reports his psychotherapy experiences have
been positive, and he is dealing well with his
stressors and has learned much from his experience.
This occurs within the context of him having a
significantly reduced level of practice for a variety of
reasons. I still have concern that if Dr. Mena enters a
fast-paced clinical practice, for example in a move to
Kellogg, some of the issues or concerns previously
involving Dr. Mena could potentially arise again.
Therefore, I would recommend if Dr. Mena is transferring to a new work situation, such as the clinic in
Kellogg, he be required to be involved with
individual psychotherapy on a regular basis during
the first six months of entry into that job
circumstance. Further, that there be good
communication between prior mental health
evaluators or treatment professionals that have been
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involved with Dr. Mena and whoever provides those
services to him.
This would allow continued
monitoring and support for Dr. Mena as it relates to
some of the interpersonal and personality dynamics
that appear to have contributing to his prior
difficulties.
3.

In regards to fitness-for-duty issues as a family practice physician, I
would note the following:
a.

Dr. Mena has undergone a substantial amount of
additional evaluation and other supportive
interventions with regard to his clinical skills. He is
currently not allowed to return to his hospital-based
practice in the Jerome area, and it has been
specifically recommended that he not engage in OB
practice. I would defer to the Board of Medicine as
to the necessity of continuing restrictions in those
areas.

b.

From a neurocognitive perspective, I did not observe
any neurocognitive deficits that would interfere with
his capacity to engage in clinical practice as a family
practice physician.

c.

Given his prior history and concerns, I would
recommend he engage in the individual counseling,
as I described above, to ensure that some of his
personal dynamics do not again create difficulties for
him.

At the Board meeting m September, 2012, the Board reviewed the Examining
Committee's Report and Dr. Beaver's recommendations and, pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836,
accepted the recommendations of those evaluators. A draft Stipulation and Order consistent with
those recommendations was submitted to Dr. Mena and he refused to sign the Stipulation and
Order.
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Consequently, Dr. Mena and his attorney were scheduled for and attended a personal
appearance with the Board on March 1, 2013. The Board reaffirmed their acceptance of the
Examining Committee's Report and Dr. Beaver's recommendations.

When Dr. Mena still

refused to voluntarily agree to follow those recommendations, a hearing was scheduled.
The Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
November 14, 2013. The Board adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and issued a Final Order on January 7, 2014. The Board's Final Order allowed Dr. Mena
to continue practicing family practice with the following monitoring and restrictions:
1.

Respondent shall continue in treatment and on medication
and comply with the recommendations of his treating
psychiatrist and psychologist and authorize them to provide
quarterly status reports.

2.

Dr. Mena shall not change his current psychiatrist or
psychologist without Board approval.

3.

Respondent's psychiatrist and psychologist must
immediately report to the Board any concerns about Dr.
Mena's ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill
and safety.

4.

Respondent shall continue in treatment for sleep apnea with
quarterly reports by his treating physician to the Board.

5.

Dr. Mena shall permanently cease practicing obstetrics and
chronic pain.

6.

Dr. Beaver shall do a complete reevaluation in two (2)
years.

7.

Respondent shall provide all employers and the Chief of
Staff at each hospital with a copy of the Final Order.
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8.

Dr. Mena to reimburse the Board for costs and fees.
Additional Issues on Appeal

The Board is entitled to costs and attorney's fees against Dr. Mena.
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I
Standard of Review

The Court's review of the Board's action is governed by Idaho Code §67-5279(3) which
states:
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter
or by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole;
or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
It is well established law that the District Court will defer to an agency's findings of fact
unless the findings are clearly erroneous and as to the weight of the evidence, the District Court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of any agency. Idaho Code §67-5279(1); Woodfield v.
Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738, 744, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1995); Wheeler
v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 260, 207 P.3d 988 (S.Ct. 2009).
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Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by substantial evidence, even though
conflicting evidence exists. Riverside Development Co. v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d
1271 (S.Ct. 2002).

A court shall affirm an agency action "unless substantial rights of the

appellant have been prejudiced." Idaho Code §67-5279(4); Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho
575, 577, 917 P.2d 409 (Ct.App. 1996); Wheeler v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare,
147 Idaho 257, 260, 207 P.3d 988 (S.Ct. 2009).

On questions of law, the Court exercises free

review. Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050 (S.Ct. 2008);
Riverside Development Company v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 1271 (S.Ct. 2002).
Error will not be presumed on appeal, but must be affirmatively shown by an appellant.
State v. Crawford, 104 Idaho 840, 841, 663 P.2d 1142 (Ct.App. 1983). An appellate court will
not search a record for unspecified and unsupported errors. State v. Crawford, supra; Drake v.
Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 672 P.2d 1064 (Ct.App. 1983-84); Woods v. Crouse, 101 Idaho 764,620
P.2d 798 (1980); Idaho Appellate Rules 34 and 35.
In Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (S.Ct. 2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court reaffirmed the well established rule that issues on appeal are waived unless supported with
relevant argument and authority. The Supreme Court stated:
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority,
those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the
Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975).
A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is
insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442,
445 263 Pl2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search the
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record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof/ Discipline,
138 Idaho 397,400, 64 P.3d 323,326 (2003). Consequently, to the
extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in
compliance with the I.A.R. it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v.
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 148 at 790.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bach was recently reaffirmed in Bettwieser v. New York
Irrigation Distric!, 154 Idaho 317, 323, 297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (S.Ct. February 22, 2013.)
Idaho Code §54-1833 allows the Board of Medicine to create an Examining Committee if
there are concerns about a physician's ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety due to
mental illness, physical illness or excessive use or abuse of drugs, including alcohol. Idaho Code
§54-1834 provides that the Examining Committee will personally meet with the physician. The
Examining Committee then submits a report to the Board pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836.
That recommendation can include a recommendation on whether the physician is fit to practice
medicine, either on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management that the committee
may recommend. That recommendation is merely advisory.
Pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836(b), the Board may accept or reject the recommendation
of the Examining Committee. Idaho Code §54-1836(c) provides that if a physician is unwilling
to execute a voluntary agreement on any restrictions, the physician is entitled to a hearing and
formal proceedings before the Board and a determination on the evidence as to whether
restrictions should be imposed.

Following the conclusion of the hearing, Idaho Code §54-

1837(c), provides:
At the conclusion of the hearing, the board shall make a
determination of the merits and if grounds therefor are found
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to exist, may issue an order imposing one or more of the
following:
(1)

(2)

(3)

Make a recommendation that the physician submit to
the care, counseling, or treatment by physicians
acceptable to the board; or
Suspend or restrict the license of the physician to
practice medicine for the duration of his impairment;
or
Revoke the license of the physician to practice
medicine; and if grounds are not found to exist, the
board shall enter its order so stating, shall dismiss the
proceedings and shall provide the respondent a true
copy thereof.

The Board fully complied with all of the statutory requirements and procedures.

II
Dr. Mena's Brief Fails To Identify and Support Issues On Appeal
Rule 84(b), I.R.C.P., requires that Briefs shall be in the form and arrangement provided
for appeals to the Supreme Court. Rule 35(a)(4), I.A.R., requires that issues presented on appeal
must be identified in Appellant's Brief in a separate section entitled Issues on Appeal. That rule
states that: "The issues shall fairly state the issues presented for review". Issues on appeal are not
simple factual statements as Dr. Mena has done in his various subsections, but must identify
clear error by the Board. Dr. Mena's Brief completely fails to comply with this Rule. The Rule
clearly distinguishes argument from issues presented on appeal. Consequently, the issues argued
in Dr. Mena's Brief should not be considered.
In the case of Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 809 P.2d 1166 (Ct.App. 1991), the Court
reviewed the requirements of Rule 35(a)(4), I.A.R. and stated: "Failure of the appellant to include
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an issue in the statement of issues required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of that
issue on appeal". [Citations omitted.] 119 at 691.
In reviewing Dr. Mena's Brief, it is interesting that there is virtually no reference to the
transcript or record on appeal and no citation to a single case showing any legal or factual error
by the Board. The subsections within Dr. Mena's Brief are merely a summary of evidence
presented. Dr. Mena has not established a single legal or factual error in the Board's Final Order
and its proceedings.
In an effort to respond to Dr. Mena's unsupported arguments, the Board will utilize the
subsection headings utilized by Dr. Mena even though those subsection headings do not meet the
requirements of the appellate rules for issues on appeal.

III
Essence of Parties' Substantive Dispute

Beginning on Page 3 of Petitioner's Opening Brief, Dr. Mena has a subheading entitled
"Essence of Parties' Substantive Dispute". Dr. Mena refers to the Board's compliance monitor's
testimony that the Board accepted the Examining Committee's recommendations at its
September, 2012, Board meeting and then Dr. Mena erroneously states that the Board did not tell
Dr. Mena. In fact, in the very next sentence of his Brief, Dr. Mena concedes the Board counsel
did notify him of the Board's determination and asked Dr. Mena to voluntarily agree to comply
with the recommendations.
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On Page 3, Dr. Mena complains that none of the proposed Stipulations the Board
"pushed" on Dr. Mena were admitted as exhibits. Since none of the Stipulations were accepted
or signed by Dr. Mena, their admission would be improper in any event. Further, there were no
restrictions on Dr. Mena's ability to offer those as exhibits if he felt they were relevant, which he
completely failed to do so.
Dr. Mena then argues without any factual support that the Board staff does not
differentiate between disciplinary cases and Disabled Physician Act cases. That is absolutely
incorrect and not supported by the record. The pleadings of record clearly indicate that this entire
process was conducted under the statutory mandates and in compliance with the Disabled
Physician Act. Dr. Mena has not pointed to one single place in the record that establishes that
the Board did not comply with and follow the statutory mandates of the Disabled Physician Act.
The Board's Filing of Administrative Proceedings Under the DPA
and Petitioner's Objections to the Board's Post-Examining
Committee Report Process

Beginning on Page 4, Dr. Mena erroneously states the DPA case was commenced May
21, 2012, "almost 11 months after the appointed Examining Committee issued its report to the
Board". In fact, the Examining Committee Report was issued June 29, 2012. (Exhibit 8.) Dr.
Mena's factual statement is absolutely incorrect.
Dr. Mena then makes a bald and unsupported statement that the Board exceeded its
statutory authority under the Disabled Physician Act, but cites no reference to the record or
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procedure of the Board which in any way violated the Act. In fact, the Board fully complied with
all of the requirements of the Disabled Physician Act.
IV
Facts Underlying The Board's Ordering a DPA Committee
Examination and Evaluation

In this subsection, Dr. Mena makes extensive argument that when the Board reopened an
investigation of him based upon an adverse action report by the hospital, at the time of the
hearing, the Board presented no testimony regarding the basis for the hospital action. Dr. Mena's
argument was correctly overruled by the Hearing Officer. The unrefuted testimony establishes
that the Disabled Physician Act proceeding was based upon Dr. Mena's prior history with the
Board, including multiple concerning evaluations, and his disjointed, tangential and irrational
response to the Board's request for information. (Exhibit 4.) (Tr., p. 15, ls.11-25; p. 16, ls. 1-25;
p. 17, ls. 1-3.)

This action was not based upon anything occurring at the hospital and

consequently any evidence of cases occurring at the hospital were irrelevant and immaterial. In
this section of his Brief, Dr. Mena makes multiple factual statements which have absolutely no
reference or citation to the administrative record and must be rejected and not considered. In
particular, on Page 8, Dr. Mena argues that the Board staff asked him to produce a confidential
patient chart for care occurring December, 2006. That is absolutely incorrect and unsupported.
On Page 8, Dr. Mena complains that the Board did not offer certain exhibits at the
hearing and failed to call Board members to testify. Again, there was no restriction on Dr.
Mena's ability or opportunity to offer whatever evidence or witnesses he wished to and he did not
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do so.

The Board staff investigator testified and did testify that the Board had significant

concerns at its December, 2011, meeting about Petitioner's written response. (Tr., p. 16, ls. 911.)
On Page 9, Dr. Mena erroneously argues, without any reference to the transcript or
record, that the Board was asking him to provide a response to care for a particular patient
occurring five years earlier. That is not correct.
V

Examining Committee Activity and Report

On Pages 10 and 11, Dr. Mena erroneously argues that the Examining Committee and Dr.
Beaver all found him fit for practice. In fact, the Examining Committee and Dr. Beaver clearly
reported that Dr. Mena was safe to practice if he was monitored, continued with psychiatric care
and was re-evaluated in two years.
In its Final Order, the Board did adopt the Recommended Findings of Fact of the Hearing
Officer. (Final Order, p. 1.) Dr. Mena argues the Hearing Officer misperceived Dr. Mena's
argument. The Hearing Officer did not misperceive the argument. In fact, Dr. Mena did argue
that the Examining Committee was required to find a "newly diagnosed issue ... before the Board
can take action". (Recommended Findings, p. 9.) Dr. Mena's argument also completely ignores
his prior history of mental health issues with the Board and his disjointed, tangential and
irrational response to the Board.
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On Page 12, Dr. Mena again, without any legal or factual support, erroneously contends
that the Board processed this case as a disciplinary case rather than a Disabled Physician Act
case. That is absolutely incorrect.
On Page 13, Dr. Mena again erroneously argues that the Examining Committee
recommended no restrictions on Dr. Mena's license. In fact, the Examining Committee did
recommend that Dr. Mena have required management, including repeat neuropsychological
testing by Dr. Craig Beaver, continued outpatient psychiatric care, and a re-evaluation in two
years with continuing Board oversight.
VI
Evaluation of the Board's Adjudicative Role in this DPA Case

On Page 14, Dr. Mena erroneously states the Board did not share the Examining
Committee Report with Dr. Mena. That is absolutely incorrect. In fact, it was provided to him
on various occasions, including when it was issued, before his personal appearance before the
Board and was also served upon him May 21, 2013 as evidenced by the Notice of Filing
Examining Committee Report.
Dr. Mena refers to the provision of the Final Order that he permanently cease practice
obstetrics and chronic pain management. The PACE and CPEP evaluations clearly establish that
due to deficiencies in clinical judgment and reasonings, Dr. Mena cannot practice obstetrics with
reasonable skill and safety. (Exhibits 12 and 13.) Further, the July 23, 2009 initial Stipulation
and Order included a permanent restriction on obstetrics and chronic pain. In fact, Dr. Mena lost
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his family practice Board certification because of that permanent restriction on obstetrics, not
because of these further proceedings.

(Exhibit 6.)

The evidence presented at the hearing

supports that permanent and continuing restriction.
On Page 15, Dr. Mena erroneously argues he was referred to the Examining Committee
"not because [sic] his medical history or a clinical report", but because of something he wrote.
This argument ignores Dr. Mena's extensive prior history with the Board and the numerous,
extensive prior evaluations which led to the prior Stipulation and Order for similar problems.
There concerns were supported by multiple examinations and consultations which were obtained
on Dr. Mena in 2006 or 2007. (See Exhibits 9 through 13.)
Dr. Mena concedes on Page 16, that the Examining Committee shall report to the Board
on the fitness of a physician to practice "either on a restricted or unrestricted basis and any
management the committee may recommend." That is exactly what the Examining Committee
did and those restrictions were adopted and imposed by the Board in its Final Order.

VII
The Board's Ruling Has Not Violated Petitioner's Substantial

In this section of his Brief, beginning on Page 17, Dr. Mena makes many unsupported
factual arguments and statements regarding his Board certification. In fact, the record clearly
establishes that this proceedings had nothing to do with his loss of his Board certification. He
lost his Board certification when he signed the Board Stipulation and Order in 2009 because of
the permanent restriction on obstetrics and chronic pain management. (Exhibit 6.)
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On Page 20, Dr. Mena refers to an Idaho Board of Pharmacy statute, Idaho Code §372718(g). That statute has never cited or relied upon by the Board and is not part of this current
proceeding.
VIII
The Hearing Below Was Not Clouded by the Board's Pervasive
Assertion of Idaho's Peer Review Statute

Beginning on Page 20 of his Brief, again, virtually all of Dr. Mena's factual arguments
and statements are unsupported by any reference to the record. Dr. Mena complains that because
of the peer review privilege he was not entitled to present peer review evidence regarding the
clinical events of December, 2006 and early 2007. The Hearing Officer correctly ruled that those
proceedings were subject to the peer review privilege. Idaho Code §39-1392(b). They were also
irrelevant.
More significantly, those were events occurring before the first Stipulation and Order
signed by Dr. Mena on July 23, 2009. (Stipulation and Order in pleadings.)
On Page 21, Dr. Mena argues that after his proposed testimony was denied, the Board
"moved for admission of three stacks of documents" as rebuttal records. Exhibits 11, 12 and 13
were admitted after Dr. Mena incorrectly testified none of the prior evaluations found he was not
fit to practice medicine.

(Tr., p. 169, ls. 8-12.)

These evaluations were reviewed by the

Examining Committee so they were also relevant.
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IX
The Board is Entitled to Costs and Attorney's Fees

The Board is entitled to costs and attorney's fees against Dr. Mena based upon his
frivolous and unsupported appeal. Idaho Code § 12-117 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person,
the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the
proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses,
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis
in fact or law.
Idaho Code § 12-117 was most recently amended in 2012. Consequently, prior decisions which
determined that attorney's fees could not be awarded on appeal are no longer in force and effect.
In the case of Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916 (S.Ct. 2011), the
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for seeking
attorney's fees against the entities to which it applies. 151 Idaho at 818. The Court noted that
2010 amendments to Idaho Code §12-117 by the Idaho Legislature inadvertently prohibited
awards of fees in petitions for review of administrative decisions. That ruling in Sopatyk has
now been overturned by the further amendments to Idaho Code §12-117 occurring in 2012.
The language of Idaho Code § 12-117 that attorney's fees are allowable on appeal where
a non-prevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis" in law or fact has not been changed by
the most recent legislation. Consequently, prior cases on that language are applicable.
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Fees can be awarded to the Board because Dr. Mena has filed an appeal and made
arguments without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway
District, 151 Idaho 196, 254 P.3d 497 (S.Ct. 2011). Attorney's fees are properly awarded under
Idaho Code §12-117 when a party fails to provide any authority supporting its appeal and pursues
an appeal without a reasonable basis in law or fact. Bonner County v. Bonner County Sheriff
Search and Rescue, Inc., 142 Idaho 788, 134 P.3d 639 (S.Ct. 2006); See also Castringo v.
McOuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106 P.3d 419 (S.Ct. 2005); Daw v. School District 91 Board of
Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (S.Ct. 2001).
In his Brief, Dr. Mena has completely failed to make any arguments supported by any
legal authority or reference to the record which have established any error by the Board in these
proceedings. The appeal has absolutely no basis in law or fact and the Board should be awarded
costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-117.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Board respectfully requests the District Court to deny Dr.
Mena's appeal and to grant the Board costs and attorney's fees.
DATED This 3bt:day of June, 2014.

URANGA & URANGA

~/cz~
JEAN R. URANGA, Of the Firm
Attorneys for the Board
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this3':>~ay of June, 2014, I served true and correct
copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by faxing copies thereof to:
Joseph D. McCollum, Jr.
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
Attorneys at Law
877 W. Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701
VIA FAX: (208) 954-5235

~/2?~
JEANR. URANGA
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,
Case No. CV-OC-2014-04321
Petitioner,

vs.

ORDER FOR
REBRIEFING

IDAHO STATE BOARD OF
MEDICINE,

Respondent.
The petitioner, Dr. Mena, has failed to submit a brief that conforms with the
requirements of I.A.R. 35.

It does not contain an issues section, nor does it clearly

delineate the issues asserted in the body of the briefing. See I.R.C.P. 84(p) and I.AR.
35(a)(4). See also Carle v. State, 2013 WL 5979202, *1 (Ct. App. 2013) ("Idaho
Appellate Rule 35 requires that an appellant identify the specific issues to be considered
on appeal and present arguments with citations to the record and transcript on which
the arguments rely. I.A.R. 35(a)(4), (6). The failure of an appellant to include an issue in
the statement of issues required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of the
issue on appeal. This rule may be relaxed, however, where the issue is argued in the
briefing.") (citing State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109,111,952 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1998)).
The Court will afford Dr. Mena an opportunity to submit a conforming brief. Dr.
Mena has 10 days from the date of this order to file and serve this brief. The

ORDER FOR REBRIEFING-1

000081

•

•

respondent's brief shall then be filed and served within 14 days after service of Dr.
Mena's brief if a response is necessary. Dr. Mena's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and
served within 10 days after service of the respondent's brief.
The oral argument set for August 14, 2014 is hereby vacated. The parties will be
advised, after receipt of this additional briefing, concerning the new oral argument
hearing date.
In the event that Dr. Mena does not submit a conforming brief, within the
requisite time period, this appeal will be dismissed, for failure to comply with the
applicable rules and the order of this court.
IT IS SO ORD~ED.
Dated this

J1_ day of July 2014.
Gerald F. Schroeder
Senior District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant to the Idaho
Rules to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:

JOSEPH D. MCCOLLUM, JR.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
PO BOX 1617
BOISE, ID 83701
JEAN R. URANGA
URANGA & URANGA
PO BOX 1678
BOISE, ID 83701

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho
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Joseph D. McCollum, Jr., ISB No. 1299
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5235
Email: jmccollum@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Petitioner
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I.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties to this Judicial Review process are an Idaho licensed physician, Robert M.
Mena, M.D., as "Petitioner," and his state licensing agency. The Idaho Board of Medicine is the
"Agency" from which this matter has been brought to a reviewing court. The "Agency" is
sometimes also referred to in this brief as the "IBOM" or "Board."
The case arises under the "Disabled Physician Act" (hereafter sometimes "DPA"), a 1976
addition to the Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1976, Ch. 290, codified as Sections 54-1831 to 54-1838
and I.C. Section 54-1840. The codification remains little changed in almost 38 years and less
discussed in reported decisions. Through these nine sections, the Agency is empowered to assess
a physician licensee's "(a) mental illness," "(b) physical illness" and/or "(c) excessive use or
abuse of drugs, including alcohol". I.C. Section 54-1832. If the Board, has "reasonable cause to
believe" that a licensed physician is "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety
to patients because of a condition described in section 54-1832," it "shall" cause a committee to
examine the physician. I.C. Section 54-1833. Thereafter, in the usual case, the Board will
receive the Examining Committee's "report and diagnosis," make a "determination of the
merits," and enter one of three specified orders to address the physician's "impairment". I.C.
Section 54-1837(c).
In concept, therefore, the DPA sets out a process by which the Board may evaluate a
physician licensee's "inability" caused by the cited illnesses, mental or physical, or addictive
processes. Put differently, the Board is charged with an examination obligation to ascertain
physician "impairment" (a state of being "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and

PETITIONER'S AMENDED OPENING BRIEF ON JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1

000089
45996.0001.6793833.1

e
safety to patients") when that condition is found to be caused by any one or more of the three
cited conditions.
In this case the Board referred Petitioner for examination under the "mental illness"
prong, I.C. Section 54-1832(a), and two of three appointed examiners were psychiatrists. That
occurred mid-June, 2012 and the committee issued its report dated June 29, 2012 (Board's
Hearing Exhibit 8), as required by I.C. Section 54-1836, which the Board could accept or reject
and, in this case, accepted. (Tr. p.4, L. 15-20).
The Examining Committee articulated its statutory charge (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) to
determine Petitioner's "fitness to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients"
and concluded that he met that statutory test. In reaching their unanimous conclusion, the
members also observed that a "formal psychiatric evaluation", which the statute allows them to
request, was then not needed and would not be helpful. The parties essentially agree that the
DPA provisions through the Examining Committee process and its report to the Board
appropriately and sequentially proceeded as statutorily outlined.
In stating the issues below and discussing his contention, Petitioner differentiates the
DPA from a broader and subsequently reenacted physician licensing statute, the "Medical
Practice Act," hereinafter usually referred to as the "MPA." It is also found in Idaho Code,
Chapter 18, Title 54. I.C. Section 54-1801-1821 (recodified Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1977, Ch.
199, Section 2, p. 536).
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Agency exceed its statutory authority, or act in violation of statute, or use

unlawful procedure in purporting to use the DPA physician examination referral process when its
purpose was to impose on Petitioner permanent license restrictions outside the purview of the
DPA? (See also Statement of Issues for Judicial Review, B 1-2, pages 2-4);
2.

Did the Agency err in issuing a Final Order imposing license restrictions on

grounds beyond those permitted by the DPA (see LC. Section 54-1832) and/or in excess of its
statutory authority? (See LC. Section 54-1837(c)(2));
3.

Did the Agency err in extending and making permanent license restrictions in an

earlier MPA stipulation and order after Petitioner was referred to a Physician Examining
Committee for evaluation under the much narrower statutory provisions of the DPA? (See also
Statement of Issues for Judicial Review, F., pages 5-6);
4.

Should the Agency's "Final Order" be vacated and the case dismissed because it

is "not supported by substantial evidence on the records as a whole" under LC. Section 675279(3)(d)?
5.

Did the Agency prejudice Petitioner's rights, and err, in initiating a DPA case

based on Petitioner's invited communication, then prevent Petitioner from introducing evidence
respecting his health and mental/psychological condition by successfully asserting Idaho's Peer
Review statutes, while also persuading the hearing officer to admit on rebuttal, over objection,
the Agency's similarly historic evidence arising out of the same peer review process? (See also
State of.Issue for Judicial Review, D., pages 4-5).
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III.
PARTIES DISAGREEMENT ON INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF DPA
A.

No Definitive Idaho Case Law Informs Our Interpretation Of The DPA, Nor Of Its
Interaction With The MPA.
In scanning Idaho's reported cases, there is little mention of the DPA and no cases

discussing the interaction between the DPA and MPA in the 37 years both regulatory acts have
been together codified as companion parts of Idaho Code, Chapter 18, Title 54. Yet the principal
issues for which review is sought are those of statutory interpretation, and the appropriate
differentiation of the DPA process from others contained in the MPA.

B.

The Board Saw No Limitations In Its Discretion To Impose "Sanctions" And
"Restrictions," As If The Case Were An MPA Disciplinary Matter; Petitioner Saw
The Case As A Much Narrower One Distinctly Governed By The DPA Under
Which It Was Brought.
The parties are in disagreement not with respect to the preliminary DPA process, but with

the Board's unrestrained interpretation of its statutory powers once it received the report of its
selected Examining Committee. As discussed by the Board's compliance monitor, the Board
"accepted" the Examining Committee's recommendations at its September 2012 board meeting,
but it didn't then tell Petitioner. (Tr. p. 36, LL. 15 - 25). Instead, the Board had its counsel
prepare another stipulation and encouraged the physician licensee to sign it; and if he would not,
the process, a staff employee testified, was that "we had to proceed with this hearing." (Tr. p.
37, LL. 1 - 15, 21 - 23). As described, the Board handled this DPA case recommendation like a
disciplinary matter: because Petitioner did not sign a stipulation, they took it to hearing.
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In contrast, Petitioner understood he was being requested to appear before the Boardselected Examining Committee to assess his present fitness to safely practice as a mental health
referral to a physician committee to review his mental health.
On Judicial Review, there are no exhibits proffered by the Board of documents it drafted
as proposed stipulations it pushed on Petitioner and that Petitioner declined to sign after
September 2011, but its staff monitor apparent! y accepted as routine, and heard "often", that
physicians who had a license "restriction" or "who are being monitored" for MPA disciplinary
issues "were unable to become board certified." (Tr. p. 38, LL. 5-11). Neither the Board nor its
staff appear to differentiate between disciplinary cases sometimes resulting in licensing
restrictions as sanctions and DPA cases in which restrictions, if any, must be related to a
licensee's inability/disability from specific disease/impairment causes that
impede/obstruct/prevent the physician licensee from practicing with "reasonable skill and safety
to patients by reason of' the three specific categories of disease or aging processes. I.C. Section
54-1832.
From its Final Order language, the Board seems to believe that once a physician comes to
its attention, irrespective of the statutory process, he's fair game for imposed "sanctions." That,
in essence, is Petitioner's concern and, he believes, was his fate in this case. That which was
administratively opened as a DPA case, and went through the Examining Committee process,
became, despite a referral back to the Board with recommendations of fitness to practice, no
more than another disciplinary opportunity against someone who would not sign that which the
Board asked him to sign. From a legal perspective, the obvious confirmation of a Board's
pervasive concept that everything is discipline, as Petitioner perceives, is found in the Board's
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Final Order language that does not once refer to the DPA; indeed it specifically speaks in terms
of imposing "sanctions" as "necessary upon Respondent's (Dr. Mena's) license to fulfil its
statutory duty" and cites the "purposes" clause of the MPA as the authority for disciplinary
restrictions in this, a clear DPA case.

C.

The Board's Filing of Administrative Proceedings under the DPA and Petitioner's
Principled Objections to the Board's Post-Examining Committee Report Process
This DPA case was commenced by the Board on or about May 21, 2012, almost 11

months after the appointed Examining Committee issued its report to the Board. At that time the
Agency filed and served a Notice of Hearing, it attached a copy of its Examining Committee's
report of the preceding year and cited LC. Section 54-1837(a). For substantive support, the
Board cited LC. Section 54-1836(c) and LC. Section 54-1837, both DPA statutory provisions.
Petitioner believes the Board, in noticing this matter for hearing as a DPA case against
Petitioner, but later in formulating the restrictive sanctions set forth in its final order, exceeded
its statutory authority under the DPA as outlined by Petitioner in his Statement of Issues on
Judicial Review and in Section II of this Amended Opening Brief.
In overview, this case on Judicial Review raises fundamental issues of the relationship
and interaction between the structure and functioning of the DPA and its co-interaction, if at all,
with the MPA. Both these statutory schemes are administered by and enforced, when needed,
through the IBOM, an agency of the State of Idaho from whose decision Judicial Review is
applical:,le. I.C. Section 54-1839 (added by Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1982, Ch. 323, Section 3, p.
798). Petitioner asserts the Board violated his substantial rights to his legal detriment and
prejudice in ignoring or deviating from statutory guidelines in prosecuting this case against him
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and, in particular, imposing "sanctions" and "permanent" license "restrictions" against him
inconsistent with the DPA's statutory scheme and outlined process.
The reviewing Justice is aware that the MPA, as a licensing and disciplinary statute, has
been frequently adjudicated. In MPA cases, the IBOM's findings of fact are treated deferentially
by the courts "unless those findings are clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial
evidence in the record." Cooper v. Bd. Of Prof' l Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. Of Med., 134
Idaho 449,456, 4 P.3d 561, 568 (Idaho 2000) (emphasis added). "Evidence is substantial and
competent only if a reasonable mind might accept such evidence as adequate to support a
conclusion." Id. Accordingly, to establish that a decision is based upon substantial and
competent evidence, the court must determine that "the agency's findings of fact are reasonable."
Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (stating that a
finding is clearly erroneous when "the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.").
IV.
FACTS UNDERLYING THE BOARD'S ORDERING A DPA COMMITTEE
EXAMINATION AND EVALUATION
Historically, the DPA statute has provided a process by which a physician's "inability"
by reason of "illness" under defined circumstances is assessed for the purposes of protecting
patients. The factual circumstances are unusual in this case, but nonetheless clear in their
Board's perception. In early October 2011, the Board received a letter report on hospital
stationery addressed to the Board stating that over five months before Petitioner's hospital
clinical privileges "had been forfeited by him" because he had not completed "required medical
training." (Hearing Ex. 1). Treating this letter as an "adverse clinical action" report, mandating
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investigation, the Board asked Petitioner by letter dated October 11 for a "written personal
response," a "copy of pertinent records" and copies of continuing education credits. (Board's
Ex. 2). Petitioner was given a response deadline of November 8, 2011.
Nearing the response deadline, in part for reasons described below. Petitioner was
scrambling to pull together his written response to the Board's request for data concerning the
alleged "adverse clinical privilege action for not completing required educational training," as
the Board's staff characterized the report it had received. Several unexplained factual gaps
impede cogent analysis of these events preceding the Board's referral of Petitioner to an
appointed examining committee authorized by the DPA:
1.

No evidence was presented that the Board had received anything other than the

single page letter, either contemporaneously with it or later, concerning the Jerome hospital's
taking the reported adverse action in April 2011, over 5 months before the IBOM was notified;
nothing besides the single letter was forwarded to Petitioner by the board staff in requesting his
written response and supporting documentation (Tr. p. 109, LL. 14-20; p.22, LC. 10-22).
2.

At the time Petitioner received a copy of the hospital letter report in October

2011, he had not known of the reported adverse action taken the preceding April; moreover, he
did not believe that he even had hospital privileges at that time against which the reported action
against him could have been taken (Tr. p. 109, LL. 20-22) since he had resigned hospital
employment in 2008 (Tr. p. 122, LL. 1-6), had last had a "Courtesy Staff' appointment in
September 2009 on provisional status covering adult admissions (Hearing Ex. 110);
subsequently, on the durational expiration of his national board certification in family medicine
without re-testing in late 2009, he lost his eligibility for staff privileges as he was formally
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notified in January 2010 (Hearing Ex. 111), 21 months before he received the Board's inquiry
letter.
3.

No independent investigative or testimonial evidence was proffered by the Board,

or public record presented by it, that the Jerome hospital had actually taken an adverse clinical
action against Petitioner in 2011, as reporting of that action would have been required, under
federal law, to the National Practitioners Data Bank ("NPDB") within a few weeks of becoming
final. The only testimonial evidence addressing this point was that of Dr. Jonathan Housley,
formerly a resident Jerome physician staff member and, during the time in question, was first a
CPEP "mentor" of Petitioner, then a member on the Jerome hospital's Medical Executive
Committee (MEC) and later an advocate for Petitioner in seeking an unrestricted license
(Hearing Ex. 122). Dr. Housley also testified both that hospitals are required to report adverse
actions to the NPDB and that he was not aware of any such action or report against Petitioner for
the noncompletion of CPEP educational monitoring (TR. p. 134, L. 20 - p. 135, L. 4), the
program specifically mentioned in Ex. 111, concerning which he had previously been a
Petitioner's voluntary mentor.
4.

No evidence was presented that Petitioner had prior knowledge of the reported

adverse clinical action report in April 2011 or between then and October. Nor would it have
made much sense for Petitioner to ask the Board to lift the 2009 two year stipulation in
September 2011 if he knew an adverse action report had been taken against him and would be
submitted to the IBOM in October; more significantly, the Board either found nothing to
substantiate the Jerome letter report, or made no attempt to do as it had no record that it even
contacted the letter's author or the hospital that was reported to have taken the adverse clinical
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action (TR. p. 21, LL. 1-13) many months before for which there was also no NPDB
documentation to which the Board as the state licensing agency has preferential access and
through upon NPDB reports are transmitted.

5.

Thus, by October 2011, some 21 months after his eligibility for staff privileges

had terminated by reason of the expiration of his board certification, Petitioner was being asked
by the Board's staff to access and produce for Board review a confidential patient chart and/or
related historical records pertaining to the reported clinical course and physician action toward a
patient whose care appeared to be of interest to the Board. Almost five years had elapsed from
the December 2006 delivery that gave rise, eventually, to educational recommendations, the
asserted non-completion of one of which was cited as triggering the letter interpreted by the
Board's staff as an adverse action report requiring of Petitioner a written response he was
obviously struggling to create. His wife testified concerning significant family medical issues
with which they were then dealing (Tr. p. 72- 73) while Petitioner was "trying to meet a
deadline" to submit his written response to the Board; she thought a draft product was
"inadvertently" delivered to the Board. (Tr. p. 73. L. 23 - p. 24, L. 25). The delivered form
reflected assistance from her sister who helped Petitioner pull his notes from her computer as the
deadline approached and he appeared to be under pressure.
Petitioner's delivered response to the Board was typed and contained attachments, but
only the response itself, and a supplemental conclusion, the Board elected to include as proffered
exhibits at hearing. (Hearing Ex. 4, 5). No Board members were called to testify about their
reaction to Petitioner's required response to his licensing agency, but its counsel's representation
at hearing suggested that the letter's form and/or organization "generated a great deal of
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concern ... about his mental capacity" and "generated the creation of the examining committee ... "
(Tr., p.6, LL. 4-7). The board staff investigator (and only witness called to testify by the Board
at hearing) also agreed with the Board's counsel in characterizing the Board as having significant
concerns at its December 2011 meeting about what Petitioner's written response "might reflect
about his mental health." (Tr. p. 16, LL. 9-11).
However, no testimony was presented by the Board or its staff that the substance of the
requested written response pertaining to clinical events almost five years earlier in Petitioner's
practice involving a particular patient about which the Board had inquired had anything to do
with its subsequent examining committee referral under the DPA. In other words, the Board's
reported reaction to the form of Petitioner's submission was the clear focus, while their
substantive concerns about patient care issues, if any at all, were never related by witnesses.
Indeed, when the Board later appointed its DPA Examining Committee, as explained by the staff
compliance employee, "we decided to go with the two psychiatrists because this was
predominately a mental health issue and not a standard of care issue ... " (Tr. p. 32, LL. 22-24).
Nor was there any other evidence suggesting that the Board's referral to an Examining
Committee was made under any statutory basis except the "mental illness" jurisdictional prong
of the DPA, I.C. Section 54-1832 (c).
The single staff witness and the Board's counsel in her opening remarks at hearing
addressed the form, organization and presentation of Petitioner's letter response to the exclusion
of any clinical observations about the 2006 clinical events or 2007 post-event hospital-based
activities associated with educational suggestions/recommendations for Petitioner about which
the Board requested Petitioner to respond in writing. Indeed, as addressed below, The Board,
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through counsel, objected on relevancy grounds to almost every attempt by Petitioner to bring in
background data and clinical history the Board has asked him to respond to in writing; indeed it
also went further in asserting a broad statutory peer review privilege to preclude Petitioner and
his witnesses from discussing hospital-related educational programs and clinical monitoring
arising out of the 2006 clinical history that precipitated an event chain leading to Petitioner's
submission of his November 2011 written response to the Jerome hospital's letter report to the
Board, Petitioner's Idaho licensing agency.
V.
EXAMINING COMMITTEE ACTIVITY AND REPORT

The written response by Petitioner to his licensing board, including all attachments, was
submitted to the Board's selected Examining Committee comprised of one family practice
physician and two psychiatrists. In its report, that Committee identified it as Petitioner's
"Undated response to the Board with attachments," one of eleven documents presented to the
Examining Committee (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) and a part of the information reviewed by the
Committee. Only one of the reviewed documents, the June 14, 2012, letter of Scott Albright,
M.D., Petitioner's treating physician, was submitted at the request of Petitioner.

Although identified as prospective Board witnesses, none of the three Examining
Committee members appointed under DPA auspices and scope testified at Hearing. Nor did
neuropsychologist Craig Beaver, who examined Petitioner as ordered by or on behalf of the
Examining Committee, testify at Hearing. Thus, the record of the process is supplied by the
Examining Committee's report, dated June 29, 2012 (Hearing Ex. 8). Dr. Albright, was called to
testify by Petitioner. All five of the individuals just mentioned, four of whom were mental health
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specialists, found Petitioner to be "fit" for practice from a mental health/illness perspective after
reviewing and focusing on Petitioner's written response to the Board, the triggering DPA referral
factor, interviewing him about it and examining him. All five were unanimous in finding him fit
for the practice he had been performing, and none voiced concerns for patient safety. The panel
also noted the absence of a pattern of patient complaints. (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 2). Petitioner
acknowledged good patient relations and related his 20 year career history of having no
malpractice claims filed against him.
VI.

THE AGENCY DID NOT RECOGNIZE OR APPRECIATE IS APPROPRIATE ROLE
IN EVALUATIN AND DECIDING TIDS DPA CASE
A.

The Agency's Hearing Officer was Unfamiliar with DPA Cases, Misperceived
Petitioner's Positions and Made Findings Perhaps Confusing to the Agency, But
Accepted By It.
What, then, did the Examining Committee do in discharging its duties? Clearly, it found

Petitioner "fit" to practice. Secondly, it reviewed and discussed with him his medical history,
considered that history in light of the statutory "mental illness" referral for committee review and
found no reason to express any patient safety concerns associated with Petitioner's practice.
Additionally, it reviewed his treatment and medications for pre-existing conditions not the focus
of the Board's referral. More specifically, it found his use of one prescriptive anxiety
medication, Lexapro, and a sleep aid, CPAP therapy for use during sleep, both appropriate and
well managed by Dr. Albright, Petitioner's treating psychiatrist of several years; significantly, it
drew nq causal relationship between the management of these routine medical management
issues and any mental health concerns under the DPA. Committee members and Petitioner
agreed that the medical management of the anxiety and sleep apnea symptoms should continue
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and Petitioner represented that he intended to do so, and had done so for several years to his
betterment. Finally, it told the Board that it did not have recommendations concerning
Petitioner's OB care, and did not mention his caring for chronic pain management patients,
topics of review not assigned, directly or implicitly, to the Committee by the Board. There has
never been a dispute about the Examining Committee doing its duty and filing its report.
We know from the Board's one witness, confirmed by the Board's attorney, that it
accepted the recommendations of its appointed Examining Committee. In view of that
administrative fact, and the fact the Board in its Final Order "acted to adopt the Recommended
Findings in toto" (Final Order, p. 1), reviewing some of the hearing officer's findings is both
illustrative and telling concerning the Board's view of its statutory role.
The hearing officer below misperceived Petitioner's argument. Petitioner is not
suggesting that the Examining Committee was required to find a "newly diagnosed
issue ... before the Board can take action." (Recommended Findings, p. 9). Rather, concerning
those pre-existing conditions for which Petitioner was then, and before and after, being treated,
there was nothing giving rise to a fitness impairment caused by mental health issues on which the
Examining Committee was tasked to focus. Or, in the language of the statute, the Examining
Committee could not say it was "because of a condition", addressing Petitioner's pre-existing
medical conditions, that he was "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to
patients." (I.C. Section 54-1833). Only if it had first found that Petitioner were "unfit", would it
have been required to more narrowly bring its findings within DPA statutory parameters by next
tying that finding of unfitness to be "because of', in this case, "mental illness" (I.C. Section 541832). There was no need to reach that step.
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The hearing officer also perceived Petitioner to be arguing that the Examining Committee
findings "preclude a hearing,"; he found to the contrary, asserting the appropriateness of Board
action prior to the DPA referral. Again, the hearing officer does not display an appreciation of
the statutory niche filled by the DPA; nor, we submit, does the Board itself as illustrated in its
approach to this case as a disciplinary matter even if by fact and process the case was referred
and processed as a matter of potential "mental illness", and related disability, to be evaluated by
an expert professional committee.

B.

The Agency Appeared to Change Direction Upon Receiving Its Examining
Committee's Report, Departing from DPA Processes.
Under the DPA, the Examining Committee plays a significant role, and mandatory one at

that, in the evaluation process. This is particularly true, Petitioner respectfully submits, in
addressing Board referrals involving mental health/illness issues which usually require special
expertis·e to appropriately evaluate. The Board initially recognized that in placing two
psychiatrists on its three physician Examining Committee to address its mental health concerns
triggered by its members visceral reaction to the form and organization of Petitioner's November
2011 written response to the Board's request for historical clinical information and
documentation. Upon later receiving its Examining Committee's advisory report, the Board had
the right to "accept or reject the recommendation" of its Examining Committee "to permit a
physician to continue to practice with or without any restriction on his license to practice
medicine." (LC. Section 54-1836(b)). Here the Board accepted the report, or so the undisputed
evidence indicates.
Yet the Committee recommended no "restriction" either as the result of temporary
"illness'.' or on Petitioner's license associated with "impairment" as it confirmed his fitness to
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practice. Had it found a causal fitness issue, particularly if tied to a factor falling within its
mental health expertise, it was authorized to recommend a license restriction, if not suspension,
during the period of impairment, or even license revocation. The Examining Committee did not
find a "fitness to practice" issue of import, nor "impairment" related to unfitness, and
recommended none of the available license-restricting actions suggesting a need to protect
patients from a risk associated with Petitioner's mental fitness to practice. Rather, the
Examining Committee reviewed the panoply of data available to it, felt comfortable with the
prior diagnoses and ongoing treatment Petitioner was undertaking and recommended that his
current care continue, adding only a reevaluation in two years.
VII.
INITS ROLE AS A AGENCY REVEWING A CONTESTED MATTER, THE BOARD
ESSENTIALLY IGNORED THE DPA STATUTORY PROCESS IN ADDRESSING ITS
EXAMINING COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION AND EXERCISING ITS OWN
STATUROY ADUCATIVE ROLE

A.

The Board Imposed Obstetric and Chronic Pain Practice Restrictions Without
Supporting Evidence.
From a evidentiary perspective, in summary, the Board: (1) did not receive chemical or

evaluative data from the Jerome hospital; (2) did not make its DPA "mental health" referral
based any clinical background Petitioner may have submitted with his response better; (3) raised
relevancy and peer review objections to Petitioner's proffered attempts to present clinical records
and physician testimony concerning the events the Board requested him to address in writing; (4)
made no DPA referral concerning Petitioner's obstetrical or chronic pain management skills, nor
tasked its Examining Committee examine skill-set competency issues as to which the Board had
previously entered into stipulations and orders under MPA-grounded processes; (5) accepted its
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Examining Committee's recommendation of Petitioner's fitness practice; (6) presented no
evidence of terms of post-examination tendered stipulations consistent with the accepted
recommendations; (7) presented no evidence of Agency process by which it had the authority to
reject the Examining Committee's recommendations, presumably adopt alternative factual
findings based on available evidence, or refer the DPA case back to its Examining Committee
with instructions and/or additional evidence to review and consider.
The Board's principal substantive action was to impose "sanctions to Petitioner's license
to practice medicine ... ", including:
5. Respondent shall permanently cease from practicing obstetrics
and chronic pain management. (Final Order, p. 3, bottom line)
Under the interpretive principles summarized above in Section III. B, the absence of
evidence supporting a disciplinary restriction of Petitioner's OB and chronic pain practices meets
the requisite insubstantiality test to reject the Board's quoted license restriction imposed by its
Final Order. On the entire factual record, this reviewing court should be left with the "definite
and firm conviction" that the Agency imposed a substantial license restriction without the
requisite presentation of evidence. It committed a mistake that substantially penalized Petitioner,
and should be vacated. (See Section II, Issues Presented on Appeal, 4).

B.

The Board Failed to Respect DPA Statutory Guidelines for Implementing Its
Actions After Accepting the Examining Committee's Recommendations.
It would appear the Board, after receiving the Committee recommendation, failed to

continue the DPA process. Its single live witness suggested that it did not share the report with
Petitioner. Rather, it put together a proposed stipulation to monitor his conduct which he
preferred not signing. When he declined to sign it, they invited him to appear before the Board
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to tell it why he wouldn't sign the Board's stipulation. He did so. The Board sent him yet
another stipulation which he declined to sign. So, as the witness explained, the Board brought
this case as a compliance matter. And, in its Final Order, the Board "deemed sanctions were
necessary upon Respondent's License to fulfill its statutory duties." (Final Order, p. 3). One of
those "sanctions" then imposed was the standard of practice restriction, previously quoted (Final
Order, p. 3 bottom line). The Board cited the MPA's enforcement powers to "protect Idaho's
public health, safety and welfare" through licensing, regulation and enforcement of standards of
physicians. In short, the Board put on its disciplinary hat and imposed its disciplinary will,
sanctioning Petitioner, it would appear, for not accepting whatever the board had wanted to
impose, of whatever duration, and for whatever unstated reason outside DPA parameters.
Focusing back on the DPA's provisions, and its 38 year history, it seems reasonable to
assume that there has been little controversy raised by referring a physician with "inability ... to
practice medicine" (LC. Section 54-1832) due to illness, mental or physical, or deterioration by
aging or drug/alcohol use and impairment In such instances the Board must only have a
"reasonable cause to believe" that an Idaho licensed physician is "unable" to practice for these
reasons to warrant themandatory examination. (LC. Section 54-1833. And in the usual case, a
physician, in facing such a referral, may "request a restriction of his license to practice medicine
(LC. Section 54-1835) to avoid the hearing while still qualifying for the reinstatement process
"under this act," referring to the DPA. (I.C. Section 54-1838).
l3ut this is not the usual case. Petitioner was referred to the Examining Panel not because
of his medical history or a clinical report but because of something he wrote, purportedly in draft
form, but then submitted to the Board in response to meeting his licensing agency's imposed
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submission deadline. And, probably unlike most of the obvious cases, the Examining Committee
found no reason for disqualification by reason of "fitness" to practice. After all, Petitioner
essentially agreed with the Committee that he was "fit" to practice as he had been doing, and
agreed with the continuing care he had been obtaining from his attending psychiatrist. What it
appears.the Board did for several months after its Committee's report was delivered was to
attempt to persuade or coerce Petitioner to voluntarily accept a license restriction as part of a
monitoring/disciplinary process. Unfortunately, we don't know what it was thinking or what
proposed stipulations it presented to Petitioner because it neither tendered any into evidence nor
offered any transparency by producing Board witnesses or executive staff to explain its interval
actions.
What we do know is that the Board's counsel asserted, its only witness supported, the
hearing officer bought and the Board then affirmed by Final Order a process whereby the Board,
in a pure DPA case, may "accept" but still ignore its Examining Committee's recommendations;
and, in switching to its disciplinary role, the Board approved its right to demand Petitioner's
compliance, or else, as if the case were a disciplinary matter from the inception, and as to which
it asserted entitlement to apply disciplinary sanctions.
And so it did. The DPA is integrated as a distinct act for considering and resolving
situations arising from the "disability" rather than the "disciplinary" side of the Board's
regulatory responsibilities. Petitioner is not suggesting that the Board was bound to what its
Examining Committee recommended; rather the Board may not ignore the constraints of the
DPA and transmute a case following Examining Committee review to a purely disciplinary one.
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In particular, the Examining Committee is charged with reporting the physician's fitness
"by reason of' the Section 54-1832 factors. As to any related impairment, the Examining
Committee "shall report" to the Board "as to the fitness of the physician to engage in the practice
of medicine ... , either on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management the committee
may recommend." (LC. Section 54-1836(a). The Board's statutory role is somewhat different.
In addition to addressing a "restriction" or not under the statutory parameters, the Board may
also impose the more severe sanctions of suspension or revocation, but not as a disciplinary
sanction. With respect to its authority to "suspend" or "restrict" a license under the DPA, the
Board may only do so "for the duration of his impairment" (I.C. Section 54-1837(c)(2) within
the statutory parameters of the DPA.
There is nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to impose "sanctions" for disability
or impairment. There is nothing in the DPA that empowers the Board to impose restrictions that
last "permanently," or for life or for any extended duration beyond a licensee's "duration of
impairment". As pointed out above, there is also nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to
impose restrictions for conditions not causally related to those categories specified in the DPA.
Moreover, there is nothing in either the language, the history, the concept or the spirit of the
DPA that the Board has the authority in a DPA case to impose restrictions for typical standard of
care violations, practice deviations or disciplinary transgressions. Finally, there is no authority
granted or implied in the DPA for the Agency's imposition of permanent restrictions on
Petitioner's practice of "OB and chronic pain management" which were not referred to the
Examining Committee under the DPA referral standards, and were not addressed by the
Examining Committee as relevant to its delegated review. Nor could such a restriction have
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been easily addressed by the Board under DPA criteria and on which the Board did not submit
evidence at hearing. Therefore, no such evidence is before this Court on Judicial Review of any
asserted Agency basis for imposing the permanent license restriction.
VIII.
THE BOARD'S RULING HAS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
The Board's sole witness testified that a license "restriction" imposition by the Board
would prevent a licensee to qualify for specialty board certification (TR. p. LL. 4 - 12).
Petitioner first took and passed his specialty board in 1996 in family practice medicine. The
certificate was issued by the American Board of Family Medicine (ABFM), certifying his having
achieved a standard of knowledge and experience of professional and personal importance. He
also recertified on his first examination. (TR. p. 95). He moved to Idaho and received his Idaho
medical license in 2002 (TR. p. 94- 95). As mentioned previously, the Jerome hospital bylaws
required physician staff members to be board certified to retain staff privileges. Although not
directly at issue in this DPA case, hanging over Petitioner is the shadowy prospect of reclaiming
eligibility for specialty board diplomat status. An abbreviated summary is found in an exchange
of emails between Petitioner and the ABFM representative (Hearing Ex. 119, p. 1). By a two
year monitoring stipulation he signed in early 2009, his license was restricted, and, as a result,
Petitioner was unable to sit again for recertification in late 2009, leading to his exclusion from
the Jerome hospital medical staff in January 2010 (Hearing Ex. 111 ).
In seeking to regain his eligibility to recertify in his practice specialty, Petitioner, when

the two year 2009 stipulation had reached its stated duration, asked the Board that it be
administratively terminated, and the Board did so, replacing it with another that, in the language
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of the ABFM credential coordinator, "it appeared that you were released from any and all terms
of that prior agreement, thus reinstating your medical license to a full and unrestricted status."
He was delighted and, indeed, applied to sit for the examination, paid his fees, and took the
examine in the spring of 2012. However, the ABFM, in reviewing his status found that the Idaho
Board's replacement stipulation referred to one paragraph of the prior agreement between the
Board and its licensee that had not been terminated; therefore, the ABFM concluded that his
state-imposed "restriction" remained, avoiding his efforts, but leaving him still board eligible.
As the ABFM representative summarized, choosing to not perform OB, or not treat pain patients
was not disqualifying, but having those restrictions/conditions placed on a medical license, his in
this case, made him ineligible to sit for a recertification examination. The IBOM uses the
leverage of "restriction" with its monitoring (Hearing Ex. 3), even if practicing clinicians most
familiar with the licensee may think a license restriction may not be clinically warranted
(Hearing Ex. 122, 123). As Dr. Lorraine Tangen testified, she, too, has quit doing obstetrics, she
was aware of Petitioner's several educational courses, believes him to be a much better
physician, improving his fitness to practice since completing them, once treated him for CPAP,
treated his family and, significantly, opined in November 2011 that Petitioner ought not have an
imposed license restriction (Tr. pp. 100 - 104).
What is somewhat mysterious is that from the Board's staff monitor, testimony was
elicited that at its September 2012 board meeting, not only did the Board "accept" the Examining
Committee's recommendations, but also offered Petitioner a "voluntary stipulation to
incorporate" the recommendations of the Examining Committee (TR. p. 19, LL. 11-14, 15 20). Then, in asking Respondent to appear before the Board, the witness was asked and agreed
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that the Board did "still vote to ask him to voluntarily restrict his practice" which he refused (TR.
p. 20, LL. 4 - 9). If, indeed, the Board was giving Petitioner the right to free himself from the
2009 restriction by agreeing to a no strings attached recommendation consistent with the
Examining Committee's recommendation, why didn't the Board offer into evidence those
proposals made to Petitioner while he was not represented by counsel? And how does that
contrast to the Board's objecting and successfully keeping out Petitioner's offer of its marked
hearing exhibit 117 conveying a to his former counsel a very restrictive stipulation proposal?
And why would counsel press, unsuccessfully, in November 2012 an unrepresented Petitioner to
sign an early Board stipulation (Hearing Ex. 118, letter only) when Petitioner had been looking
for the opportunity to voluntarily withdraw from certain aspects of his earlier practice for
personal reasons unrestrained by state-based but ABFM accepted non-eligibility restrictions?
There may be a few circumstances when, for disciplinary reason, a physician should be
precluded from attaining additional educational experiences or specialty certifications, even
though Petitioner may find that hard to understand. In even fewer cases, it would seem, a license
restriction should be imposed in a disability case unless the reason for the disability raises safety
and/or fitness issues. No such restrictions were recommended by the Examining Committee.
The Board, for reasons unexplained but perhaps based on an unknown history with Petitioner's
serial requests for its lifting an earlier restriction, has now specifically and purposefully imposed
"perm~ent" practice restrictions as "sanctions", cited a statute not a part of the DPA as its
authority and ensured that this physician will have a license restriction of record purportedly
arising out of a disability act application.
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Additionally, there is one matter not covered by the record of this case below but
followed shortly thereafter which prejudices Petitioner. This court is referred to the Idaho
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Section 37-2718(g) which allows the Idaho Board of
Pharmacy to issue without a hearing a restriction upon a physician registrant's controlled
substance registration consistent with that of a state licensing board for that registrant. Petitioner
represents that his controlled substance registration was restricted to not allow him to prescribe
to OB patients or chronic pain patients. Thus, if covering in a rural hospital ER or an urgent care
clinic situation, a patient should present who happens to be injured, but is also pregnant and/or
has chronic pain issues, Petitioner may be constrained in appropriately treating that patient on an
emergent basis by reason of the IBOM' s permanently imposed restriction and that Final Order's
impact on Petitioner's Idaho controlled substance license. And, for reasons unknown, the IBOM
waited until 2014 to notify the IBOP under a 1971 law of his now imposed "permanent" license
restrictions as "sanctions" automatically carrying over to his controlled substance registration.

IX.
THE HEARING BELOW WAS CLOUDED BY THE BOARD'S PERVASIVE
ASSERTION OF IDAHO'S PEER REVIEW STATUTE
In response to a purported "adverse clinical action" taken by the Jerome hospital in April
2011, but not received by the Board until October, the Board asked Petitioner for patient clinical
records and his written explanation of what occurred. At hearing, Petitioner was prepared to
produce documents and call witnesses to address the events about which he was asked. In
summaty, much of his proposed testimony through Ors. Lally, Tangen, Housley and himself was
prepared to describe the underlying clinical events of December 2006, an early 2007 hospital
Fair Review Panel hearing, and later educational/training courses and related activities. A
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substantial portion of this planned and/or proffered evidence was excluded by the hearing officer
in upholding the Board's comprehensive assertion of Idaho's Peer Review privilege. Petitioner
was narrowly permitted to show that after the obstetrical event in question, his hospital privileges
were suspended for 60 days on 2/22/2007 (Hearing Ex. 104) but reinstated less than a month
later on 3/20/2007 (Hearing Ex. 105). He was also allowed to submit a neuropsychological
report by Dr. Beaver to the hospital that Petitioner underwent on 8/8/2007 at the hospital's
request (Hearing Ex. 107) which provided a nice baseline for the Beaver evaluation five years
later to the Board's Examining Committee (Hearing Ex. 9).
Petitioner will not here repeat the extensive briefing previously filed with the hearing
officer. In essence, after a substantial portion of Petitioner's potential documentary case and
much of his prospective witnesses testimony was excluded, the Board, on rebuttal, moved for
admission of three stacks of documents as "rebuttal" records, several of which appeared to be
some of those which Petitioner had attached to his written response, denuded of which had been
previously admitted (Hearing Ex. 4). The difference, that Petitioner gave most of them to the
Board and were thus fair game on rebuttal, rings hollow in view of the compulsion and deadline
the Board had imposed on him to get to it "pertinent records" of the clinical events of almost five
years before, and those of subsequent in-hospital educational monitoring and related
developments. Recognizing the breadth of Idaho's peer view statute, the concept of some equalhandedness in its application seems reasonable in a case in which the Board did absolutely
nothing to obtain hospital records and/or otherwise learn the facts about the circumstances under
which, in the end, it saw fit to impose permanent restrictions on Petitioner's license as an
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disciplinary sanction arising out of events it in large part refused to consider or allow its hearing
officer to review.
For purposes of making a record, Petitioner hereby incorporates his arguments filed in a
Memorandum dated August 22, 2013, particularly pages 8 - 16, concerning the request of
Petitioner to have his submissions and those of the Boards be judged by similarly fair standards
in applying Idaho's complex, and broad, statutory peer review concepts. In that context,
(

Petitioner asserts that the hearing officer, and the confirming Board, erred in sustaining the
Board's peer review privilege claims against Petitioner's proffered exhibits and testimony and in
admitting the Board's rebuttal exhibits. In retrospect, however, the narrowed review serves to
emphasize that this case was a DPA matter, not a disciplinary review of a reported "adverse
clinical action" either in 2011 or in 2006. And the focus of this case, in view of the subsequent
Final Order, is on the Board's exercise and abuse of the DPA in its imposition of permanent
"sanctions" against Petitioner to his significant professional detriment.

X.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, and consistent with the statutory guidelines governing
Judicial Review, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's imposition of
sanctions against Petitioner under the Disabled Physician Act, and particularly the sanction of
license restriction, item 5 in its enumerated Final Order. Moreover, the Board should be
instructed to dismiss the DPA proceedings per the last cited alternative stated in I.C. Section 541837(b) because grounds for the other alternative findings were not found to exist.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS~ day of July, 2014.
LEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This case is an appeal of a Final Order issued by the Idaho State Board of Medicine
placing restrictions on Dr. Mena's license and awarding costs and attorney's fees.
Course of the Proceedings

By Order dated May 14, 2012, the Idaho State Board of Medicine instituted proceedings
involving Dr. Mena under the Disabled Physician Act. The Examining Committee met with Dr.
Mena on June 13, 2012. The Examining Committee issued a report June 29, 2012, which was
accepted by the Board at their December, 2012 Board meeting. Since Dr. Mena was unwilling to
stipulate to voluntary restrictions, he was invited to personally appear at the March 1, 2013,
Board meeting, which Dr. Mena personally attended with his attorney. The Board again voted to
accept the Examining Committee report. Dr. Mena was still unwilling to voluntarily agree to
follow the recommendations and a hearing was scheduled for July 10, 2013. Following the
hearing, the Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
November 14, 2013. The Board issued its Final Order January 7, 2014.
Statement of Facts

Dr. Mena is a family practice physician who was first licensed by the Idaho State Board
of Medicine on September 13, 2003. He practices in Jerome, Idaho.
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In 2007 and 2008, Dr. Mena went through various evaluations due to problems which
arose at St. Benedict's Hospital in Jerome, Idaho and which were also reviewed by the Board of
Medicine.
Dr. Mena was evaluated at the Betty Ford Center from February 28, 2007 to March 1,
2007. The Betty Ford records are included in Exhibit 11, pp. 12-106. Concerns regarding Dr.
Mena related to slurred speech, tired or depressed affect, inattentiveness and complaints about
inadequate record keeping, late dictations and possible inadequate medical care. (Exhibit 11, p.
12.)

During the Betty Ford evaluation, Dr. Mena conceded that he had "difficulties with

authorities" which had precipitated moves from prior positions in Provo, Utah; Washington
State; and Vermont. (Exhibit 11, p. 28.) During the Betty Ford evaluation, they did a complete
evaluation of Dr. Mena's cognitive capabilities through use of a MicroCog Assessment. The
entire results of that assessment are found at Exhibit 11, pp. 58-106.

The psychologist

administering the MicroCog Assessment of Cognitive Functioning noted that Dr. Mena took an
unusually long period of time to complete the tests and many of his scores fell in the low range.
The evaluator stated: "Using norms for licensed professionals with this instrument, Dr. Mena's
scores show significantly compromised cognitive functioning and further testing is indicated".
(Exhibit 11, p. 42.) Another evaluator noted:
Using norms established for licensed professionals, Dr.
Mena's scores indicate that he is currently functioning
significantly below professional standards and further
neuropsychological testing is recommended. (Exhibit 11, p.
50.)

-2-

000123

In the final Integrated Clinical Summary, while Betty Ford found no substance abuse
problems, they did diagnose Dr. Mena with obsessive compulsive disorder, a nonspecific
personality disorder with negativistic, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic traits. (Exhibit 11,
p. 56.) At the time of the Betty Ford evaluation, Dr. Mena had no ongoing psychotherapy or
psychiatric care. The Betty Ford Center expressed the following opinion:
In the opinion of the CDE Team, Robert M. Mena, M.D., is
not currently fit to practice medicine. His suitability for
returning to work should not be reassessed until after he has,
(1) completed residential treatment as outlined above, (2)
been discharged with staff approval, (3) is currently
functioning cognitively within professional standards, (4)
enrolled in therapeutic monitoring programs directed by the
Idaho Medical Board Physician Recovery Network. (Exhibit
11, p. 57.)
On August 1, 2007, the Colorado Physician Health Program referred Dr. Mena to Dr.
Craig Beaver in Boise for neuropsychological testing. The case summary from CPHP is found in
Exhibit 11, pp. 3-11.

The CPHP evaluation notes the concerns raised by the MicroCog

Assessment of Cognitive Functioning. (Exhibit 11, p. 4.) That same page notes that Dr. Mena
had a history of depressive disorder and he had recently begun treatment for anxiety disorder as
well as sleep disorder.

It was noted Dr. Mena did meet diagnostic criteria for depressive

disorder. (Exhibit 11, p. 5.) The report supported Dr. Mena's return to work in a clinic-based
setting with a caveat that his work be supervised in some way and with a recommendation that
Dr. Mena refrain from hospital work. (Exhibit 11, p. 6.)
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In order to evaluate clinical skills, Dr. Mena submitted to a Physician Assessment and
Clinical Education Program (PACE), with those evaluations occurring December 20-21, 2007
and February 4-8, 2008. The PACE evaluation results are included as Exhibit 12. On Page 3 of
Exhibit 12, PACE again noted Dr. Mena's below average performance on processing speed,
general cognitive proficiency, reasoning/calculation, memory, spatial processing and general
cognitive functioning.

PACE reported that they did not observe any behaviors indicating

cognitive impairment. The evaluation noted relative weakness on the use of opioids. (Exhibit
12, p. 4.) The oral obstetrics examination found numerous deficiencies in Dr. Mena's knowledge
base and approach to treatment. (Exhibit 12, p. 7.) The conclusion found adequate performance
in family practice, but stated:
The oral exam administered by Dr. Gin revealed significant
deficiencies in Dr. Mena's approach to obstetrics. Due to the
deficiencies, Dr. Mena should either discontinue his
involvement in obstetrics or pursue an intensive hands-on
training course or a fellowship program as a means to update
his knowledge base. (Exhibit 12, p. 8.)
Dr. Mena apparently attempted to question the recommendations of the PACE Program and sent
a series of emails to the PACE Program. In a letter dated October 3, 2008, the PACE Program
notified Dr. Mena that they would not accept any more emails, faxes, letters or phone calls from
him and that his file would be closed. (Exhibit 12, pp. 9-10.)
Finally, Dr. Mena completed a Center for Personalized Education for Physician
Evaluation at CPEP in Denver, Colorado. (Exhibit 13.) The Assessment was done November
10-11, 2008. (Exhibit 13, p. 5.) The CPEP Assessment Summary begins in Exhibit 13 at Page
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32.

With respect to medical knowledge, the report found Dr. Mena demonstrated medical

knowledge that varied from adequate to poor and his knowledge of obstetrical topics lacked
adequate depth overall. (Exhibit 13, p. 33.) The CPEP evaluation found his knowledge was
adequate in family medicine, but in obstetrics, his clinical judgment and reasoning overall was
varied and concerning. (Exhibit 13, p. 36.) CPEP recommended:
Should Dr. Mena return to obstetrical care, he should
participate in a clinical experience to provide the necessary
supervision required as he addresses the areas of
demonstrated need for obstetrical care. Dr. Mena should
initially have 100% direct supervision in the inpatient
obstetrical care setting as well as retrospective chart review
in the last trimester to determine relevant issues related to
delivery. (Exhibit 13, p. 38.)
On June 23, 2009, Dr. Mena signed a Stipulation and Order with the Board of Medicine
related to Dr. Mena's training and ability to perform certain medical procedures, including
obstetrics and treat chronic pain. (Paragraph II.) In Paragraphs VI(b) and VII of the Stipulation
and Order, Dr. Mena stipulated to a permanent restriction on performing obstetrics and treating
chronic pain patients. He also agreed to limit his work hours and continue in treatment with a
Board approved counselor and psychiatrist and agreed to follow their recommendations.
On September 26, 2011, an Order Terminating Stipulation and Order was signed by the
Board chair. That Order was mailed to Dr. Mena on September 27, 2011. On October 13, 2011,
a letter was sent to Dr. Mena reminding him of the permanent restriction on obstetrics. (Exhibit
3.) The letter did not refer to the permanent restriction on chronic pain treatment but that is
included in Dr. Mena's Stipulation and agreement with the Board.
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Within a few days of termination of the Stipulation and Order, on October 3, 2011, the
Board received a notice from St. Benedicts Family Medical Center that they had taken an adverse
clinical privilege action involving Dr. Mena. Pursuant to Idaho Code §39-1393, hospitals are
required to report adverse actions to the Board of Medicine. That letter was admitted as Exhibit
1 and notes that Dr. Mena had agreed to obtain additional training before he exercised any
privileges and he failed to receive the training so his medical staff membership was forfeited.
There is no explanation for why the hospital delayed reporting the adverse action which was
taken April 15, 2011.
Upon receipt of that letter from the hospital, the Board staff initiated an investigation and
wrote to Dr. Mena for an explanation. (Exhibit 2.) The letter noted that the adverse clinical
privilege action indicated he had not completed required educational training.
The Board staff received an undated written response from Dr. Mena which was admitted
as Exhibit 4. A review of that letter indicates that it is disjointed, tangential and irrational.
During the hearing, Dr. Mena admitted that the letter was concerning and tried to explain that it
should have never been sent. (Tr., p. 137, ls. 2-18 and p. 138, ls. 14-25.) He acknowledged
staying up all night to polish the drafts. (Tr., p. 138, ls. 19-20.)
However, in an email sent later on November 15, 2011, Dr. Mena provided the Board
investigator with a one page Conclusion to be annexed to his prior response. (Exhibit 5.) That
Conclusion is still as disjointed, tangential and irrational as Exhibit 4.
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The Board reviewed Dr. Mena's responses at the December, 2011 Board meeting. Given
Dr. Mena's psychiatric history and cognitive difficulties as noted in the prior evaluations, the
Board was particularly disturbed by and concerned about Dr. Mena's responses. The Board
instructed the staff to institute Disabled Physician Act proceedings to review Dr. Mena' s ability
to practice with reasonable skill and safety.
In an email dated December 29, 2011, Dr. Mena advised the Board attorney that he would
never be allowed to be Board certified in family practice because of the fact that he agreed to
permanently restrict obstetrics in 2009. (Exhibit 6.) At the hearing, Dr. Mena testified that the
American Board of Family Practice mistakenly allowed him to take the Board certification exam
in April, 2013 and he failed that exam by a very large margin. (Tr., p. 150, ls. 10-19; p. 65, ls.
21-25; and p. 96, ls. 5-22.)
In Orders dated May 14, 2012, the Board created an Examining Committee pursuant to
the Disabled Physician Act and ordered Dr. Mena to appear for an examination.

That

Examination Committee consisted of Dr. Jeffrey Berlant, a psychiatrist; Dr. Martin Gabica, a
family practice physician; and Dr. Ronald Larsen, a psychiatrist. The Examining Committee
met with Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012.
They issued their report June 29, 2012 which was admitted as Exhibit 8. That report lists
the records that the Examining Committee reviewed, including Exhibits 11, 12 and 13. The
report indicates that the Examining Committee met with Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012 for 90
minutes. The report states:
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Dr. Mena provided a verbal summary of the events that led to
Board's involvement. He revealed that he has benefitted
from treatment for Depression and Anxiety. He stated that
he is under Psychiatric care and plans to continue with that
care. Treatment for Sleep Apnea has also addressed past
concerns about "slurred speech" and ''tiredness".
A review of prior examinations revealed that Robert has been
found to have Obsessive - Compulsive and Narcissistic
personality traits. There is also evidence for deficits in
Cognitive
processing
speed
demonstrated
on
Neuropsychological testing. The PACE evaluation revealed
deficits in Obstetrics knowledge. These findings, as well as
past concerns about chart completion, were discussed with
Dr. Mena. He admitted that he signed and submitted a
version of the "Undated response to the Board" without
reading its contents.
Based upon their review of the reports and their meeting with Dr. Mena, the Examining
Committee issued the following recommendation:
The Examination committee concluded that Dr. Robert Mena
can continue his present practice of medicine with reasonable
skill and safety, with required management including:
Repeat Neuropsychological testing by Dr. Craig Beaver
Continued outpatient Psychiatric care
Reevaluation in two years, with continuing Board
oversight
Consistent with the recommendation of the Examining Committee, on September 10,
2012, Dr. Mena completed a neuropsychological examination by Dr. Craig Beaver. A detailed
report prepared by Dr. Beaver was admitted as Exhibit 9. Dr. Beaver conducted a variety of
psychological tests. His report reviewed the prior Betty Ford evaluation, PACE evaluation and
CPEP evaluation.

Dr. Beaver reported that Dr. Mena was currently on Lexapro and was
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continuing in counseling. (Exhibit 9, p. 5.) On Page 7 of his report, Dr. Beaver noted that Dr.
Mena's memory functioning had significantly dropped from Dr. Beaver's prior testing. (Exhibit
9, pp. 7 and 8.)

Dr. Beaver confirmed the obsessive compulsive disorder and continuing

narcissistic personality traits together with sleep apnea. Dr. Beaver made the following
recommendations:
2.

In considering further care and treatment, I would recommend the
following:
a.

Dr. Mena continues to need to follow medical
recommendations with regard to his sleep apnea. For
example, continued use of the CPAP machine if
indicated.

b.

Dr. Mena is currently on a low dose of Lexapro
which his psychotherapist and he have noted to be
beneficial. I would defer to Dr. Albright as to his
continuing need for medication.

c.

Dr. Mena reports his psychotherapy experiences have
been positive, and he is dealing well with his
stressors and has learned much from his experience.
This occurs within the context of him having a
significantly reduced level of practice for a variety of
reasons. I still have concern that if Dr. Mena enters a
fast-paced clinical practice, for example in a move to
Kellogg, some of the issues or concerns previously
involving Dr. Mena could potentially arise again.
Therefore, I would recommend if Dr. Mena is transferring to a new work situation, such as the clinic in
Kellogg, he be required to be involved with
individual psychotherapy on a regular basis during
the first six months of entry into that job
circumstance. Further, that there be good
communication between prior mental health
evaluators or treatment professionals that have been
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involved with Dr. Mena and whoever provides those
services to him. This would allow continued
monitoring and support for Dr. Mena as it relates to
some of the interpersonal and personality dynamics
that appear to have contributing to his prior
difficulties.
3.

In regards to fitness-for-duty issues as a family practice physician, I
would note the following:
a.

Dr. Mena has undergone a substantial amount of
additional evaluation and other supportive
interventions with regard to his clinical skills. He is
currently not allowed to return to his hospital-based
practice in the Jerome area, and it has been
specifically recommended that he not engage in OB
practice. I would defer to the Board of Medicine as
to the necessity of continuing restrictions in those
areas.

b.

From a neurocognitive perspective, I did not observe
any neurocognitive deficits that would interfere with
his capacity to engage in clinical practice as a family
practice physician.

c.

Given his prior history and concerns, I would
recommend he engage in the individual counseling,
as I described above, to ensure that some of his
personal dynamics do not again create difficulties for
him.

At the Board meeting m September, 2012, the Board reviewed the Examining
Committee's Report and Dr. Beaver's recommendations and, pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836,
accepted the recommendations of those evaluators. A draft Stipulation and Order consistent with
those recommendations was submitted to Dr. Mena and he refused to sign the Stipulation and
Order.
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Consequently, Dr. Mena and his attorney were scheduled for and attended a personal
appearance with the Board on March 1, 2013. The Board reaffirmed their acceptance of the
Examining Committee's Report and Dr. Beaver's recommendations.

When Dr. Mena still

refused to voluntarily agree to follow those recommendations, a hearing was scheduled.
The Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
November 14, 2013. The Board adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and issued a Final Order on January 7, 2014. The Board's Final Order allowed Dr. Mena
to continue practicing family practice with the following monitoring and restrictions:
1.

Respondent shall continue in treatment and on medication
and comply with the recommendations of his treating
psychiatrist and psychologist and authorize them to provide
quarterly status reports.

2.

Dr. Mena shall not change his current psychiatrist or
psychologist without Board approval.

3.

Respondent's psychiatrist and psychologist must
immediately report to the Board any concerns about Dr.
Mena's ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill
and safety.

4.

Respondent shall continue in treatment for sleep apnea with
quarterly reports by his treating physician to the Board.

5.

Dr. Mena shall permanently cease practicing obstetrics and
chronic pain.

6.

Dr. Beaver shall do a complete reevaluation in two (2)
years.

7.

Respondent shall provide all employers and the Chief of
Staff at each hospital with a copy of the Final Order.
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8.

Dr. Mena to reimburse the Board for costs and fees.
Additional Issues on Appeal

The Board is entitled to costs and attorney's fees against Dr. Mena.
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I
Standard of Review

The Court's review of the Board's action is governed by Idaho Code §67-5279(3) which
states:
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter
or by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole;
or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
It is well established law that the District Court will defer to an agency's findings of fact
unless the findings are clearly erroneous and as to the weight of the evidence, the District Court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of any agency. Idaho Code §67-5279(1); Woodfield v.
Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738, 744, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1995); Wheeler
v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 260, 207 P.3d 988 (S.Ct. 2009).
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Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by substantial evidence, even though
conflicting evidence exists. Riverside Development Co. v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d
1271 (S.Ct. 2002).

A court shall affirm an agency action "unless substantial rights of the

appellant have been prejudiced." Idaho Code §67-5279(4); Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho
575, 577, 917 P.2d 409 (Ct.App. 1996); Wheeler v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare,
147 Idaho 257, 260, 207 P.3d 988 (S.Ct. 2009).

On questions of law, the Court exercises free

review. Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050 (S.Ct. 2008);
Riverside Development Company v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 1271 (S.Ct. 2002).
Error will not be presumed on appeal, but must be affirmatively shown by an appellant.
State v. Crawford, 104 Idaho 840, 841, 663 P.2d 1142 (Ct.App. 1983). An appellate court will
not search a record for unspecified and unsupported errors. State v. Crawford, supra; Drake v.
Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 672 P.2d 1064 (Ct.App. 1983-84); Woods v. Crouse, 101 Idaho 764, 620
P.2d 798 (1980); Idaho Appellate Rules 34 and 35.
In Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (S.Ct. 2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court reaffirmed the well established rule that issues on appeal are waived unless supported with
relevant argument and authority. The Supreme Court stated:
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority,
those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the
Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975).
A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is
insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442,
445 263 Pl2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search the
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record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof! Discipline,
138 Idaho 397,400, 64 P.3d 323,326 (2003). Consequently, to the
extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in
compliance with the I.A.R. it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v.
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 148 at 790.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bach was recently reaffirmed in Bettwieser v. New York
Irrigation District, 154 Idaho 317,323,297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (S.Ct. February 22, 2013.)
Idaho Code §54-1833 allows the Board of Medicine to create an Examining Committee if
there are concerns about a physician's ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety due to
mental illness, physical illness or excessive use or abuse of drugs, including alcohol. Idaho Code
§54-1834 provides that the Examining Committee will personally meet with the physician. The
Examining Committee then submits a report to the Board pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836.
That recommendation can include a recommendation on whether the physician is fit to practice
medicine, either on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management that the committee
may recommend. That recommendation is merely advisory.
Pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836(b), the Board may accept or reject the recommendation
of the Examining Committee. Idaho Code §54-1836(c) provides that if a physician is unwilling
to execute a voluntary agreement on any restrictions, the physician is entitled to a hearing and
formal proceedings before the Board and a determination on the evidence as to whether
restrictions should be imposed.

Following the conclusion of the hearing, Idaho Code §54-

1837(c), provides:
At the conclusion of the hearing, the board shall make a
determination of the merits and if grounds therefor are found
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to exist, may issue an order imposing one or more of the
following:
(1)

(2)

(3)

Make a recommendation that the physician submit to
the care, counseling, or treatment by physicians
acceptable to the board; or
Suspend or restrict the license of the physician to
practice medicine for the duration of his impairment;
or
Revoke the license of the physician to practice
medicine; and if grounds are not found to exist, the
board shall enter its order so stating, shall dismiss the
proceedings and shall provide the respondent a true
copy thereof.

The Board fully complied with all of the statutory requirements and procedures.

II
Dr. Mena's Brief Fails To Support Issues On Appeal

In the Board's initial Respondent's Brief filed June 30, 2014, the Board identified various
procedural defects in the Opening Brief filed by Dr. Mena. In an Order filed July 17, 2014, this
Court issued an Order determining Dr. Mena had failed to submit a brief that conformed with the
requirements of Rule 35, I.A.R. That Order noted that Dr. Mena's Brief "does not contain an
issues section, nor does it clearly delineate the issues asserted in the body of the briefing. See
I.R.C.P. 84(p) and I.A.R. 35(a)(4)".

The Court Order also cited Carle v. State, 2013 WL

5979202 which ruled that an appellant must identify specific issues to be considered on appeal
and present arguments with citations to the record and transcript on which the arguments rely.
The Court allowed Dr. Mena an opportunity to submit a conforming brief.
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On July 25, 2014, Dr, Mena filed Petitioner's Amended Opening Brief on Judicial
Review. A review of that Amended Brief indicates that Dr. Mena added a Table of Contents,
Table of Authorities, both of which are required by Rule 35(a), I.A.R., and were missing from his
first brief.

On Pages 3 and 4, Dr. Mena added a section entitled "Issues Presented on Appeal"

and identified five (5) specific alleged issues on appeal. Other than these additions, the entire
balance of Dr. Mena's Amended Opening Brief is virtually identical to the original Opening Brief
with a few minor clerical changes in wording in a few sections of the brief. The argument
section of the Amended Opening Brief is in no way tied to the alleged issues presented on appeal.
Rule 35(a)(c), I.A.R., requires that the argument sections be tied to the specific issues presented
on appeal. That rule further requires that the argument include citations to authorities, statutes
and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. Dr. Mena's Amended Opening Brief still fails
to comply with the requirements of this rule.

Dr. Mena's Brief and his appeal should be

dismissed based upon his failure to submit a brief which conforms with the requirements of Rule
35, I.A.R.
In reviewing Dr. Mena's Amended Opening Brief, it is interesting that there is virtually
no reference to the transcript or record on appeal and no citation to a single case showing any
legal or factual error by the Board. The subsections within Dr. Mena's Brief are merely a
summary of evidence presented. Dr. Mena has not established a single legal or factual error in
the Board's Final Order and its proceedings.
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As noted in the Court's Order issued July 17, 2014, it is not enough to identify issues on
appeal. Dr. Mena is also required to present arguments which specifically refer to and support
the issues on appeal with citations to the record and transcript on which the arguments rely. In
his briefing, Dr. Mena has not tied any of his newly identified issues on appeal with the
arguments raised in his Brief.
In an effort to respond to Dr. Mena's unsupported arguments, the Board will generally
utilize the subsection headings utilized by Dr. Mena even though those subsection headings do
not meet the requirements of the appellate rules for issues on appeal.
III
Essence of Parties' Substantive Dispute

Beginning on Page 4 of Petitioner's Amended Opening Brief, Dr. Mena has a subheading
entitled "Parties Disagreement on Interpretation and Application of DPA". Dr. Mena refers to
the Board's compliance monitor's testimony that the Board accepted the Examining Committee's
recommendations at its September, 2012, Board meeting and then Dr. Mena erroneously states
that the Board did not tell Dr. Mena. In fact, in the very next sentence of his Brief, Dr. Mena
concedes the Board counsel did notify him of the Board's determination and asked Dr. Mena to
voluntarily agree to comply with the recommendations.
On Page 5, Dr. Mena complains that none of the proposed Stipulations the Board
"pushed" on Dr. Mena were admitted as exhibits. Since none of the Stipulations were accepted
or signed by Dr. Mena, their admission would be improper settlement negotiations. Further,
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there were no restrictions on Dr. Mena's ability to offer those draft Stipulations as exhibits if he
felt they were relevant, which he completely failed to do so.
Dr. Mena then argues without any factual support that the Board staff does not
differentiate between disciplinary cases and Disabled Physician Act cases. That is absolutely
incorrect and not supported by the record. The pleadings of record clearly indicate that this entire
process was conducted under the statutory mandates and in compliance with the Disabled
Physician Act. Dr. Mena has not pointed to one single place in the record that establishes that
the Board did not comply with and follow the statutory mandates of the Disabled Physician Act.
The Board's Filing of Administrative Proceedings Under the DPA
and Petitioner's Objections to the Board's Post-Examining
Committee Report Process

Beginning on Page 6, Dr. Mena erroneously states the DP A case was commenced May
21, 2012, "almost 11 months after the appointed Examining Committee issued its report to the
Board". In fact, the Examining Committee Report was issued June 29, 2012. (Exhibit 8.) Dr.
Mena's factual statement is absolutely incorrect.
Dr. Mena then makes a bald and unsupported statement that the Board exceeded its
statutory authority under the Disabled Physician Act, but cites no reference to the record or
procedure of the Board which in any way violated the Act. In fact, the Board fully complied with
all of the requirements of the Disabled Physician Act.
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IV
Facts Underlying The Board's Ordering a DPA Committee
Examination and Evaluation

In this subsection, Dr. Mena makes extensive argument that when the Board reopened an
investigation of him based upon an adverse action report by the hospital, at the time of the
hearing, the Board presented no testimony regarding the basis for the hospital action. Dr. Mena's
argument was correctly overruled by the Hearing Officer. The unrefuted testimony establishes
that the Disabled Physician Act proceeding was based upon Dr. Mena's prior history with the
Board, including multiple concerning evaluations, and his disjointed, tangential and irrational
response to the Board's request for information. (Exhibit 4.) (Tr., p. 15, ls.11-25; p. 16, ls. 1-25;
p. 17, ls. 1-3.)

This action was not based upon anything occurring at the hospital and

consequently any evidence of cases occurring at the hospital were irrelevant and immaterial. In
this section of his Brief, Dr. Mena makes multiple factual statements which have absolutely no
reference or citation to the administrative record and must be rejected and not considered. In
particular, on Page 10, Dr. Mena argues that the Board staff asked him to produce a confidential
patient chart for care occurring December, 2006. That is absolutely incorrect and unsupported.
On Pages 10 and 11, Dr. Mena complains that the Board did not offer certain exhibits at
the hearing and failed to call Board members to testify. Again, there was no restriction on Dr.
Mena's ability or opportunity to offer whatever evidence or witnesses he wished to and he did not
do so.

The Board staff investigator testified and did testify that the Board had significant
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concerns at its December, 2011, meeting about Petitioner's written response. (Tr., p. 16, ls. 911.)
On Page 11, Dr. Mena erroneously argues, without any reference to the transcript or
record, that the Board was asking him to provide a response to care for a particular patient
occurring five years earlier. That is not correct.
V
Examining Committee Activity and Report

On Pages 12 and 13, Dr. Mena erroneously argues that the Examining Committee and Dr.
Beaver all found him fit for practice. In fact, the Examining Committee and Dr. Beaver clearly
reported that Dr. Mena was safe to practice if he was monitored, continued with psychiatric care
and was re-evaluated in two years.
VI
Evaluation of the Board's Adjudicative Role in this DPA Case

In its Final Order, the Board did adopt the Recommended Findings of Fact of the Hearing
Officer. (Final Order, p. 1.) Dr. Mena argues the Hearing Officer misperceived Dr. Mena's
argument. The Hearing Officer did not misperceive the argument. In fact, Dr. Mena did argue
that the Examining Committee was required to find a "newly diagnosed issue ... before the Board
can take action". (Recommended Findings, p. 9.) Dr. Mena's argument also completely ignores
his prior history of mental health issues with the Board and his disjointed, tangential and
irrational response to the Board.
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On Page 14, Dr. Mena again, without any legal or factual support, erroneously contends
that the Board processed this case as a disciplinary case rather than a Disabled Physician Act
case. That is absolutely incorrect.
On Page 15, Dr. Mena agam erroneously argues that the Examining Committee
recommended no restrictions on Dr. Mena's license. In fact, the Examining Committee did
recommend that Dr. Mena have required management, including repeat neuropsychological
testing by Dr. Craig Beaver, continued outpatient psychiatric care, and a re-evaluation in two
years with continuing Board oversight.
VII
The Board did not Ignore the DPA Statutory Process

On Pages 16 and 17, Dr. Mena adds the first new substantive language to his Amended
Opening Brief that was not found in his first Opening Brief. He argues that the Board imposed
obstetric and chronic pain practice restrictions without supporting evidence and then lists seven
things the Board purportedly did wrong without any reference to the appellate record or the
citations to the transcript to support any of the arguments. He makes an unsupported argument
that restrictions on obstetrics and chronic pain are disciplinary restrictions. In fact, Idaho Code
§54-1837(c)(2) allows the Board, through the Disabled Physician Act, to impose any appropriate
restrictions on the license of a physician to practice medicine. In this case, the evaluations done
at Betty Ford found Dr. Mena's test scores showed significantly compromised cognitive
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functioning.

(Exhibit 11, Page 42).

The same evaluation found Dr. Mena was currently

functioning significantly below professional standards. (Exhibit 11, Page 50).
The evaluation conducted by the Colorado Physician Health Program found the same
concerns regarding Dr. Mena's cognitive functioning, but found he could work in a clinic based
setting with supervision and included a recommendation that Dr. Mena refrain from hospital
work. (Exhibit 11, Page 4 and 6).
The PACE evaluation found below average performance on processing speed, general
cognitive proficiency, reasoning/calculation, memory, spatial processing and general cognitive
functioning.

(Exhibit 12, Page 3). The PACE evaluation noted weaknesses and the use of

opioids and inadequate performance and significant deficiencies on Dr. Mena's approach to
obstetrics. (Exhibit 12, Page 4 and 8).
Finally, the CPEP evaluation found Dr. Mena's knowledge in obstetrics with respect to
clinical judgment and reasoning was varied and concerning and that he should not practice
obstetrics without supervised additional training and direct supervision of 100% of all cases.
(Exhibit 13, Page 33, 36 and 38).
Finally, Dr. Mena agreed m June, 2009, that he would permanently cease treating
obstetrics and chronic pain. (June 23, 2009, Stipulation and Order, Paragraph VI(b)).
Consequently, contrary to Dr. Mean's argument in his Amended Opening Brief, there was
significant substantial evidence to support restrictions on obstetrics and chronic pain through the
Disabled Physician Act proceeding.
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On Page 17, Dr. Mena erroneously states the Board did not share the Examining
Committee Report with Dr. Mena. That is absolutely incorrect. In fact, it was provided to him
on various occasions, including when it was issued, before his personal appearance before the
Board and was also served upon him May 21, 2013 as evidenced by the pleading entitled Notice
of Filing Examining Committee Report.
Dr. Mena refers to the provision of the Final Order that he permanently cease practice
obstetrics and chronic pain management. The PACE and CPEP evaluations clearly establish that
due to deficiencies in clinical judgment and reasoning, Dr. Mena cannot practice obstetrics with
reasonable skill and safety. (Exhibits 12 and 13.) Further, the July 23, 2009 initial Stipulation
and Order included a permanent restriction on obstetrics and chronic pain. In fact, Dr. Mena lost
his family practice Board certification because of that permanent restriction on obstetrics, not
because of these further proceedings.

(Exhibit 6.)

The evidence presented at the hearing

supports that permanent and continuing restriction.
On Page 18, Dr. Mena erroneously argues he was referred to the Examining Committee
"not because [sic] his medical history or a clinical report", but because of something he wrote.
This argument ignores Dr. Mena's extensive prior history with the Board and the numerous,
extensive prior evaluations which led to the prior Stipulation and Order for similar problems.
There concerns were supported by multiple examinations and consultations which were obtained
on Dr. Mena in 2006 or 2007. (See Exhibits 9 through 13.)
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Dr. Mena concedes, on Page 20, that the Examining Committee shall report to the Board
on the fitness of a physician to practice "either on a restricted or unrestricted basis and any
management the committee may recommend." That is exactly what the Examining Committee
did and those restrictions were adopted and imposed by the Board in its Final Order.
VIII
The Board's Ruling Has Not Violated Petitioner's Substantial Rights

In this section of his Brief, beginning on Page 21, Dr. Mena again makes many
unsupported factual arguments and statements regarding his Board certification. In fact, the
record clearly establishes that this proceedings had nothing to do with his loss of his Board
certification. He lost his Board certification when he signed the Board Stipulation and Order in
2009 because of the permanent restriction on obstetrics and chronic pain management. (Exhibit
6.)

On Page 24, Dr. Mena refers to an Idaho Board of Pharmacy statute, Idaho Code §372718(g). That statute has never cited or relied upon by the Board and is not part of this current
proceeding.
IX
The Hearing Below Was Not Clouded by the Board's Pervasive
Assertion of Idaho's Peer Review Statute

Beginning on Page 24 of his Amended Brief, again, virtually all of Dr. Mena's factual
arguments and statements are unsupported by any reference to the record. Dr. Mena complains
that because of the peer review privilege he was not entitled to present peer review evidence
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regarding the clinical events of December, 2006 and early 2007. The Hearing Officer correctly
ruled that those proceedings were subject to the peer review privilege. Idaho Code §39-l 392(b).
They were also irrelevant.
On Page 25, Dr. Mena argues that after his proposed testimony was denied, the Board
"moved for admission of three stacks of documents" as rebuttal records. Exhibits 11, 12 and 13
were admitted after Dr. Mena incorrectly testified none of the prior evaluations found he was not
fit to practice medicine. (Tr., p. 169, ls. 8-12.) Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 clearly refute Dr. Mena's
testimony. These evaluations were reviewed by the Examining Committee so they were also
relevant and admissible.
X
The Board is Entitled to Costs and Attorney's Fees

The Board is entitled to costs and attorney's fees against Dr. Mena based upon his
frivolous and unsupported appeal. Idaho Code §12-117 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person,
the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the
proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses,
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis
in fact or law.
Idaho Code §12-117 was most recently amended in 2012. Consequently, prior decisions which
determined that attorney's fees could not be awarded on appeal are no longer in force and effect.
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In the case of Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916 (S.Ct. 2011), the
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Idaho Code §12-117 is the exclusive means for seeking
attorney's fees against the entities to which it applies. 151 Idaho at 818. The Court noted that
2010 amendments to Idaho Code §12-117 by the Idaho Legislature inadvertently prohibited
awards of fees in petitions for review of administrative decisions. That ruling in Sopatyk has
now been overturned by the further amendments to Idaho Code §12-117 occurring in 2012.
The language of Idaho Code §12-117 that attorney's fees are allowable on appeal where
a non-prevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis" in law or fact has not been changed by
the most recent legislation. Consequently, prior cases on that language are applicable.
Fees can be awarded to the Board because Dr. Mena has filed an appeal and made
arguments without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway
District, 151 Idaho 196, 254 P.3d 497 (S.Ct. 2011). Attorney's fees are properly awarded under
Idaho Code §12-117 when a party fails to provide any authority supporting its appeal an.d pursues
an appeal without a reasonable basis in law or fact. Bonner County v. Bonner County Sheriff
Search and Rescue, Inc., 142 Idaho 788, 134 P.3d 639 (S.Ct. 2006); See also Castringo v.
McOuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106 P.3d 419 (S.Ct. 2005); Daw v. School District 91 Board of
Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (S.Ct. 2001).
In his Brief, Dr. Mena has completely failed to make any arguments supported by any
legal authority or reference to the record which have established any error by the Board in these
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proceedings. The appeal has absolutely no basis in law or fact and the Board should be awarded
costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Board respectfully requests the District Court to deny Dr.
Mena's appeal and to grant the Board costs and attorney's fees.
DATED This ~~ay of August, 2014.

URANGA & URANGA

~/cz~~

JEAN R. URANGA, Ofthefirm
Attorneys for the Board
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I.
INTRODUCTION
This is a case of statutory bait and switch, where the Idaho Board of Medicine ("Board")
brought Petitioner Robert Michael Mena, M.D. ("Petitioner") before it under the auspices of the
Idaho Disabled Physician Act ("DPA") and then proceeded to impose physician discipline on
Petitioner as if acting under an entirely separate statute, the Medical Practice Act ("MPA"). In
doing so, the Board acted entirely in excess of and in violation of the statutory authority
conferred on it by the DPA and without substantial and competent evidence, placing an unlawful
permanent restriction on Petitioner's ability to earn a living in his chosen profession. The
Board's ultra vires and unsupported decision should be vacated and this case remanded with
instructions to dismiss.
II.
ARGUMENT

As fully explained in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board's decision should be wholly
set aside because it was in excess of the Board's statutory authority under the DPA, violated the
DPA, and made upon unlawful procedure under the DPA. Additionally, although the Board
accepted the findings of the Examining Committee that Petitioner was fit to practice medicine,
its decision to permanently restrict Petitioner's practice contradicted those findings and,
accordingly, was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

A.

Standard of Review.
As the Board accurately states, the Court's review of the Board's action is governed by

Idaho Code § 67-5279(3):
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or
by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm
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the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole;
or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
While the Court is deferential to an agency's findings of fact, the Court exercises free
review over questions of law. Mercy Med'l Center v. Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050
(2008); Riverside Dev. Co. v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 1271 (2002). Statutory
interpretation is a question of law. Black v. Idaho State Police, 155 Idaho 570,573,314 P.3d
625, 628 (2013).
Additionally, the Court "defers to an agency's findings of fact unless those findings are
clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Cooper v. Bd. of Profl
Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. of Med., 134 Idaho 449,456, 4 P.3d 561,568 (Idaho 2000)
(emphasis added). "Evidence is substantial and competent only if a reasonable mind might
accept such evidence as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. Accordingly, to establish that a
decision is based upon substantial and competent evidence, the court must determine that "the
agency's findings of fact are reasonable." Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (stating that a finding is clearly erroneous when "the reviewing court
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on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.").

B.

The Board's decision was in excess of the Board's statutory authority under the
DPA, violated the DPA, and made upon unlawful procedure under the DPA.
As explained in Petitioner's Amended Brief on Judicial Review and conceded in

Respondent's Amended Brief, the Board instituted this case under the DPA, a 1976 addition to
the Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1976, Ch. 290, codified as Idaho Code§§ 54-1831 through -1838 and
Idaho Code § 54-1840. While the Board spends a great deal of Respondent's Amended Brief
arguing that Petitioner fails to cite supporting authority for its arguments regarding the DPA, this
is because the DPA has never been thoroughly analyzed and has only been passingly cited in
Idaho case law to date. Tellingly, the Board likewise cites no case law discussing the DPA and,
in fact, makes little legal argument regarding the statutory authority conferred on the Board by
the DPA or how the Board acted within that authority in issuing its decision. Indeed, the
statutory language of the DPA is plain and reveals that the Board's conduct and ultimate decision
should be set aside.
1.

The DPA is separate and distinct from the MPA.

Administrative agencies, such as the Board, are creatures that live and die by their
authorizing statutes. Indeed, it is axiomatic that "[a]n administrative agency ... has only such
powers as the statute or ordinance confers." Protest v. Transfer of Water Right No. 11-0290 in

the Name of Agric. Prods. Corp., 610 P.2d 546,550, 101 Idaho 187, 191 (1980). "When
interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the plain language. '[l]f the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any
statutory construction." City of Pocatello v. State (In re SRBA), 145 Idaho 497,508, 180 P.3d
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1048, 1059 (2008). A review of the plain language of the DPA and MPA reveal that they
provide separate and distinct powers, duties, and procedures. Thus, the Board is not free to use
one as means to meet the other's end.
The DPA narrowly empowers the Board to evaluate whether there is "reasonable cause to
believe" that a licensed physician is "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety
to patients" on the bases of"( a) mental illness," "(b) physical illness" and/or "( c) excessive use
or abuse of drugs, including alcohol." Idaho Code§§ 54-1832, -1833. To facilitate this inquiry,
the Board "shall" appoint a qualified Examining Committee, which is charged with ordering a
mental or physical examination of the physician if "necessary to its determination of the fitness
of the physician to practice." Idaho Code § 54-1834(b ).
The Board may thereafter accept or reject the Examining Committee's recommendation
or refer the matter back to the Examining Committee. Idaho Code § 54-1836(b ). To proceed
against a physician, the Board must serve on the physician copies of the Examining Committee's
report and diagnosis. Idaho Code§ 54-1837(a). Following an evidentiary hearing, the Board
must make a "determination of the merits" and, if grounds exist, enter one of only three specified
orders to address the physician's "impairment." Idaho Code§ 54-1837(c). These orders
exclusively may include: (1) "a recommendation that the physician submit to the care,
counseling, or treatment by physicians acceptable to the board; (2) a suspension or restriction of
"the license of the physician to practice medicine for the duration of his impairment'; or (3)
revocation of "the license of the physician to practice medicine." Id. (emphasis added).

In stark contrast, the MPA sets forth a broad list of 22 grounds for physician discipline,
all focusing on misconduct or a failure to meet a standard of care. Idaho Code§ 54-1814. See
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also Haw v. Idaho State Bd. of Med.,140 Idaho 152, 155,90 P.3d 902,905 (2004). None of these
grounds overlap with the three narrow grounds for a finding of disability under the DPA, and
none of the DPA procedures apply. No Examining Committee is employed in an MPA
proceeding, and the inquiry is not restricted to inability to "practice medicine with reasonable
skill and safety to patients." See Idaho Code§§ 54-1832, -1833.
Indeed, the DPA was enacted in 1976 separately from and subsequently to the original
codification of the MPA, and none of its provisions were written to incorporate or reference
MPA provisions. Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1976, Ch. 290. Likewise, when the MPA was
reenacted in 1977, it was not amended to reference the DPA or incorporate it as a segment of its
broader disciplinary power. Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1977, Ct. 19, Section 2, p. 536.
In short, the plain language of the DPA and the MPA reveal that the Legislature
contemplated two entirely separate and distinct purposes and processes under the respective
statutes.
2.

The Board instituted this proceeding exclusively under the DPA.

In this case, it is clear and conceded that the Board initiated this proceeding under the
DPA. The Board referred Petitioner for examination under the "mental illness" prong of the
DPA, Idaho Code§ 54-1832(a), and two of three appointed examiners were psychiatrists. That
occurred mid-June 2012, and the committee issued its report dated June 29, 2012 (Board's
Hearing Exhibit 8), as required by Idaho Code§ 54-1836, which the Board could accept or reject
and, in this case, accepted. (Tr. p.4, L. 15-20).
The Board's concern over the form of Petitioner's draft written response was the clear
focus, while its substantive concerns about patient care issues, if any at all, were never addressed
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and, in fact, were never related by any witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, when the
Board later appointed its DPA Examining Committee, as explained by the staff compliance
employee, "we decided to go with the two psychiatrists because this was predominately a mental
health issue and not a standard of care issue ... " (Tr. p. 32, LL. 22-24). Nor was there any other
evidence suggesting that the Board's referral to an Examining Committee was made under any
statutory basis except the "mental illness" jurisdictional prong of the DPA, I.C. Section 54-1832
(c).

The Examining Committee articulated its statutory charge (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) to
determine Petitioner's "fitness to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients"
and concluded that he met that statutory test. In reaching their unanimous conclusion, the
members also observed that a "formal psychiatric evaluation," which the statute allows them to
request, was then not needed and would not be helpful. (Id.)
The parties essentially agree that the DPA provisions through the Examining Committee
process and its report to the Board appropriately and sequentially proceeded as statutorily
outlined. However, the Board's subsequent conduct and ultimate decision wholly deviated from
theDPA.
3.

After bringing Petitioner before it under the auspices of the DPA. the Board
proceeded to impose discipline on Petitioner in excess of its powers under the
DPA. without following DPA procedures, and in violation of the DPA.

As fully explained in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board ultimately abandoned DPA
purposes and procedures in order to impose discipline on Petitioner as if this case were brought
under the MPA. Again, the Board "accepted" the Examining Committee's recommendations at
its September 2012 board meeting, but it didn't then tell Petitioner. (Tr. p. 36, LL. 15 - 25).
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Instead, the Board had its counsel prepare another stipulation and encouraged the physician
licensee to sign it; and if he would not, the process, a staff employee testified, was that "we had
to proceed with this hearing." (Tr. p. 37, LL. 1 - 15, 21 - 23). As described, the Board handled
this DPA case recommendation like a disciplinary matter: because Petitioner did not sign a
stipulation, they took it to hearing. However, Petitioner only understood that he was being
requested to appear before the Board-selected Examining Committee to assess his present fitness
to safely practice as a mental health referral to a physician committee to review his mental
health.
Moreover, the Board wholly failed to recognize the statutory distinction between
disciplinary sanctions allowed under the MPA and licensing restrictions under the DPA, which

must be related to a licensee's inability as a result of one of three specific conditions to practice
with "reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of' the three specific categories of disease
or aging processes. Idaho Code§§ 54-1832, -1837. Indeed, the Board, in this clear DPA case,
imposed a restriction on Petitioner's license not allowed under the DPA. As indicated above, the
Board may "[ s]uspend or restrict the licence of the physician to practice medicine" only "for the
duration of his impairment." Idaho Code§ 54-1837(c)(2). In direct contravention of that
limitation, the Board's principal substantive action was to impose "sanctions to Petitioner's
license to practice medicine ... ," including that "Respondent shall permanently cease from
practicing obstetrics and chronic pain management." (Final Order, p. 3, bottom line.)
There is nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to impose "sanctions" for disability
or impairment. There is nothing in the DPA that empowers the Board to impose restrictions that
last "permanently," or for life, or for any duration beyond a licensee's "duration of impairment."
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There is also nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to impose restrictions for conditions
not causally related to those categories specified in the DPA. Moreover, there is nothing in the
language, the history, the concept, or the spirit of the DPA giving the Board authority in a DPA
case to impose restrictions for typical standard of care violations, practice deviations, or
disciplinary transgressions.
Finally, there is no authority granted or implied in the DPA for the Agency's imposition
of permanent restrictions on Petitioner's practice of "OB and chronic pain management," which
were not referred to the Examining Committee under the DPA referral standards, and were not
addressed by the Examining Committee as relevant to its review. Nor could such a restriction
have been easily addressed by the Board under DPA criteria and on which the Board did not
submit evidence at hearing. While the Board is not bound by the Examining Committee's report
(Idaho Code§ 54-1836(a)), the DPA provides the Board three options in determining its role in
the proceedings: accept, reject, or order further examination. Idaho Code§ 54-1836(b). In this
case, the Board chose to accept the Committee's uniquely qualified recommendations, which
focused solely on Petitioner's mental health. In subsequently ignoring those accepted findings,
completely deviating from that focus and subject matter, and imposing an entirely unrelated
restriction, the Board contravened DPA procedure and, as further explained below, acted without
substantial and competent supporting evidence.
In all, because the Board clearly instituted these proceedings under the DPA but then

failed to act within its statutory parameters, its decision should be set aside and the case
remanded for dismissal.
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The Board's decision was not based on substantial and competent evidence.
The lack of substantial and competent evidence supporting the Board's decision is fully

explained in Petitioner's opening brief. Most importantly, as indicated above, the Board's
referral to a DPA Examining Committee was plainly made under the "mental illness"
jurisdictional prong of the PDA, Idaho Code§ 54-1832(a). (See Tr. p. 32, LL. 22-24). Again,
this is one of only three statutory grounds for any "restriction, suspension, or revocation ... in
case of inability of the licensee to practice medicine with reasonable skill or safety. Idaho Code
§ 54-1832.
Accordingly, to constitute substantial and competent evidence sufficient to uphold a
restriction under the DPA, the evidence relied upon by the Board must at least be relevant to
Petitioner's alleged mental illness. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co.,132 Idaho 513, 515,975 P.2d
1178, 1180 (1999) ("[Substantial and competent evidence] is relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion.") (emphasis added). In this regard, the evidence
before the Board was grossly inadequate. As fully explained in Petitioner's opening brief and
above, the Examining Committee, whose findings were accepted by the Board, unanimously
found Petitioner to be "fit" for practice from a mental health/illness perspective and
recommended only that he continue his current care and be reevaluated in two years. (Hearing
Ex. 8; Final Order, p. 1).
Additional evidence presented at the hearing did nothing to contradict that finding,
leaving the Board with no relevant evidence to support any restriction related to its inquiry under
the DPA. In short, as fully explained in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board: (1) did not receive
chemical or evaluative data from the Jerome hospital; (2) did not make its DPA "mental health"
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referral based on any clinical background Petitioner may have submitted with his response; (3)
raised relevancy and peer review objections to Petitioner's proffered attempts to present clinical
records and physician testimony concerning the events the Board requested him to address in
writing; (4) made no DPA referral concerning Petitioner's obstetrical or chronic pain
management skills, nor tasked its Examining Committee examine skill-set competency issues as
to which the Board had previously entered into stipulations and orders under MPA-grounded
processes; (5) accepted its Examining Committee's recommendation of Petitioner's fitness to
practice; (6) presented no evidence of terms of post-examination tendered stipulations consistent
with the accepted recommendations; and (7) presented no evidence of Board process by which it
had the authority to reject the Examining Committee's recommendations, presumably adopt
alternative factual findings based on available evidence, or refer the DPA case back to its
Examining Committee with instructions and/or additional evidence to review and consider.
Accordingly, the Board's decision should also be set aside for lack of substantial and
competent evidence.

D.

The Board is not entitled to attorney fees and costs.
The Board makes a bold request for attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117, arguing

that this appeal was brough~ entirely without basis in fact and law. However, a court may only
award attorney fees on such basis ''when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was
pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Gamer v.

Povey, 151 Idaho 462,470,259 P.3d 608,616 (2011) (quoting C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho
763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
However, "when a party pursues an action which contains fairly
debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and
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without foundation." Id. A claim is not necessarily frivolous
simply because the district court concludes it fails as a matter of
law. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107
Idaho 890,894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct. App. 1984).
Furthermore, "[a] misperception of the law, or of one's interest
under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question
is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so
plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950
P.2d 262,265 (Ct. App. 1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Garner, 151 Idaho 462,468,259 P.3d at 614.

As fully argued in Petitioner's opening brief and above, Petitioner has a legally and
factually founded argument that the Board's conduct and decision were entirely improper under
the DPA. Even if the Court does not ultimately accept Petitioner's arguments, he at the very
least has raised "fairly debatable issues" regarding the Board's adherence to the DPA and the

evidence relied upon in issuing its decision, particularly with regard to the unlawful permanent
restrictions issued by the Board.
The Board's request for attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117 should accordingly be
denied.
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III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court set aside
the Board's imposition of sanctions against Petitioner under the DPA, and particularly the
sanction of a permanent license restriction set forth in item 5 of its Final Order. Moreover, the
Board should be instructed to dismiss the DPA proceedings because grounds for other alternative
findings were not found to exist.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

Jl~ay of September, 2014.
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,
Case No. CV-OC-2014-04321
Petitioner,
vs.
OPINION ON APPEAL
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF
MEDICINE,

Respondent.
ATIORNEY FOR THE PETITIONER: JOSEPH D. MCCOLLUM, JR.
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: JEAN R. URANGA
Robert Mena, M.D., seeks judicial review of a final order of the Idaho State Board
of Medicine imposing restrictions on his license to practice medicine.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts and procedural history are derived from the board's brief and
appear to be undisputed: On May 14, 2012, the Idaho State Board of Medicine instituted
proceedings involving Dr. Mena under the Disabled Physician Act. The Examining
Committee met with Dr. Mena on June 23, 2012, and issued a report June 29, 2012,
which was accepted by the Board at their December, 2012 Board meeting. Dr. Mena
was invited to personally appear at the March 1, 2013, Board meeting, which he and his
attorney attended. The Board voted to accept the Examining Committee report. Dr.
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Mena did not agree to follow the recommendations, and a hearing was scheduled for
July 10, 2013. Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued Recommended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Board issued its Final Order January 7, 2014.
The hearing officer's "recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law"
issued November 14, 2014, stated the following:
The Board presented oral testimony through one (1) witness and
presented thirteen (13) exhibits, all of which were admitted into evidence.
Dr. Mena presented the testimony of four (4) witnesses and also testified
on his own behalf. Dr. Mena offered eighteen (18) exhibits, which were
admitted, and several exhibits which were not admitted based upon Idaho
statutes pertaining to privilege.
At the close of the hearing, each party was granted leave to file written
closing arguments, the last of which was filed on October 21, 2013.
Upon review of the pleadings filed in this matter, the transcript of the
hearing, the exhibits, and the arguments of both counsel, the following
recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are entered.
Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 1-2.
The hearing officer entered the following findings of fact:
Dr. Mena is the holder of an Idaho license to practice medicine and
surgery, license number M-8898, issued by the Idaho State Board of
Medicine on September 13, 2003.
Dr. Mena practices medicine in Jerome, Idaho. In 2007, he had privileges
to practice at St. Benedict's Family Medical Center ('St. Benedict's') in
Jerome and was also credentialed by the American Board of Family
Medicine. Although the record is lacking because of the assertion of
privilege by the Board, it appears that Dr. Mena became involved in a
controversy of some kind with St. Benedict's in 2007. This apparently led
to an evaluation at the Betty Ford Center in Rancho Mirage, California, in
early 2007 and a neuropsychological evaluation performed by Dr. Craig
Beaver of Boise, Idaho, in August of 2007. By the time Dr. Mena was
evaluated by Dr. Beaver, he had undergone a comprehensive clinical
diagnostic evaluation by a psychologist, who noted a diagnosis of
obsessive-compulsive disorder, as well as a personality disorder, in arrest,
with negativistic and narcissistic traits. Further, Dr. Mena was noted to
have a history of sleep apnea and had been on a CPAP machine for six
(6) months by the time he was evaluated by Dr. Beaver. The Betty Ford
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Center found no evidence of chemical dependency, but the staff was
concerned about Dr. Mena's psychological status and recommended
further treatment and evaluation. Further, Dr. Mena had been seen by a
psychiatrist who concluded that Dr. Mena had an adjustment disorder,
possible ADHD,
possible
obsessive-compulsive
disorder and
neuropsychological abnormalities.
Dr. Mena had also attended the Bridge to Recovery program by the time
he was evaluated by Dr. Beaver. The program found evidence of
obsessive-compulsive disorder, ADHD and/or a personality disorder. They
recommended that Dr. Mena limit himself to a forty (40) hour work week
and continued involvement in a twelve step program.
In addition, Dr. Doris Gunderson evaluated Dr. Mena and found that he
showed symptoms of significant depression with an untreated mood
disorder. Dr. Beaver found little evidence of neurocognitive deficits, but did
find evidence of obsessive-compulsive disorder with elements of an
adjustment disorder, as well as narcissistic and self-defeating personality
traits, in addition to Dr. Mena's sleep apnea. Dr. Beaver noted that Dr.
Mena was on medication (Lexapro) and recommended continued
counseling to avoid burnout.
Subsequent to Dr. Beaver's evaluation, Dr. Mena attended the Physical
Assessment and Clinical Education Program ('PACE') at the University of
California - San Diego. The program staff found that Dr. Mena's approach
to obstetrics contained significant deficiencies and recommended that he
discontinue his involvement in obstetrics or, in the alternative, pursue an
intensive hands on training course as a means to update his knowledge
base.
Dr. Mena was further assessed by the Center for Personalized Education
for Physician ('CPEP'). The assessment found that Dr. Mena was deficient
in some areas of knowledge regarding obstetrics and family practice and
made a series of educational recommendations.
Although it is not explicit as to how the Idaho Board of Medicine became
aware of Dr. Mena's situation, it is clear that as of January 2009 the Board
had completed an investigation and offered a stipulation to Dr. Mena. The
more pertinent conditions of the stipulation required Dr. Mena to
permanently cease performing obstetrics, refrain from the practice of pain
management, work no more than forty (40) hours per week, continue
counseling and psychiatric treatment, follow the recommendations of his
treatment providers and be subject to random monitoring for compliance.
Dr. Mena accepted and signed the stipulation, upon advice from his
counsel on July 16, 2009.
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According to the evidence elicited at the hearing by Dr. Mena, it appears
that the stipulated settlement was beneficial to both Dr. Mena's emotional
wellbeing and to that of his family.
Shortly thereafter, the Board filed with the National Practitioner Databank
an adverse action report to the effect that Dr. Mena's license to practice
medicine was subject to 'limitation or restriction.'
Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it is apparent that the
adverse action report affected Dr. Mena's ability to be board certified by
the American Academy of Family Practice. This led to a notification to Dr.
Mena from St. Benedict's to the effect that he would not be able to return
to practice at St. Benedict's until he reestablished board certification.
On September 26, 2011, the Board, through its Chairman, Leo Harf, M.D.,
terminated the July 16, 2009, stipulation and order upon Dr. Mena's
request.
On September 26, 2011, Keith Davis, M.D., the Chief of Staff of St.
Benedict's authored a letter to the Idaho State Board of Medicine to the
effect that Dr. Mena had forfeited his privileges at St. Benedict's Family
Medical Center.
On October 11, 2011, Beverly Kendrick, on behalf of the Board, wrote to
Dr. Mena, inquiring about his loss of privileges and requesting a response.
Two days later, Nancy Kerr, on behalf of the Board, informed Dr. Mena in
writing that while the Board had agreed to terminate the 2009 stipulation,
the agreement to permanently cease practicing obstetrics was still in force
and effect.
Sometime thereafter, on an unstated date, but prior to the Board's
December 20, 2011, meeting, Darlene Parrott, who replaced Beverly
Kendrick as an investigator, received a thirteen (13) page response from
Dr. Mena in reply to the adverse action by St. Benedict's, which by then
had become St. Luke's Hospital in Jerome.
Ms. Parrott shared the response with the Board, which had concerns
about the disjointed and rambling nature of the document. Id., at 2-5.
The hearing officer concluded:
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Given the past history involving Dr. Mena, the Board's actions in requiring
an examination were both reasonable and prudent. The document in
response to the Board's inquiry is more than rambling and disjointed. The
document contains many obscure references, contains many grammatical
and syntax errors, and contains sentences which are nearly impenetrable
as to Dr. Mena's point. Moreover, the document appears to be a defense
of the doctor's conduct which led to the 2009 stipulation.
At the hearing, Dr. Mena seemingly conceded that the document would be
concerning to the Board. He explained that the document was a draft that
had been erroneously sent to the Board. This testimony was not
particularly compelling for two reasons. First, as Board counsel correctly
pointed out, Dr. Mena later sent a conclusion page which contains much
the same style of writing as the prior document. Second, no document has
been produced by Dr. Mena regarding the 'correct' response that should
have been sent.
In any event, given the nature of the two documents, the Board could
easily have entertained an honest and strong suspicion that Dr. Mena was
suffering from one of the three conditions listed as grounds for restriction
of a license in Idaho Code§ 54-1832.
Once that determination was made, Dr. Mena was ordered to undergo an
examination before three physicians, including two psychiatrists. This
order was in accordance with Idaho Code § 54-1834. The committee's
charge was to determine Dr. Mena's fitness to practice medicine with
reasonable skill and safety to patients, either on a restricted or
unrestricted basis, and report its recommendations to the Board.
The examination occurred on June 19, 2012. Among the information
disclosed by the committee were the facts that Dr. Mena was under
continuing psychiatric care with plans to continue in that care, and that he
had sent the first document to the Board without reading its contents. The
committee concluded that Dr. Mena could continue to practice medicine. It
recommended repeat neuropsychological testing by Dr. Craig Beaver,
continued psychiatric care and reevaluation in two years, with continuing
Board oversight.
The examining committee has fulfilled its duties in accordance with Idaho
Code § 54-1834. In so doing, the examining committee took into account
Dr. Mena's psychiatric care, including his prior examinations revealing
obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic personality traits.
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A voluntary agreement regarding the examining committee's findings was
offered to Dr. Mena who has rejected that proposed agreement and has
sought formal proceedings in accordance with Idaho Code § 54-1836. 1
Prior to this matter being noticed for hearing, Dr. Mena was evaluated by
Dr. Beaver. Interestingly, he describes his perception of the reason for the
repeat neurological examination as his low performance scores that he
had on a 'microCog' test he completed some time in the past. He
apparently did not relate his repeat neuropsychological examination to the
recommendations of the examining committee. Dr. Beaver found that Dr.
Mena had maintained on a low dose of an antidepressant, and that Dr.
Mena exhibited a level of defensiveness that was atypical of persons
submitting to psychological tests. Dr. Beaver noted that while Dr. Mena
was having no significant psychological difficulties, Dr. Mena was on a low
dose of Lexapro and that his probable obsessive-compulsive disorder was
in partial remission. Dr. Beaver also found that Dr. Mena had a continuing
narcissistic personality trait and moderate occupational stressors.
Dr. Beaver recommended that Dr. Mena follow medical recommendations
regarding his sleep apnea, that he continue on a low dose of Lexapro as
recommended by his psychiatrist and that if transferring to a new work
situation, he be required to be involved in individual psychotherapy on a
regular basis during the first six months. Finally, Dr. Beaver recommended
that Dr. Mena engage in individual counseling to ensure that some of his
personal dynamics do not again create difficulties for him.
At the hearing, Dr. Mena produced a letter date June 14, 2012, sent by his
psychiatrist, Dr. Albright, to two of the examining committee members.
This letter states, in pertinent part, that it was Dr. Albright's understanding
that the reason that Dr. Mena was appearing before the examining
committee was because he 'mistakenly sent 'rough draft' that was
accidentally printed in place of a 'proof read' completed letter. Yet, for

11.c. § 54-1836:
(a) The examining committee shall report to the board its findings on the examination of the
physician under section 54-1834, the determination of the committee as to the fitness of the
physician to engage in the practice of medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients, either
on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management that the committee may recommend.
Such recommendation by the committee shall be advisory only and shall not be binding
on the board. (b) The board may accept or reject the recommendation of the examining
committee to permit a physician to continue to practice with or without any restriction on his
license to practice medicine, or may refer the matter back to the examining committee for further
examination and report thereon. (c) In the absence of a voluntary agreement by a physician
under section 54-1835 for restriction of the licensure of such physician to practice medicine, any
physician shall be entitled to a hearing in formal proceedings before the board and a
determination on the evidence as to whether or not restriction, suspension, or revocation of
licensure shall be imposed. (Emphasis added).
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whatever reason, I believe it has been construed by IBOM staff as some
clue to Dr. Mena as being potentially disorganized and therefore unable to
practice medicine safely.' It is unclear whether Dr. Albright saw the letter,
but given his comments to Dr. Beaver, Dr. Albright does not appear to
have formally assessed or evaluated Dr. Mena as of the writing of the
June 14, 2012, letter. Dr. Albright also noted 'a large portion of his issues
have been related to adjustment anxiety over his once restricted family
practice board certification and diplomat status.' Dr. Albright further stated
that Dr. Mena had clinically improved 'now that his board certification
privilege has been reinstated.' Dr. Albright's letter is not compelling. It is
based on year old information and is based on a misunderstanding of the
facts regarding Dr. Mena's privileges.
At the conclusion of a hearing under the statutory scheme pertaining to
impaired physicians, the Board is tasked with making a 'determination of
the merits and, if grounds therefore are found to exist' the Board may
issue an order imposing one or more of the following:
1. Make a recommendation that the physician submit to the care,
counseling or treatments by physicians acceptable to the Board; or,
2. Suspend or restrict the license of the physician to practice
medicine for the duration of the impairment; or,
3. Revoke the license of the physician to practice medicine.
If no grounds exist, the Board shall enter its order so stating and dismiss
the proceedings. Dr. Mena argues that there was no reason for the Board
to seek an agreement and no reason for the Board to require a formal
hearing. In other words, Dr. Mena seems to argue that the examining
committee's findings, on their face, preclude a hearing in this matter.
There is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Dr. Mena's history
was reviewed by the examining committee. That committee noted that,
while Dr. Mena had benefited from treatment for depression and anxiety,
he stated he was under psychiatric care and planned to continue with that
care.2 Further, the committee reviewed findings regarding Dr. Mena's
2"The

Examination committee concluded that Dr. Robert Mena can continue his present practice of
medicine with reasonable skill and safety, with required management including:
Repeat Neuropsychological testing by Dr. Craig Beaver
Continued outpatient Psychiatric care
Reevaluation in two years, with continuing Board oversight
We do not feel that requiring a formal Psychiatric evaluation at this time would be helpful.
We are unable to make any recommendations concerning restrictions on his practice of Obstetrics.·
Exhibit 8, at 2 ("Report of Findings and Recommendations Examination Committee for the Board of
Medicine, State of Idaho June 29, 2012.").
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obsessive-compulsive
and
narcissistic
personality traits,
and
recommended repeated continuing psychiatric care and reevaluation with
continuing Board oversight. Under these conditions, the Board fulfilled its
duties in seeking a voluntary agreement and in lieu of that, setting a formal
proceeding.
Dr. Mena also argues that there is an absence of a causal psychiatric
diagnosis. In other words, Dr. Mena appears to argue that no evidence
was put before the examining committee that would lead it to conclude
that there is a newly diagnosed issue. There is nothing found in the
statutory scheme to suggest that there need to be a 'new' psychological
issue found before the Board can take action. On the contrary, the Board
must find a psychological or physical impairment. There is ample evidence
from the documents produced at hearing that Dr. Mena is currently
undergoing some level of psychological impairment, even if that
impairment is milder than it was in 2007. The most pertinent recent
information regarding Dr. Mena's impairment is the report of the examining
committee and Dr. Beaver's 2012 evaluation. Further, Dr. Mena told the
examining committee that he intended to continue his psychiatric care,
and that he was going to continue taking Lexapro. Therefore, the
examining committee and Dr. Beaver's recommendations were both
reasonable and prudent. Indeed, both recommendations amount to little
more than continuing medication as needed and continued counseling. 3

It appears from the hearing that the main reason Dr. Mena has resisted
the recommendations of the examining committee and Dr. Beaver is not
because he believes that they are unwarranted. Rather, he does not wish
to be mandated by the Board, which he deems a restriction on his license.
This appears to be his position because it would (at least in theory)
disqualify him from seeking certification again. While it may or not be true
that Dr. Mena will be prevented from seeking board certification, a hearing
under the Disabled Physician Act is not the forum to test the legality or
reasonableness of the credentialing agency or St. Benedict's actions. The
only question here is whether there is information to determine that
grounds exist to find some level of disability or impairment. Those grounds
do exist.
While the level of impairment may be debatable, it is clear and convincing
that some level of impairment exists. Therefore, the Board is in a proper
position, in its discretion, to issue an order imposing one or more of the
three (3) potential orders found in Idaho Code§ 54-1837(c). Id., at 5-10.
In its final order, the board noted "[a]fter consideration and upon COPD
(Committee on Professional Discipline] recommendation, the Board acted to adopt the
3Emphasis

added.
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Recommended Findings in toto after determining the principal issues in this contested
case hearing were appropriately adjudicated." Final Order, at 1.
The board "ordered the following sanctions" to Dr. Mena's license to practice
medicine:
Respondent shall continue ongoing treatment/medication and shall comply
with recommendations of his current and future treating psychiatrist and
psychologist. Respondent shall authorize them to issue regular quarterly
status reports regarding his continuing treatment and condition to the
Board. Such reports shall include, but are not limited to, Respondent's
commitment to ongoing psychiatric treatment/medication, compliance,
response to treatment, recommended care and treatment issues.
Respondent shall provide the Board with written proof of compliance with
this paragraph within fifteen (15) days of the date of the last signature
below ...
Respondent shall not change his current psychiatrist or psychologist
without approval of the Board. All requests for changes of his current
psychiatrist or psychologist must be in writing and approved, prior to any
change ...
Respondent shall authorize his current and future psychiatrist and
psychologist to immediately report to the Board any concerns with his
· ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety ...
Respondent shall continue in treatment for sleep apnea and shall comply
with the recommendations of his current and future treating physician with
respect to sleep apnea. Respondent shall authorize his current and future
treating physician to issue written quarterly status reports regarding his
continuing treatment and condition to the Board. Such reports shall
include, but are not limited to, Respondent's commitment to ongoing
treatment/medication, compliance, response to treatment, recommended
care and treatment issues. Respondent shall provide the Board with
written proof of compliance with this paragraph within fifteen (15) days of
the date of the last signature below ...
Respondent shall permanently cease from practicing obstetrics and
chronic pain management ...
Respondent shall undergo a complete reevaluation by Dr. Craig Beaver
two (2) years from the date of the last signature below. Respondent shall
authorize Dr. Beaver to issue a written report with-in one (1) month after ..
. the complete reevaluation to the Board ...
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Respondent shall provide all employers and the Chief of Staff at each
hospital where he ... applies for or obtain privileges, with a copy of this
Final Order. Respondent shall provide the Board with written proof of
compliance with this paragraph within fifteen (15) days of the date his
employment application for or obtaining of hospital privileges ...
Within six (6) months of the date of the last signature below, Respondent
shall facilitate and fully cooperate with a medical record review by Board
staff ...
Respondent shall execute the Release . . . authorizing any person or
entity having information relevant to Respondent's compliance with the
provisions of this Final Order to release such information to the Board ...
Respondent shall obey all federal, state and local laws, and all rules
governing the practice of medicine in Idaho ...
This Final Order shall be considered a public record as that term is used in
the Idaho Code. Final Order, at 3-4.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The procedures concerning judicial review of Idaho state agency determinations
are set forth in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act:
(1) Judicial review of agency action shall be governed by the provisions of
this chapter unless other provision of law is applicable to the particular
matter.
(2) A person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a
contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person
complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279,
Idaho Code.
(3) A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an
agency other than the industrial commission or the public utilities
commission is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person
complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279. I. C.
§ 67-5270.
An appellate court may not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-5279(1). The court
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must defer "to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Price v.

Payette County Board of County Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583,
586 (1998); Bennett v. State, 147 Idaho 141,142,206 P.3d 505, 506 (Ct. App. 2009).
"An agency's actions are afforded a strong presumption of validity." Maclay v.

Idaho Real Estate Commission, 154 Idaho 540, 544, 300 P.3d 616,620 (2012). Agency
action must be affirmed on appeal unless the court determines that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon
unlawful procedure; (d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 675279(3); Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. The party attacking the agency's
decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency erred in a manner specified
in section 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Price, 131 Idaho
at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506.
ANALYSIS

Near the outset of their case, this Court determined that the Petitioner's opening
brief failed to comply with I.AR. 35. It did not contain an issues section or clearly
delineate the issues asserted in the body of the briefing. See I.R.C.P. 84(p} and I.AR.
35(a)(4). See also Carle v. State, 2013 WL 5979202, *1 (Ct. App. 2013).
Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires that an appellant identify the specific
issues to be considered on appeal and present arguments with citations to
the record and transcript on which the arguments rely. I.AR. 35(a)(4), (6).
The failure of an appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues
required by I.AR. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of the issue on
appeal. This rule may be relaxed, however, where the issue is argued in
the briefing.") (citing State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 111, 952 P.2d 1245,
1247 (1998).
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The court afforded the Petitioner an opportunity to submit a conforming brief. The
Petitioner submitted an amended brief which contains a "statement of issues." However,
the issues specified in the issues statement of the amended brief are not supported by
corresponding argument and citation to authority in the body of the brief.
There is an attempt to rectify this in the reply brief but it is not appropriate to
present argument supported by citation to authority for the first time in a reply brief. See
Liponis, infra, 149 Idaho at 375, 234 P.3d at 699. "'We refused to consider the

arguments unsupported by authority, even when authority was later presented in the
reply brief." See also Indian Springs, LLC v. Andersen, 154 Idaho 708, 302 P.3d 333,
341 (2012) "'(T)his Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the
appellant's reply brief. 'A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the
issues presented because those are the arguments and authority to which the
respondent has an opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief."'
This Court will analyze the issues that are sufficiently defined in the briefing.
Dr. Mena asserts the following issues in this petition for judicial review: (1) the
agency exceeded its statutory authority, or acted in violation of statute, or used unlawful
procedure to use the Disabled Physician Act physician examination referral process
when its purpose was to impose permanent license restrictions which is outside the
purview of the DPA; (2) the agency erred in issuing a Final Order imposing license
restrictions on grounds beyond those permitted by the DPA and/or in excess of its
statutory authority; (3) the agency erred in extending and making permanent license
restrictions in an earlier MPA stipulation and order after Dr. Mena was referred to a
Physician Examining Committee for evaluation under the much narrower statutory
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provisions of the DPA; (4) the Final Order should be vacated and the case dismissed
because it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and (5)
the agency prejudiced Dr. Mena's rights and erred in initiating a DPA case based on
invited communication and prevented him from introducing evidence respecting his
health and mental/psychological condition by asserting Idaho's Peer Review statutes
and persuading the hearing officer to admit on rebuttal, over objection, the agency's
similarly historic evidence arising out of the same peer review process. Petitioner's
Amended Opening Brief on Judicial Review, at 3.
Substantial Evidence

Dr. Mena contends that the agency's Final Order should be vacated and the case
dismissed because it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
However, substantial evidence supports the board's requirements. The board
essentially required Dr. Mena to continue his "ongoing" psychiatric/psychological
treatment and medication and comply with the recommendations of his treating
psychiatrist and psychologist. He was also required to continue his sleep apnea
treatment. Finally, he was directed to permanently cease practicing obstetrics and
chronic pain management.
The hearing officer found that Dr. Mena had been diagnosed with various
psychological disorders including an adjustment disorder, ADHD, personality disorder,
untreated mood disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, narcissistic personality
disorder, and neuropsychological abnormalities. Dr. Beaver's most recent examination
of Dr. Mena specifically noted that he was continuing to benefit from his medication and
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he also noted the prior recommendation of continued psychological counseling and
"continued use of medication and CPAP." Exhibit 9, at 2.
The board's requirement that Dr. Mena continue with his ongoing medication and
treatment, as recommended by his treating psychiatrist and psychologist, is supported
by substantial evidence. There is evidence that Dr. Mena suffers from mental conditions
that adversely impact his ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill or patient
safety and which require ongoing psychiatric and/or psychiatric monitoring. Dr. Mena
himself argued before the board that he was accepting of continued recommended
treatment.
The board prohibited Dr. Mena from practicing obstetrics and chronic pain
management permanently. He contends that this was done without supporting
evidence. However, the court notes the evidence in the record concerning Dr. Mena's
deficiencies in practicing obstetrics and in chronic pain medication. See Exhibits 13 and
18 (PACE and CPEP Evaluations). 4

4 See,

e.g., Exhibit 12 (PACE Evaluation, at 3 ("He had areas of relative weakness on the use of opioids"
and scored "in the lowest 10%" in testing concerning knowledge of pharmacotherapeutics.); 7 - ("[S]ome
of Dr. Mena's management decisions put patients at risk for poor outcomes. The oral examination
administered by Dr. Gia revealed significant deficiencies in Dr. Mena's approach to obstetrics. Due to
these deficiencies, Dr. Mena should either discontinue his involvement in obstetrics or pursue an
intensive hands-on training course or fellowship program as a means to update his knowledge base .");
Exhibit 13 (CPEP Evaluation, at 22 Dr. Mena "[s]tated that he does not do chronic pain management ...
stated that he follows labs in his chronic pain patients ... However, there were no labs results in this
chart and no notes that labs were ordered."); 29 - ("During this Assessment, Dr. Mena demonstrated
medical knowledge that varied from adequate to poor. While overall he appeared to have a broad base of
knowledge, in some areas that knowledge was shallow or inaccurate. Additionally, in some areas it was
not current. His knowledge for obstetrical topics lacked adequate depth overall.").

OPINION ON APPEAL - 14

000180

Dr. Beaver, in his most recent examination of Dr. Mena, specifically noted that
Dr. Mena is prone to having more confidence in his abilities than he actually possesses,
and he also appeared concerned about Dr. Mena's psychological condition in the event
that he increased his job responsibilities, noting that he was doing better with reduced
work responsibilities. See Exhibit 9.
Substantial evidence supports the board's conclusion that Dr. Mena should be,
for reasons of patient safety, restricted from engaging in obstetrics and chronic pain
management. 5
The problem created by the order is that it seems to deviate from the structure of
Idaho Code § 54-1837(c)(3). Subsection (c)(3) allows revocation of the physician's
license to practice medicine. Subsection (c)(3) does not appear to contemplate a
continuing practice with restrictions on the license. The remedy short of revocation of
the license appears to fall under subsection (c)(2) which allows the board to "suspend or
restrict the license of the physician to practice medicine for the duration of his
impairment ... " _Acting under subsection (c)(2) the suspension or restriction continues
"for the duration of his impairment," rather than as a permanent suspension or
restriction as provided in the board's order. Such a suspension may in fact be
permanent if the impairment continues. On the other hand, a revocation of the license
may not be permanent, because a physician may seek reinstatement pursuant to I.C. §
54-1838. Nonetheless, the two subsections are not the same. In any event, it appears
that the board was applying section 54-1837(c)(2) which allows restrictions rather than
the full revocation of the license authorized by section 54-1837(c)(3). Operating under

5while Dr. Mena characterizes these restrictions as "permanent," pursuant to I.C. § 54-1838, he has "a
right," "at reasonable intervals," to petition for removal of these restrictions.
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(c)(2) the restrictions should be for the duration of the impairment, not designated as
permanent.
Evidence/Peer Review Records

Dr. Mena contends the agency prejudiced his rights and erred "in initiating a DPA
case based on [his] invited communication, then prevent[ed] him from introducing
evidence regarding his health and mental/psychological condition by successfully
asserting Idaho's Peer Review statutes .... " Petitioner's Amended Opening Brief on
Judicial Review, at 3. In the body of his brief, he asserts "the hearing below was
clouded by the board's pervasive assertion of Idaho's peer review statute." Id., at 24. 6
The petitioner bears the burden of showing error was committed. He has not
demonstrated that he was not permitted to introduce evidence that was relevant to the
proceeding or was otherwise permitted to be introduced pursuant to I.C. § 39-1392b. 7

6As previously noted, "[t)he Board presented oral testimony through one (1) witness and presented (13)
exhibits, all of which were admitted into evidence. Dr. Mena presented the testimony of four (4) witnesses
and also testified on his own behalf. Dr. Mena offered eighteen (18) exhibits, which were admitted, and
several exhibits which were not admitted based upon Idaho statutes pertaining to privilege."
Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 1.

7

RECORDS CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED. Except as provided in section 391392e, Idaho Code, all peer review records shall be confidential and privileged, and shall
not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted
as evidence, nor shall testimony relating thereto be admitted in evidence, or in any action
of any kind in any court or before any administrative body, agency or person for any
purpose whatsoever. No order of censure, suspension or revocation of licensure, or of a
certification in the case of emergency medical services personnel, or health care
organization privilege of any physician licensed to practice medicine in Idaho shall be
admissible in any civil proceeding seeking damages or other civil relief against the
physician, emergency medical services personnel, or health care organization which may
be a defendant in said cause. However, this section shall not prohibit or otherwise affect
the use of documents, materials or testimony in health care organization proceedings,
nor shall it prohibit or otherwise affect the dissemination, for medical purposes, of
information contained in such documents or materials or the conclusions and findings of
such health care organization. This section shall not affect the admissibility in evidence in
any action or proceeding of the patient care records of any patient.
OPINION ON APPEAL - 16

000182

In his August 22, 2013, memorandum Dr. Mena argued "Respondent's Exhibits
101, 102 and 103" should be admitted into evidence. Memorandum Review of Idaho's
Peer Review Statute, at 10. However, this section of the memorandum does not explain
or substantiate the relevance of these records. Dr. Mena also does not specify how he
was prejudiced by the exclusion of these materials.
Dr. Mena also cites the "rejected ... proffered testimony of Richard Lally, M.D."
Id., at 12. He cites this testimony in reference to the "2007 Fair Hearing," as he does

Respondent's Exhibits 101, 102, and 103. See, id., at 10. However, the relevance of this
information is unclear, particularly considering his agreement in 2009, by stipulation, to
permanently cease performing obstetrics, refrain from the practice of pain management,
work no more than forty (40) hours per week, continue counseling and psychiatric
treatment, follow the recommendations of his treatment providers and be subject to
random monitoring for compliance. Dr. Mena accepted and signed the stipulation, upon
advice from his counsel on July 16, 2009. Recommended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, at 3-4. It is unclear why Dr. Mena, who assented to the stipulation,
would want to revisit the issue of the propriety of his prior conduct with the board or how
this would have impacted the proceedings before the board given that the 2007 conduct
was not at issue. It was the subsequently occurring evaluations and actions that caused
the board concern.
As noted by the board, "[t]his action was not based upon anything occurring at
the hospital and consequently any evidence of cases occurring at the hospital were
irrelevant and immaterial." Respondent's Amended Brief, at 19. The board also correctly
notes that materials that Dr. Mena contends were improperly admitted (Petitioner's
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Amended Opening Brief on Judicial Review, at 25) were records introduced to refute his
testimony that no prior evaluation had found him unfit for duty as a physician. See
August 12, 2013 Hearing Transcript, at 169-73.
Dr. Mena has failed to demonstrate that the board erred and that a substantial
right was prejudiced by its failure to consider the materials cited by him as improperly
excluded or included. 8
Sanctions

A problem in this case is the board's use of the term "sanctions" in the order.
There are multiple meanings that can be attached to this word. In the context of this
case, it certainly does not mean approval. Examining traditional dictionary definitions,
e.g., the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, several of the
definitions begin with the word "penalty." That is, punishment for non-compliance with a
law or decree or moral standard. That is perplexing language in the context of a
disability case, particularly when the doctor has accepted many of the limitations. It
appears to brand the doctor as being morally worthy of punishment. The impression that
this is the case is the use of a permanent revocation, rather than a revocation so long
as the conditions leading to the limitations exist. There may be no difference in effect. A
doctor may move to have a permanent suspension vacated. A limitation so long as the

8Dr.

Mena references "the Idaho Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Section 37-2718(9) which allows the
Idaho Board of Pharmacy to issue without a hearing a restriction upon a physician registrant's controlled
substance registration consistent with that of a state licensing board for that registrant. Petitioner
represents that his controlled substance registration was restricted to not allow him to prescribe to OB
patients or chronic pain patients." Petitioner's Amended Opening Brief on Judicial Review, at 24.
However, Dr. Mena concedes this "is one matter not covered by the record of this case below" and,
again, this court does not consider issues asserted for the first time on appeal.
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disability exists may be permanent. Nonetheless, tying the language of sanctions to the
language of a permanent revocation gives the appearance that the doctor should be
punished. That is not the language of section 54-1837(c)(2) of the Doctors with
Disability Act. There is nothing in the hearing officer's findings that indicates the doctor's
practice should be limited as a punishment, though it should be limited as a protection
to the patient public and in the doctor's own interest.
The sum of this discussion is that the record in this case supports the limitations
upon the doctor's practice under I.C. § 54-1837(c)(2). The record does not justify those
limitations upon the doctor's practice as a punishment for his disabilities or for
contesting the proceedings.

Board's Request for Attorney Fees
The board has requested an award of attorney fees, pursuant to I.C. § 12-117.
I.C. § 12-117(1) provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
(emphasis added).
The board is the prevailing party so far as the determination that Dr. Mena's
license should be restricted and that he must continue to take rehabilitative steps.
However, there was a reasonable basis for this proceeding arising from the board's
mixing of statutory remedies and the board's use of the language of sanctions which in
this context moves the case from protection of the public and rehabilitative to
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punishment, which implies moral deficiency or intentional bad conduct. Attorney fees
are denied.
CONCLUSION

Dr. Mena has failed to demonstrate that the board's license restrictions and
requirements were in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; in excess of
statutory authority of the agency; made upon unlawful procedure; not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion; or that a substantial right has been prejudiced. He has demonstrated that the
restrictions and requirements should be pursuant to I.C. § 54-1837(c)(2) so long as the
impairments continue, not as permanent revocation of his license. Further, the
restrictions on Dr. Mena's license should be characterized in the language of section
54-1837(c)(2), not as "sanctions."
The restrictions and conditions imposed by the board are affirmed pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 54-1837(c)(2). The case is remanded for entry of an order consistent with
this opinion.
Neither party is awarded attorney fees.
Dated this _L!:::. day of February 2015.
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--------------TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT
RESPONDENT AND ITS COUNSEL OF RECORD, JEAN URANGA
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN:
1.

Petitioner/Appellant Robert Michael Mena, M.D. ("Mena"), appeals against

Respondent Idaho State Board of Medicine ("Board") to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
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Opinion on Appeal ("Opinion") entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court of Idaho, Senior
District Judge Gerald F. Schroeder, on February 12, 2015.
2.

Mena has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Opinion is

appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(2).
3.

The issues on appeal include but, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(f), are not

limited to whether the District Court erred in its Opinion on Appeal by failing to find that, in
issuing its Final Order on January 7, 2014 in Case No. 2007-BOM-5888 before the Idaho Board
of Medicine ("IBOM"), the IBOM:
a.

Violated substantial rights of Petitioner to his legal detriment and
prejudice;

b.

Acted in violation and in excess of its statutory authority under the
Disabled Physicians Act ("DPA") (Idaho Code§§ 54-1831 et seq.);

c.

Based its decision upon unlawful procedure;

d.

Failed to support its decision with substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; and

e.
4.

Acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and abused its discretion.

Mena requests preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript in

electronic format:
a.
5.

Hearing re Oral Argument on Appeal on 11/6/2014.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record, in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
a.

The Agency Record on Appeal filed 4/19/2014;
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6.

b.

Petition for Judicial Review filed 3/4/2014;

c.

Statement of Issues for Judicial Review filed 3/18/2014;

d.

Notice Of Filing Record On Appeal filed 4/28/2014;

e.

Certification filed 4/28/2014;

f.

Petitioner's Opening Brief on Judicial Review filed 5/19/2014;

g.

Respondent's Brief filed 6/30/2014;

h.

Order for Rebriefing filed 07/17/2014;

1.

Petitioners Amended Opening Brief on Judicial Review filed 7/25/2014;

J.

Respondent's Amended Brief filed 8/20/2014;

k.

Petitioner's Reply Brief on Judicial Review filed 9/11/2014;

1.

Opinion on Appeal filed 2/12/2015.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set
out below:
Tiffany Fisher
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702

b.

That the clerk of the district court will be paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript after notice to Mena of the amount of the
estimated fee;
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record will be paid

after notice to Mena of the amount of the estimated fee;
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d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS j)~Y of March, 2015.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,
Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
JOSEPH .D. MCCOLLUM, JR.

JEAN URANGA

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
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JUN 11 2015
Date of Service: - - - - - - - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

.

ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D.,
Supreme Court Case No. 43125
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
25th day of March, 2015.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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